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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
This dissertation is composed of two essays on horizontal divestitures and product market
relationships. The first essay of my dissertation explores horizontal asset sale activity from 1988-2005, at
the firm level, utilizing a database of customer, supplier, and rival firms in order to investigate the wealth
effects of horizontal divestitures on divesting firms, industry rivals, corporate customers, and suppliers.
Subsequently, I investigate the impact of horizontal asset sales on changes in operating performance
around the divestitures for divesting firms, corporate customers, and suppliers.
The second essay of my dissertation investigates this topic by exploring quarterly horizontal
divestiture activity at the industry level by aggregating firm level divestitures by industry using a sample
of horizontal divestitures from 1979-2010. I explore whether customer (supplier) industry level horizontal
divestiture activity has implications for the profitability and value of supplier (customer) industries.
Additionally, I consider whether customer (supplier) industry level divestiture activity influences real
producers’ prices (input costs) charged (faced) by upstream (downstream) firms. Finally, I determine
whether industry dependence and barriers to entry play a vital role in changes in supplier (customer)
industry cash-flow margins and real producers’ prices (input costs) around horizontal divestiture events.
What exactly are horizontal divestitures? Horizontal divestitures represent asset sales, spinoffs, or
equity carve-outs of a subsidiary, division, business line, or asset that operates within the same industry or
same stage of the production process (along the supply chain) as the firm’s primary line of business. In
other words, horizontal divestitures signify a reduction or contraction in divesting firm size in its primary
line of operating activities.
Prior research focuses on corporate events that increase relative firm size and its impact along the
supply chain. These studies investigate events in which the firm increases in size at the same stage of the
production process (i.e. horizontal takeovers or acquisitions), successive stages of the production process
(i.e. vertical mergers and takeovers), or unrelated stages of the production process with intersecting
sources of supply (i.e. conglomerate mergers). This line of research has explored, both, firm level and
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aggregate industry level horizontal expansion activity on the product market. Another line of related
research investigates the impact of, firm level, vertical divestitures—an event in which the firm decreases
its relative size via successive stages of the production process—along the supply chain by exploring
equity carve-outs and spinoffs. Consequently, the literature fails address the motivations behind
horizontal contractions or divestitures and the implications on the divesting firms, rival firms, customer
(downstream) firms, and supplier (upstream) firms. This dissertation attempts to fill this gap in the
literature.
The first essay entitled “What are the motives and consequences behind horizontal asset sales?
Evidence from customer, supplier, and rival firms.” explores the firm level motivations of horizontal asset
sales and the implications for divesting firms, rivals, corporate customers, and suppliers. Using a sample
of horizontal asset sales, I compare the wealth effects and operating performance of divesting firms, rival
firms, customer firms, and supplier firms, to determine the relative significance of industry demand
shocks, financial constraints, diseconomies of scale / efficiency, or financial distress related motivations
behind horizontal asset sales. Using this approach, this is the first study, to my knowledge, to document
the product market effects of horizontal divestitures, rather than considering these effects in isolation.
Prior research suggests that environmental factors such as the level of product market
concentration and changes in concentration affect firm financial and operating performance. This essay
considers how the level and the extent of changes in industry concentration enhance or lessen the wealth
effects at the announcement of horizontal asset sales. I also consider how these environmental factors may
affect changes in operating performance around horizontal asset sales. Specifically, I consider how the
probability of reduced selling power, reduced buyer power, reduced purchasing efficiencies, or enhanced
product market competition may influence the anticipated gains and losses associated with the primary
motivations of horizontal asset sales.
The second essay entitled “Is your loss my gain? Horizontal divestitures and product market
relationships.” explores industry level horizontal divestiture activity and the industry-wide repercussions
for customer (downstream) firms, suppliers (upstream) firms, and rival (side-stream) firms. Using a
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sample of 46 downstream (35 upstream) industry-level horizontal divestiture events, I conduct a crossindustry analysis of the product market effect of industry horizontal divestiture activity on supplier
industries, leading to 274 (35) industry-supplier (industry-customer) pairs from 1979-2010. I empirically
test whether downstream industry level horizontal divestiture activity diminishes buying power of
customer (downstream) industries relative to supplier (upstream) industries, enhances the relative
bargaining position of repositioning customer (downstream) industries, or produces offsetting input price
increases and decreases by price discriminating suppliers. Additionally, I test whether upstream industry
level divestiture activity diminishes selling power of supplier (downstream) industries and prompts
customers to exploit suppliers to negotiate lower input costs, leading to increased profitability.
Specifically, I test whether supplier opportunism, customer opportunism, or rival opportunism plays a
role in potential changes in supplier (upstream) industry cash-flow margins, value, and real producers’
prices following industry-level divestiture activity. In addition, I investigate whether customer
opportunism plays a substantial role in the changes of customer (downstream) industry cash-flow
margins, value, and input costs subsequent to upstream divestiture activity.
Prior research documents that customer (downstream) industry-level horizontal acquisition (or
merger) activity produces buying power relative to supplier (upstream) industries due to downstream
consolidation (increased market/bargaining power). The enhanced buying power for downstream
industries adversely impacts the performance of economically dependent supplier industries, leading to
substantial declines in supplier profitability and supplier prices subsequent to downstream consolidation.
This evidence suggests that customer (downstream) deconsolidation (horizontal divestiture activity) may
adversely impact the buying power of downstream firms relative to upstream firms. Therefore,
downstream horizontal divestiture activity suggests that economic (industry dependence) may enhance
the economic performance and pricing power of upstream firms favorably.
1.2. Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. The first essay is presented in Chapter 2 and comprises
an introduction, hypothesis development and literature review, a discussion of data sources, sample
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formation, empirical methodology, results, and conclusions. The second essay is presented in Chapter 3
and comprises an introduction, discussion of empirical existing literature, motivation and development of
testable hypotheses, sample construction, empirical methodology, results, and conclusions. Chapter 4
discusses overall conclusions. Tables are contained within appendices at the end of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2: WHAT ARE THE MOTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES BEHIND HORIZONTAL
ASSET SALES? EVIDENCE FROM CUSTOMER, SUPPLIER, AND RIVAL FIRMS.
2.1. Introduction
What are the motivations behind horizontal assets sales? One line of research contends that asset
sales are driven by efficiency considerations (Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001;
Warusawitharan, 2008; Yang, 2008) that may be an efficient firm response to changes in optimal firm
size, a reallocation to higher valued uses, or changing economic conditions. Other lines of research
suggest that asset sales are determined by financing considerations (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995,
Gadad and Thomas, 2005) or financial distress (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Brown, James, and
Mooradian, 1994). A fourth line of thought proposes that asset sales are driven by gains related to
corporate focus considerations (John and Ofek, 1995). With the exception of Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro
(1995), very little research considers the role that economic linkages play in these transactions by
considering the impact on industry rivals, corporate customers, and corporate suppliers.
Prior research indicates that managers go to great lengths to expand the horizontal boundaries of
the firm by undertaking horizontal acquisitions or takeovers to achieve gains related to efficiency,
bargaining/buying power, or the ability to engage in collusive behavior (Stigler, 1963, Eckbo, 1983, Fee
and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005; Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011; Bernile and Lyandres, 2010). Fee and
Thomas (2004) and Sharur (2005) document evidence that some of the gains from horizontal mergers can
be attributed to the buying power motive (Galbraith, 1952), which conjectures that countervailing power
enables merging firms to pressure suppliers into price concessions (Snyder, 1996, 1998; Stole and
Zwiebel, 1996). Also, Shahrur (2005) finds evidence to suggest that some horizontal takeovers are
motivated by efficiency considerations and have positive spillover effects on corporate customers,
suppliers, and rivals in a subsample of bidders and targets that have a positive combined wealth effect. If
horizontal expansions have important wealth implications for economically linked firms such as corporate
customers, suppliers and rivals, then it raises the question of whether or not horizontal contractions (asset
sales in this case) have implications for industry rivals, corporate customers, and suppliers, as well.
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This study investigates the motivations and consequences of horizontal divestitures using a
dataset of 81 horizontal divestitures. 1 Multivariate analysis of divesting firm abnormal returns indicate the
wealth effects of horizontal asset sales are driven primarily by reducing pre-divestiture financing frictions
and scale diseconomies within the firm. I also find mixed evidence regarding divesting firm
underperformance subsequent to divestiture, providing some support that some firms in financial distress
engage in horizontal asset sales. This study documents that increased product market competition,
resulting from substantial horizontal divestiture activity, enhances managerial performance and increase
firm efficiency. However, I also note that horizontal asset sales reduce divesting firm bargaining power.
Consequently, suppliers appear to take advantage of this notion by raising input costs, which lessens the
magnitude of the gains associated with horizontal asset sales. I report that some of the gains from
horizontal asset sales are more pronounced in concentrated industries and industries that experience a
large change in industry concentration, leading to lower overhead costs, labor intensity, and wage related
expenses. However, the gains from horizontal divestitures are less pronounced due to a decrease in
purchasing efficiencies resulting from higher input costs in industries that have a large decrease in
industry concentration.
I present evidence that corporate customers of upstream (supplier) divesting firms experience
more negative than positive stock price reactions and a significant increase in input costs subsequent to
upstream divestitures in more concentrated industries, suggesting that divesting suppliers face increasing
competitive pressures to maintain cash-flow performance and increase input costs for their customers.
The customer wealth effects are more pronounced in response to upstream divestitures that compose a
large proportion of the industry. For deals in concentrated industries, the post-divestiture median industryadjusted costs of goods sold-to-sales ratio increases temporarily, while it decreases temporarily for deals
in less concentrated industries. Non-reliant individual customers and customer portfolios experience
significantly more negative than positive abnormal returns relative to reliant customers. Univariate
evidence from customer reliant and non-reliant subsamples indicate that horizontal asset sales are less
1

Asset sales, sell-offs, and divestitures are used interchangeably, hereafter.
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beneficial for non-essential customers than those customers with greater relationship specific investments,
providing evidence that divesting firms appear to pass along higher input costs from reduced bargaining
power with suppliers along to customers that are less important to their business.
I report that suppliers of downstream divesting firms experience significant short-lived increases
in cash-flow performance in the immediate year subsequent to the divestiture of downstream firms. These
effects are more pronounced for deals in less concentrated industries and for divestiture deals that do not
substantially change the competitive landscape. This evidence indicates that suppliers are better
positioned to take advantage of the reduced size of divesting downstream firms, in more competitive
industries, by instituting higher input prices post-divestiture: providing evidence in support of the
purchasing inefficiencies hypothesis.
I follow Fee and Thomas (2004) and examine the supplier termination retention decision to
examine whether divesting firms look to increase efficiency subsequent to the divestiture or face
substantial product market pressures that increase managerial efficiency by terminating inefficient
suppliers. I document that higher divesting firm abnormal returns are positively related to the supplier
termination decision, suggesting divesting firms enhance value by terminating inefficient suppliers. I
document that deals that result in large increases in industry competition in divesting industry increase the
probability of terminating the supplier subsequent to the deal. Divesting firms seem to be more likely to
end long-term supplier relationships and those terminate suppliers with higher switching costs, indicating
that divesting firms increase efficiency and value by breaching implicit contracts with suppliers.
To shed further light on the gains and losses related to suppliers, this study explores several
supplier subsamples. I present evidence that downstream horizontal asset sales are detrimental to
suppliers with high switching costs but are beneficial to the cash flows of supplier portfolios with lower
switching costs. Suppliers who report a single large customer in their financial statements experience
significantly negative stock price reactions at announcement and negative cash-flow performance
subsequent to the divestiture. To examine this issue further, I follow Fee and Thomas (2004) and find that
suppliers terminated subsequent to the divestiture event experience significant negative wealth effects and
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negative cash-flow performance in the years subsequent to the divestiture of downstream firms. In
contrast, suppliers retained subsequent to the divestiture event experience significant positive changes in
median industry-adjusted cash-flows. This evidence suggests that divesting firms use horizontal asset
sales as opportunity to enhance the efficiency of their product market relationships with suppliers,
terminate contracts with less efficient suppliers and reduce order sizes from suppliers with high switching
costs. Concentrated suppliers appear to benefit from downstream divestitures, while non-concentrated
suppliers appear to be disadvantaged by divestitures. Overall, I find that the overall impact of downstream
horizontal asset sales on suppliers depends on supplier concentration, supplier switching costs, and the
ability of suppliers to preserve its product market relationship with divesting firms.
This study makes several contributions to the corporate finance literature. First, the extant
literature on corporate restructuring tends to concentrate primarily on corporate events that increase
relative firm size, which may change the dynamics between customer firms and suppliers (Fee and
Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005; Bhattacharyya and Nain; Shenoy, 2012; and Greene, Kini, and Shenoy,
2013. The exception to this statement is Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011), who investigate the product
market implications of vertical divestitures. These studies typically investigate events in which the firm
increases in size at the same stage of the production process (i.e. horizontal mergers, acquisitions, tender
offers and takeovers), successive stages of the production process (i.e. vertical mergers and takeovers), or
unrelated stages of the production process with intersecting sources of supply (i.e. conglomerate
mergers). In contrast, Jain, Kini, and, Shenoy (2011) investigate customer supplier relationships using
vertical divestitures (equity carveouts and spinoffs)—an event in which the firm decreases its relative size
via successive stages of the production process. While the motives and consequences of horizontal
expansions have been well established, a scarcity of empirical evidence on horizontal contractions exists.
Therefore, I endeavor to fill a void in this stream of literature by investigating a corporate event that
decreases relative firm size at the same stage of the production process, horizontal asset sales. Horizontal
divestitures represent an important area to study because, unlike a vertical or non-horizontal divestiture, it
does not increase firm focus (in certain situations, a horizontal divestiture may decrease firm focus in a
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diversified firm) and may have unintended consequences for the divesting in the product market such as
reduced bargaining power or ability to collude.
This study extends the line of research that examines the impact of corporate events on product
market relationships. This is the first paper, to my knowledge, that explores the impact of asset sales on
customer-supplier relationships. While the extant literature examines the impact of horizontal expansions
(Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005; Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011), vertical expansions (Shenoy,
2012) and contractions (Jain, Kini, and, Shenoy, 2011), and firm contractions (Slovin, Sushka, and
Ferraro, 1995) on product market relationships, this study addresses the gap in the literature by examining
the impact of horizontal contractions on product market relationships. Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995)
study the intra-industry valuation effects of divestitures (equity carve-outs, spinoffs, and asset sales) on
corporate rivals, in comparison, this study includes the impact of asset sales on suppliers and customers.
Fee and Thomas (2004), Shahrur (2005), and Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) explore the impact
of horizontal mergers on product market relationships. Additionally, prior research examines the effect of
vertical restructuring on product market relationships such as takeovers (Shenoy, 2012) and carveouts
and spin-offs (Jain, Kini, and Shenoy, 2011), while this study focuses on horizontal asset sales product
market relationships with respect to divestitures. The primary difference between this study and that of
John and Ofek (1995) is that this study extends the analysis of sell-offs to include the valuation effects on
corporate customers, suppliers, and rivals, whereas, John and Ofek (1995) do not. John and Ofek
concentrate on focus increasing asset sales, whereas my primary event is horizontal asset sales (events
that may potentially decrease firm focus in the case of a diversified or multiple segment firm). In contrast
John and Ofek’s (1995) study, this study also examines the wealth effects of horizontal divestitures and
also entails substantially larger sample of asset sales (my sample is more than 1.7 times the size of John
and Ofek’s sample). To my understanding, there exists no prior studies that investigate the impact of
horizontal asset sell-offs on corporate customers and suppliers.
Second, this study adds to the nexus of the industrial organization and corporate finance literature
that explores how changes in market structure influence firm value. Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur
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(2005) document evidence of purchasing efficiencies arising from increased countervailing power from
horizontal mergers. In contrast, I report evidence consistent the notion that horizontal asset sales result in
the divesting firm’s decreased ability to counteract the market power of powerful suppliers as a
consequence of reduced firm size. Additionally, I present evidence consistent with the idea that some
divesting firms become exposed to increased competitive pressures resulting from divestiture deals in
concentrated industries and those deals that compose a large percent of the industry. These divestiture
deals reduce the probability of managers being able to live the “quiet-life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2003; Giroud and Mueller, 2001) subsequent to the divestiture event and improve cost efficiency for the
divesting firm.
Third, I document the roles that customer (supplier) switching costs and market structure play in
customer (supplier) wealth effects at announcement of upstream (downstream) asset sales. I provide
evidence that high supplier switching costs have negative wealth implications for suppliers at
announcement of downstream horizontal divestitures. This evidence complements that of Fee and
Thomas (2004) who document high supplier switching costs negatively impact the wealth of suppliers at
announcement of downstream horizontal mergers. In addition, I report that customers with low switching
costs (less reliant) or low relationship-specific investments experience negative wealth effects at
announcement of upstream horizontal divestitures. I also report that customers (individual suppliers) with
less market power (those in less concentrated industries) demonstrate a significant negative reaction at
announcement to upstream (downstream) horizontal divestitures, whereas, Fee and Thomas (2004) report
that concentrated suppliers respond negatively at announcement to horizontal mergers due to reduced
bargaining power.
Finally, this study also contributes to the literature on the source of gains of asset sales. Prior
literature suggests that gains related to asset sales come from financing consideration (Lang, Poulsen, and
Stulz, 1995), corporate focus considerations (John and Ofek, 1995), and efficiency considerations (Hite,
Owers, and Rogers, 1987; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001, 2002). Using multivariate regression analysis,
I that pre-divestiture labor intensity, overhead costs, and financing constraints are positively related to
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divesting firm abnormal returns suggesting that a reduction firm bureaucracy and financing frictions are
the primary source of gains for horizontal asset sales. In addition, I note that managers use horizontal
divestitures as an opportunity to increase the efficiency of the firm’s contracts with corporate suppliers
and customers, similar to the way in which horizontal mergers are used as an opportunity to terminate the
merging firm’s relationship with inefficient suppliers (Fee and Thomas, 2004). In particular, some of the
gains from asset sales are achieved through the reduction of the firms’ labor intensity, overhead costs, and
wage related expenses in concentrated industries that may be suffering from corporate bureaucracy,
suggesting that the gains come from the disposition of human capital rather than physical capital.
The remainder of this chapter continues as follows. Section 2.2 develops the hypotheses that are
empirically tested and discusses the relevant literature. Section 2.3 discusses the data sources, sample
formation requirements, and empirical methodology. Section 2.4 presents the results. Section 2.5 provides
a summary of the findings and concluding remarks.
2.2. Hypothesis development and related literature
This section of the paper develops the hypotheses for the entire sample of divestitures. In
particular, I motivate the industry demand hypothesis, financing hypothesis, diseconomies of scale /
efficiency hypothesis, and financial distress hypothesis.
2.2.1.

Industry demand considerations
Prior research indicates that asset sales are events that transfer assets to higher valued uses due to

differential productivity among industry firms (Maksimovic and Phillips 2001, 2002). More specifically,
firms divest less productive assets, divisions, or subsidiaries to more proficient firms in the industry,
resulting from an industry demand shock. Consequently, I posit that industry demand shocks generate a
positive reaction from the divesting firm. Industry competitors may respond positive or negatively in
response to the event. For instance, less efficient rivals may react negatively in response to a more
efficient firm post-divestiture or positively in response to information of positive demand shocks for their
less productive divisions. Corporate customers are likely to respond positively in response to a more
efficient divesting firm and a higher valued subsidiary or division in the hands of a more capable
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producer. I conjecture that corporate suppliers may react positively or not at all in response to an industry
demand shock. Suppliers may face a more valuable and productive customer post-divestiture due to a
more efficient parent and subsidiary. Alternatively, suppliers may face a more efficient customer that is
able to increase its value without increasing its demand for inputs.
It is well established that prior studies use Tobin’s Q a proxy for firm growth
prospects/managerial productivity, therefore, I employ the variable Tobins_Q in the year prior to the
divestiture as a proxy for the demand conditions for firm assets. I define Tobins_Q as the ratio of the
firm’s market value of assets to the book value of firm assets: price at fiscal year-end close (Compustat
item 199) * common shares outstanding (Compustat item 25) plus total assets (Compustat item 6) less
book value of common equity (Compustat item 60) scaled by total assets (Compustat item 6).
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) surmise that there is a greater likelihood that less productive firms will
sell segments to more productive producers. Thus, if managerial productivity is low for the divesting
firm, then there will be a greater demand for the firm division sold.
2.2.2.

Financing considerations
The financing hypothesis contends that assets sales deliver funds when different sources of

funding are too costly due to agency costs of debt or information asymmetries that make equity sales
unappealing (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995). Several studies argue that financing considerations are
important in divestiture decisions (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; Colak and Whited, 2007; Jain, Kini,
and Shenoy, 2011). Lang Poulsen and Stulz (1995) find that firms selling assets 1) are likely poor
performers, 2) have considerable leverage likely driven by its financial condition rather than another firm
having comparative advantage in operating assets, and 3) respond positively to asset sales planning to use
proceeds to pay down debt.
Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) document that industry financing conditions influence the choice to
vertically divest rather than internal financing constraints. Given that the divesting firm and the asset,
subsidiary or division are in the same industry, industry financing conditions can be ruled out since both
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are equally affected. However, internal financing constraints of the parent firm could still explain
horizontal divestitures.
Therefore, I postulate that financing constraints in the fiscal year prior to the divestiture produce a
positive reaction from divesting firms. Industry rivals may face a more competitive firm that can take
advantage of investment opportunities eliciting a negative reaction. However, industry competitors with
similar or worse financing constraints will receive information on how to resolve financial constraints of
their own, resulting in a positive contagion effect and, therefore, a positive stock price reaction.
Eliminating financing constraints suggests that divesting firms can take advantage of investment
opportunities leading to increased demand for inputs. Therefore, suppliers may react positively to the
reduction of financial constraints. Customers, similarly, may respond positively to divesting firms who
overcome financial constraints due to higher quality products or new offerings. I follow Jain, Kini, and
Shenoy (2011) and proxy financing constraints with the variable NEED_FOR_FUNDS as the difference
between capital expenditures (Compustat item 128) and the sum of operating income before depreciation
(Compustat item 13) and change in net working capital (Compustat item 4 less Compustat item 5) in the
year prior to the divestiture announcement.
2.2.3.

Diseconomies of scale/Efficiency
Several papers suggest that managerial and coordination costs linked to diseconomies of scale

influence firm size. Coase (1937) conjectures that firm size varies over time in response to: changes in
marketing costs and diminishing returns to management. Rosen (1982) posits that firm management is
subject to scale economies, but there exists diminishing returns to management because managers lose the
ability to govern as firm size increases. Rosen indicates that there is a compromise between scale
economies and the ability to manage effectively. Warusawitharana (2008) develops a model of asset
purchases and sales and postulates that firm profitability and size play a role in a firm’s decision to
engage in asset sales. Warusawitharana posits that a decrease in profitability leads to a decrease in
optimal, proposing that the least profitable firms downsize via asset sales. Mulherin and Boone (2000)
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examine acquisitions and divestitures in the 1990s and document that firms reduce size (downsize) by
efficiently reacting to economic changes by engaging in divestitures.
Consequently, I conjecture that the elimination of firm scale diseconomies is positively related to
the gains from abnormal returns and operating performance resulting from new efficiencies. However,
Industry rivals may react negatively or positively to news of horizontal divestitures depending on
contagion or competitive effects. For instance, industry rivals with greater scale diseconomies may
respond negatively (positively) in response to facing a more efficient rival (to information on how to
eliminate scale diseconomies of its own). Yet, the effect of divestitures on corporate suppliers is not as
clear. Corporate suppliers may respond negatively or not all to the elimination of scale diseconomies
(downsizing) due to lower input demand bringing about fewer orders. Customers may react negatively or
not at all to scale diseconomies. For example, the divesting firm may use the divestiture as an opportunity
to renegotiate contracts with their customers to become even more efficient. Alternatively, customers may
respond positively to improved coordination from decreased divesting firm size. Therefore, the net effect
on customers is ambiguous.
I explore two specific proxies related to scale diseconomies: input costs and labor intensity to
pinpoint the potential gains associated with horizontal divestitures. Fee and Thomas (2004) proxy input
costs with the ratio of cost of goods sold-to-sales for input related scale economies and labor related
factors with the employee to sales and selling, general, and administrative expense-to-sales ratios. Several
measures of firm size include value added, employees, revenues, or assets (Canback, Samouel, and Price,
2006). Canback, Samouel, and Price surmise that the number of employees is a good proxy for firm size
and diseconomies of scale should be linked to human frailty. As such, they identify bureaucratic failure as
a cause of increased coordination costs. Therefore, I use the employee to sales ratio, selling, general, and
administrative expense (also linked employee and salary related cost), and the number of parent firm
employees as to proxy for the coordination costs associated with diseconomies of scale.
To determine whether divesting firms extend their efforts to increase efficiencies from not only
inside the firm but also outside of the firm, I examine the divesting firm’s contracting relationships
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between customers and suppliers. To explicitly test these contracting relationships, I consider both
supplier and customer switching costs. With respect to suppliers, I hypothesize that divesting firms will
opportunistically seek to improve contracting efficiencies with suppliers with high switching costs.
Hence, I predict that suppliers with high switching costs will react negatively to horizontal asset sales.
With respect to corporate customers, the outcome is not so straightforward. On the one hand, divesting
firms may see the divestiture as an opportunity to adjust prices upward on customers with high switching
costs, and customers may react negatively. On the other hand, divesting firms may want to appease and
assure customers essential to their business (those with high switching costs) that quality and service
subsequent to the divesture will not decline but choose to exploit customers less essential to their survival
(those with low switching costs). Therefore, customers with high switching costs may react positively or
negative to horizontal asset sales. In the end, this is an empirical matter. I proxy supplier low and high
switching costs using suppliers with suppliers a single large customer and more than one large customers.
Suppliers with multiple large customers is defined as suppliers that disclose more than one large public
customer in the Compustat Customer Segment Database. Suppliers with a single large customer is
defined as suppliers that disclose only one large public customer in the Compustat Customer Segment
Database. I proxy customer switching costs using a measure a measure of customer reliance in the spirit
of Johnson, Kang, Masulis, and Yi (2011). Reliant classifies customers that have a ratio of customer sales
(to the divesting firm) divided by the market value of the customer firm two days prior to the event that is
greater than 2.5%. Non-reliant classifies customers that have a ratio of customer sales (to the divesting
firm) divided by the market value of the customer firm two days prior to the event that is less than or
equal to 2.5%.
2.2.4.

Financial distress considerations
Other researchers postulate that asset sales are motivated by financial distress or financial

constraint considerations. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) posit that asset sales by financially distressed firms
may be sold at a discount relative to financially healthy firms. Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994)
empirically investigate asset sales conducted by financially distressed firms and document significantly
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lower returns to shareholders when asset sales proceeds are used to repay debt compared to when the
proceeds are retained by the firm. The financial distress hypothesis postulates that distressed firms will
likely sell assets at a significant discount relative to healthy firms. Thus, I anticipate divesting firms to
react negatively to financial distress. Industry rivals may react positively or negatively at announcement.
For instance, rivals may face a more financially healthy rival and elicit a negative competitive effect.
Alternatively, rivals in financial distress may elicit a contagion, indicating information on how other
distressed firms can sell assets to resolve issues of financial distress. Corporate customers and suppliers
may react negatively in reaction to the asset sale as a result of the firm’s financially distressed state. Prior
literature indicates that on average industry rivals and suppliers react negatively to firms in financial
distress and that customers may be the source of financial distress (Lang and Stulz, 1992; Hertzel, Li,
Officer, and Rodgers, 2008).
I eliminate firms with negative book values of equity from consideration in the year prior to the
divestiture announcement; therefore, I do not specifically consider distressed firms. However, I use the
variable, Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968) as a proxy for firm financial distress or financial health.
Following Altman (1968), I define ALTMAN_Z_SCORE as the sum of 3.3 * earnings before interest and
taxes scaled by total assets, 0.99 * net sales scaled by total assets, 0.6 * market capitalization at fiscal
year-end scaled by total liabilities, 1.2 * current assets scaled by total assets, and 1.4* retained earnings
scaled by total assets. I expect a negative relation between the ALTMAN_Z_SCORE and wealth effects
and operating performance.
Table 1 summarizes the possible underlying motivations driving horizontal asset sales and
specifies the conjectured reactions of a horizontal sell-off on the divesting firms, in addition to their
customers, suppliers, and rivals. Panel A presents the general hypotheses for the entire sample. While the
different reactions can occur in multiple outcomes, the respective source of gains/losses has a unique
result with respect to the way in which individual firms are anticipated to be influenced by the divestiture.
I take advantage of this point to differentiate the reactions derived from industry demand, diseconomies of
scale/efficiency, and financial distress hypotheses.
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2.2.5.

Product market considerations
This section addresses the potential tradeoffs arising from firms conducting horizontal

divestitures and the consequences arising from product market effects from these deals that may reduce or
enhance the potential gains from restructuring activities.
2.2.5.1. Monopolistic collusion considerations
Stigler (1964) asserts that monopolistic collusion allows merging firms to collude with industry
rivals and restrict production to customers earning the monopoly price. Eckbo and Wier (1985) theorize
that events that decrease the probability of horizontal mergers would potentially result in lost monopoly
rents to merging firms and industry rivals. Eckbo (1983) contends that under collusion engendered by
merging firms, monopoly rents are detrimental to customers and suppliers. By implication, a horizontal
divestiture may reduce the firm’s size and hinder the divesting firm’s potential to collude with industry
rivals. Consequently, I expect that a horizontal divestiture will lead to increased output by the divesting
firm and its former subsidiary or division by the acquiring firm. Therefore, customers will receive
potentially lower input prices and higher quantities of goods and services. On the one hand, suppliers of
the divesting firm may receive higher orders from the parent firm and the divested subsidiary under the
control of the acquirer. On the other hand, suppliers may receive decreased quantities ordered from the
divesting firm since the new acquirer may source its inputs from alternative suppliers. These effects are
likely to be more detectable in concentrated industries in which the divesting firm operates and from
divestitures that result in large changes in industry concentration. Divesting firms in less concentrated
industries will likely have less monopoly power and customers in more concentrated industries will be
more able to reap the benefits from the divestiture.
The monopolistic collusion hypothesis proposes that horizontal integration (mergers, acquisitions,
or expansions) facilitates collusion between industry rivals leading to limited output and elevated price to
the detriment of customers. The potential for advantages in a horizontally integrated framework calls into
consideration of whether horizontal divestitures lead to the degradation of these advantages. Since
monopolistic collusion is more likely to be observed in concentrated industries than non-concentrated, I
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anticipate a decreased probability of collusion amongst rival firms in concentrated industries. Thus, the
monopolistic collusion hypothesis predicts that divesting and rival firms would suffer and that customers
would profit provided that the dominant outcome of an inadequate monopoly is increased production and
decreased prices. The effects of a surge in downstream output and input utilization would positively affect
suppliers; however the significance of these effects remains ambiguous.
Considering that concentrated industries are more likely to exhibit pricing discretion, there may
be an alternative outcomes. The effect under the monopolistic collusion hypothesis may be less
pronounced in less concentrated industries for product market counterparts. If divesting firms in less
concentrated industries have less pricing discretion or ability to limit output, then the effects on product
market customers would be less of change in production and prices relative to concentrated industries,
assuming less concentrated industries are not as susceptible changes in market forces than concentrated
firms. Whereas, divesting firms in more concentrated industries may have a greater ability to adjust to
more efficient prices as they move prices closer to marginal costs.
To capture the effects customer concentration, I explore customer concentration by examining
both concentrated industries and less concentrated industries as follows. Non-concentrated customers
classifies corporate customers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is less than or equal to 1800.
Concentrated customers identifies corporate customers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is
greater than 1800.
2.2.5.2. Monopsonistic collusion considerations
Blair and Harrison (1993) argue that, in an imperfectly competitive product market, a
monopsonist will have the ability to restrict production in the output market, leading to higher prices and
reduced output compared to the perfectly competition case. Chen (2007) argues that employing
monopsony power results in decreased economic efficiency, indicating that the use of monopsonistic
power is detrimental to consumer welfare. Given that horizontal mergers or acquisitions potentially
increase the industry concentration of buyers and may lead to increased monopsony power as proposed by
Eckbo (1983). Again, Eckbo and Wier (1985) conjecture that events that reduce the likely of horizontal
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mergers would potentially result in lost rents to colluding firms, merging firms and industry rivals. By
inference, this notion raises the concern of whether or not horizontal divestitures lead to reduced market
power and, therefore, monopsony rents for divesting firms and industry rivals.
Drawing on these studies, I refer to the monopsonistic collusion hypothesis as the concept that
horizontal divestitures potentially decrease the anticompetitive behavior of divesting firms and their
product market rivals. This hypothesis asserts that rivals no longer are able to profit at the expense of
suppliers due to decreased probability of coordination amongst competitors to obtain lower input prices.
The monopsonistic collusion hypothesis proposes that industry rivals will react negatively to news of
decreased potential for collusion. Eckbo (1983) argues that under collusion engendered by merging firms,
monopoly rents are unfavorable to customers and suppliers. A reduction in monopsonistic collusion will
result in an improvement in economic efficiency for customers and suppliers. Customers will receive
increased production quantities. Suppliers will likely receive increased production and higher prices due
to reduced buyer power. These effects will most likely be revealed in industries in which there is greater
competition amongst suppliers and divesting industries that experience a large change in industry
concentration.
To capture the effects supplier concentration, I, similarly, investigate supplier concentration by
examining both concentrated industries and less concentrated industries as follows. Non-concentrated
suppliers classifies suppliers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is less than or equal to1800.
Concentrated suppliers classifies suppliers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is greater than
1800.
2.2.5.3. Purchasing inefficiency/countervailing power considerations
The theory of countervailing power conjectures that economic power leads to economic power
(Galbraith, 1952). More specifically, the group that is bound by the economic power of a dominant group
offsets that position by augmenting its own economic power in relation to the power of the dominant
group, thus revealing countervailing power. In this framework, a large customer uses its bargaining power
relative to its suppliers’ bargaining power; consequently, suppliers cut their selling prices to its buyers. If
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countervailing power serves as a channel to constrain buying power and selling power, then what is the
implication of relaxing this constraint, in this case buyer size, on buying power? Intrinsic in the theory of
countervailing power is the concept that horizontal divestitures of downstream firms or buyers relax the
channel that limits or keeps in check upstream firms’ or suppliers’ selling power. More specifically,
horizontal divestitures may reduce bargaining power, to the point in which it diminishes the boundaries
on suppliers’ selling power, resulting in moderated buying power for a given divesting firm relative to its
suppliers.
In a theory of dynamic countervailing power, Snyder (1996) finds that large buyers achieve lower
prices from colluding sellers, and that the profitability of all buyers improves at the detriment of the
supplier after a merger of another firm due to merger induced competition amongst suppliers (Snyder,
1998). Hence, in the context of reduced buying power, countervailing power theory suggests adverse
consequences for not only the horizontally divesting firm, but for industry rivals as well. Thus, I expect
industry rivals to respond negatively to news of a horizontal divestiture. I anticipate that a reduction in
countervailing power will lead to a potential reduction in corporate customer welfare and an improvement
in supplier bargaining power, especially, for concentrated suppliers. Consequently, concentrated suppliers
may opportunistically raise input prices on less powerful divesting firms. Ultimately, this may lead to
higher prices but a conceivably lower quantity; therefore, the effects may be ambiguous for suppliers. The
divesting firms will no longer be able to pass lower input prices along to their customers. Therefore,
customers may see an increase in their input costs. If divesting firms pass along these potentially higher
costs, these firms may decide to pass these costs along customers with high or low switching costs. On
the one hand, customers with high switching costs may have a strong customer-supplier relationship, and
thus, divesting firms may pass these costs along to customers with lower switching costs (non-essential
customers). On the other hand, divesting firms may act opportunistically and pass these costs along to
those customers with high switching costs. Ultimately, this is an empirical question. These effects may be
more pronounced in less concentrated industries in which the divesting firm operates and divestitures that
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result in substantial changes in the industry Herfindahl index. I proxy customer switching costs using the
approach defined in section 2.2.3.
2.2.5.4. Product market competition hypothesis
Extant literature discusses the role that product market competition plays in mitigating conflicts
between shareholders and management (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958). Several papers conjecture that
increased product market competition may serve as an efficient tool to abate managerial slack or
ineffectiveness (Hart, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Allen and Gale, 2000). Hart (1983) posits that
product market competition unequivocally decreases managerial slack by assuming that managers attempt
to obtain a profit target, consequently, managers face stiff competition and must work diligently to reach
those targets. However, Scharfstein (1988) conjectures product market competition potentially makes the
incentive problem worse and reduces managerial effort. Nickell (1996) uses a sample of U.K.
manufacturing firms and shows that greater competition results in fewer monopoly rents. Monopoly rents
provide opportunity for company stakeholders such as managers and employees to capture monopolistic
rents with slack or lack of effort. Nickell (1996) finds evidence that an increase in product market
competition is related to an increase in productivity. Nickell finds that increased competition leads to a
decrease in costs and managerial slack and an increase in innovation. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)
postulate that weak governance firms prefer to enjoy the quiet life by circumventing cognitively difficulty
behaviors that may include bargaining with suppliers and unions over input prices and wages,
respectively, and attempting to enhance labor productivity (Giroud and Mueller, 2010).
By implication, if horizontal divestiture activity increases product market competition, then I
expect that divesting firms in concentrated industries or industries that experience large reductions in
concentration will undergo improved performance from increased susceptibility to product market
competition. This hypothesis stipulates that horizontal divestitures potentially increase competition and
reduce the probability that managers will be able to enjoy “the quiet life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2003), therefore increasing managerial incentives to negotiate lower prices from suppliers or lower
wages from unions and improve productivity. Therefore, I anticipate that suppliers may experience an
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adverse stock price reaction and reduced cash-flow performance as a result of horizontal divestitures, in
concentrated industries relative to non-concentrated industries or industries that experience a large change
in industry concentration.
With respect to customers, increased competition may pressure managers to maintain cash-flow
performance despite a reduction in size or to reduce prices in the face of increased competition, therefore
the outcome is ambiguous. Thus, customers may react positively or negatively to news of horizontal
divestitures. Industry rivals may react positively, as a result of increased competitive pressure that
incentivizes managers to decrease managerial slack, or negatively in response to a more efficient rival.
Therefore, if a rival is more concentrated than the divesting firm, I anticipate that positive reaction will
indicate a contagion effect, whereas, a negative reaction would indicate a competitive effect.
Additionally, I consider the effect of increased product market competition on the supplier
retention termination decision. I conjecture that managers subject to increased competition will likely
terminate ineffective suppliers, reducing supplier profitability and value. To capture the impact of product
market competition, I proxy suppliers with high and low switching costs in a similar manner to the one
outlined in Section 2.2.3. I also attempt to capture the economic effects of product market competition by
examining supplier retention versus termination decisions by divesting firms. Retained suppliers are those
suppliers that were listed as suppliers before and after a divestiture deal. Terminated suppliers are those
suppliers that were listed as suppliers before a divestiture deal but not after.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the testable hypotheses that incorporate product market considerations. In
particular, Panel B presents the predicted effects of the monopolistic collusion, monopsonistic collusion,
purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing power, and product market competition hypotheses on divesting
firms, rivals, customers, and suppliers.
2.3. Data
In this section, I discuss the data sources and sample formation requirements employed to identify
my sample of horizontal divestitures. I also offer the relevant features of my final sample of horizontal
divestitures.
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2.3.1.

Sample construction
This study depends on several data sources for my empirical investigation. I initially obtain my

preliminary sample of horizontal divestitures from the universe of divestitures proposed from the
Securities Data Company (SDC). I employ the data on firm-level customer-supplier relationships
established by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) using the Compustat Customer Segment database. 2 Similar to
other studies, I acquire financial security data from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP)
and accounting data from Compustat.
To simply the analysis and limit the scope of this study and number of predictions, I focus
primarily on asset sales. Thus, my sample of divestitures excludes equity carve-outs and spin-offs over
the period 1987-2005. My initial sample of divestitures is acquired from the Securities Data Company
(SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database. This study eliminates divestitures that are described by the
following (1) parent firms are private firms, limited partnerships, financial and regulated firms
[Compustat historical Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 6000-6999, 4000-4099, 4500-4599, or
4800-4999], Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), foreign firms, or joint ventures, (2) information on
the parent firm is not accessible on Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) directly following the
divestiture, (3) concurrent announcements are made such as quarterly earnings; issues of equity, preferred
stock or warrants; mergers and acquisitions; termination of technical agreements; share repurchases;
private placements, dividends; and executive turnover, (4) parent firms simultaneously announce an intent
to spin off or carve out a unit in addition to divesting assets (5) the announcement date of the proposed
divestiture cannot be determined via a search of newswires and newspapers, Lexis-Nexis or Wall Street
Journal searches, (6) the parent firm does not have data available in Compustat on both a consolidated and
industry–segment basis (7) parent and acquirer are not U.S. based, (8) the parent and divestiture target do
not have matching SIC codes in SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database, (9) the parent SIC code in SDC
Mergers and acquisitions database does not match historical standard industry classification codes in
Compustat (10) divestiture is considered an equity carve-out or spin-off, (10) the parent has less than $20
2

I am indebted to Lauren Cohen and Andrea Frazzini for generously sharing their data.
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million in sales (in constant 1987 dollars), and (11) the ratio of the deal value to total assets is less than
0.1%. 3 These last two restrictions facilitate the collection of transaction information from news stories
and maintain the relative meaningfulness of these deals in the product market.
As a consequence of these limitations placed on the sample, there are 81 transactions that met the
sample construction conditions from 1988 to 2005, and summary statistics for these divestiture deals are
displayed in Table 2. The number of transactions does not vary substantially compared to other studies
considering that horizontal divestitures represent a subcategory of divestitures. In general, divestitures
may also be conglomerate or vertical in nature. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) report a final sample of
93 asset sales. Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) examine 179 sell-offs. Mulherin and Boone (2000)
examine 139 asset sales. As shown in Panel A, there is some degree of variability in the incidence of
deals, relative size of the transactions, and number of employees by year. Roughly sixty-five percent of
the divestiture activity occurs from 1999-2005 in the sample. The average (median) ratio of
subsidiary/unit net transaction value (transaction value less advisor fees) to parent total asset value one
year prior to the divestiture is 17 (2.5) percent for this sample of deals, which suggests that this sample is
relatively smaller and skewed upward compared to the average (median) ratio of subsidiary/unit net
transaction value of 18 (11) percent reported by Mulherin and Boone (2000). Thus, horizontal divestiture
deals appear to be about the same size as general divestiture deals, on average. The typical net transaction
value (deal value less advisor fees) is $172.87 million. The average divesting firm in the sample has
roughly $10.8 billion in market capitalization, $7.4 billion in total assets, and 37,400 employees. Market
capitalization, total assets, and transaction values are reported in 2003 dollars.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the accumulated deals into broad industries established by Fama and
French (1997). 4 Petroleum and natural gas, healthcare, electronic equipment, pharmaceutical products,
and restaurants, hotels and motels industries generate the most divestiture activity in my sample.
Divestitures in these industries comprise 72.87 percent of the divestitures in the sample. Additionally, the
3

Berger and Ofek (1999) restrict their sample of asset sell-offs to sales at least $100 million in 1984 (the initial year
in the sample).
4
One hundred percent of the divesting firms in this sample are all focused reporting one business segment.
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petroleum and natural gas industry dominates other industries in the sample accounting for 29.63 percent
of the divestiture activity in the sample. The relative transaction value of deals reported in electronic
equipment industries (0.92) appear to be much greater than the relative transaction value of deals reported
in the other industries.
Panel C of Table 2 reports the frequency of divestiture deals by deal characteristics. With respect
to method of payment or deal consideration as reported by SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database and
news stories, 38.27 percent of the deals were paid via a cash transaction. Stock based and mixed (cash and
stock based) methods of payment compose 3.70 percent and 3.70 percent, respectively. However, the
method of payment was unknown for 54.32 percent of divestiture deals. Panel C also describes the deals
based on whether the deal was an intra-industry transaction versus an inter-industry transaction between
seller and buyer. I document a greater proportion of intra-industry deals, 53.09 percent, between sellers
and buyers, than inter-industry deals, 46.91 percent.
2.3.2.

Identifying corporate rivals, suppliers, and customers
This study follows Fee and Thomas (2004), Cohen and Frazzini (2008), Hertzel, Li, Officer, and

Rodgers (2008), and Bernile and Lyandres (2013) by employing the firm’s reported information regarding
material corporate customers obtained from the Compustat Customer Segment Files to identify firm
suppliers and customers of the divesting firms, and their industry rivals. SFAS No. 131 mandates firms to
disclose specific financial information the existence of customers whose purchases comprise at least 10
percent of the firm’s consolidated annual sales. Obtaining the identifying characteristics of each firm’s
major customers from the Compustat Segment Files and linking these major customers to corresponding
firms on CRSP and Compustat databases facilitates the creation of a sample of firms’ primary customers.
Once firm i is classified as a major customer of firm j, the database is inverted and firm j is classified as a
supplier of firm i. 5 To identify suppliers of divesting firms, I match the parent (divesting) firm’s name to a
customer firm’s name (from or on the Compustat Customer Segment Files) in the fiscal year-end prior to
the divestiture announcement date. I include customers of the divesting parent firm. For the typical deal in
5

See Cohen and Frazzini (2008) for a more comprehensive description of the matching algorithm employed.
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the sample, I identify 0.52 customer firms and 1.21 supplier firms with the required data to compute
announcement period abnormal returns. This is similar to the average deal in the sample of Fee and
Thomas (2004), who identify 0.40 customer firms and 1.09 supplier firms with the required data.
Table 3 describes the sample distribution of 140 corporate customers and suppliers of firms
proposing horizontal assets sales between 1988 and 2005 by industry

The mean supplier market

capitalization is $1.47 billion (in 2003 dollars), and the mean customer market capitalization is $41.15
billion (in 2003 dollars) Thus, the mean divesting firm’s market capitalization is more than 7.34 times
greater than its suppliers’ market capitalization, whereas, the typical customer firm in the sample has a
market capitalization more than 3.81 times greater than the typical divesting firm in the sample. The
relative size of the event firm in question and the supplier firm is similar to that of Fee and Thomas
(2004) (8.57 times), while the relative size of the event firm in question and the customer firm is
somewhat smaller compared to that of Fee and Thomas (2004) (6.93 times). This indicates that the
database may be more efficient in testing hypotheses linked to purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing
power rather than the reduced monopsonistic power, since I am more likely to capture less powerful
customers and more powerful suppliers. The industries with the largest proportion of matches of
customers and suppliers are the electronic equipment, petroleum and natural gas, wholesale, computers,
machinery, and communications industries, respectively. The greatest proportion of customer firms come
from the petroleum and natural gas industry, while the greatest proportion of supplier firms come from
electronic equipment industry. This industry distribution of customers and suppliers is somewhat similar
to that of divesting firms, with the exception of the healthcare industry.
The data employed to identify industry rivals for the divesting firms is also from the Compustat
industry segment files. I identify rivals as any firm (excluding the parent, customer, or supplier firm)
which reports the same historical four-digit SIC code as the parent firm with at least $5 million in market
capitalization to reduce the impact of very small rivals, since I am examining asset sales of parent firms
with at least $20 million in sales (in 1987 dollars). For the typical deal in the sample, I identify 67.63
(50.84) single and multiple-segment (single-segment only) rival firms with the required data to compute
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announcement period abnormal returns that is not substantially lower than comparable studies. 6 Fee and
Thomas (2004) consider the impact of horizontal mergers on single-segment and single and multiple
segment rivals, whereas, Shahrur (2005) excludes them from his sample and considers only singlesegment rivals because they increase the power of the sample. I include single and multiple segment
rivals to determine if horizontal asset sales have a differential impact on pure play firms versus diversified
firms in the same industry, however, I consider that the results from the single-segment rival sample result
in more power.
2.3.3.

Computing announcement period abnormal returns
Staying consistent with Fee and Thomas (2004), I use standard event study methodology to

compute abnormal returns for the parent, in addition to any firm classified as an industry rival, supplier,
or customer of the divesting parent firm. The market model parameters are calculated over the 200 trading
day period beginning at day -240 in relation to the announcement date. I require a minimum of 100
trading over the trading days over the estimation period for a firm to be incorporated in the sample.
Cumulate abnormal returns (CARs) are computed over the three-day window centered on the
announcement date, and all significance tests are executed employing standardized prediction errors in
accordance with similar studies.
With the purpose of investigating the cross-sectional differences, I consider each rival, customer,
and supplier as one observation in the computation of abnormal returns. The returns of rivals, customers,
and suppliers may be subject to event induced cross-sectional correlation (Eckbo, 1983; Fee and Thomas,
2004; Shahrur, 2005; Jain, Kini, and Shenoy, 2011). Consequently, I document results considering all
rivals, customers, and suppliers, respectively, as equally weighted portfolios for each transaction. The
equally weighted strategy is put forth to take into consideration the contemporaneous cross-sectional
dependence in returns. I compute the abnormal returns to the parent rival, supplier, and customer
portfolios for the same event windows as for the parent firm.
2.3.4.
6

Measuring changes if operating performance

Fee and Thomas report 75.55 industry competitors per average deal in their sample of merging firms.
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Following Fee and Thomas (2004), I utilize a matching-firm methodology so as to compare
industry-adjusted pre- and post-divestiture operating performance and to account for mean reversion in
operating performance metric. For completed divestiture deals, I explore the changes in operating
performance for divesting firms and their customers and suppliers. I select matching firms for each of the
divesting firms and their customers and suppliers contingent on industry, asset size, and preceding
operating performance consistent with Barber and Lyon (1996) and performed by Loughran and Ritter
(1997) and Fee and Thomas (2004).
This study performs the following matching algorithm. I begin with all firms on Compustat that
are not included in the sample (i.e., parent, supplier, or customer) that have cash-flow (defined as
operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) to sales (Compustat item 12) data available for
the same years as the firms in the sample (i.e., matching firms are obligated to have accessible data for the
same time window around the divestiture as the firms in the sample). I identify the firms with same twodigit SIC code as a sample firm, asset size at the close of year-1 relative to the divestiture between 25
percent and 200 percent of the sample firm, and cash-flow to sales between 90 percent and 110 percent of
the sample firm in the same year. I select the matching firm from these firms with the cash-flow to sales
ratio nearest in magnitude to that of the sample firm. However, if no matching firm fulfills this
requirement, I lessen the industry restrictions to necessitate only a match of the one-digit SIC code. Yet, if
there continues to be no match, I remove the industry matching condition and match on size and
performance. Ultimately, if I obtain no match after removing the industry matching condition, I eliminate
the size restriction and match solely on performance. Considering the 221 firms in which an industry
counterpart is pursued, 110 have matches at the two-digit level, 24 at the one digit level, 9 retaining size
and performance, and 12 retaining only performance.
Staying consistent with Fee and Thomas (2004), I predominantly measure operating performance
using the cash-flow to sales ratio. This ratio is computed for the sample firms and for the matching firms
for one year preceding the divestiture and for each of the three years following the year in which the
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divestiture is completed. 7 For a given year, I delineate the industry-adjusted performance measure as the
sample firm’s ratio less the benchmark ratio. Following Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Fee and Thomas
(2004), I concentrate on median values as a result of skewness and the underlying effect of outliers when
employing accounting ratios. Other measures of operating performance include the cost of goods sold-tosales ratio, the employee to sales ratio, and selling, general and administrative expenses to sales ratio.
2.4. Empirical results
In this section, I investigate the announcement period wealth effects of horizontal divestitures and
changes in operating performance around horizontal divestitures in both univariate and multivariate
frameworks. I develop univariate and multivariate analyses in an approach that improves the ability to
differentiate amongst non-mutually exclusive hypotheses.
2.4.1.

Abnormal returns for all divestitures
Table 4 documents the mean (median) abnormal returns for the samples of divesting firms, rival

firms, corporate customers and suppliers. In Panel A of Table 4, I present the announcement period
abnormal returns for the divesting firms in my sample. Panels B and C of Table 4 documents the
abnormal returns to industry rivals at the divestiture announcement for single-segment portfolios and
single- and multiple-segment industry rival portfolios, respectively, to capture any potential differential
effects between pure-play versus diversified rivals. Panels D and E of Table 4 report the abnormal returns
for individual customers firms (available for cross-sectional tests) and customer firm portfolios
(constructed per divestiture transaction), correspondingly. Panels F and G in Table 4 report the abnormal
returns for individual suppliers and supplier portfolios, respectively.
For the total sample of horizontal divestitures, I report a mean (median) positive abnormal return
of 1.58% (0.79%) to parent firms over the three-day window, significant at the 5% level using a t-test
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) on standardized prediction errors, and significantly more positive than
negative abnormal returns, using a sign test. This evidence of positive mean abnormal returns is in
7

I compute this ratio for each year following the divestiture completion date, as well to be consistent with similar
studies. Currently, I assume that each divestiture deal is completed within the three years following the divestiture
proposal date.
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accordance with prior divestiture studies using asset sales (Hite, Owers, and Rogers, 1987; John and
Ofek, 1995; Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; Slovin, Sushka and Ferraro, 1995; Mulherin and Boone,
2000; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2003). I present statistically significant (at the 10% level) mean
abnormal returns of -1.09% for single segment rival portfolios for the entire sample, while the single- and
multiple-segment rival portfolios earn a significant mean (median) abnormal return of -1.49% (-0.52%) at
the 5% level. The evidence from Panel B and C is inconsistent with that of Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro
(1995), who examine the impact of asset sell-offs of industry rivals and document a 0.04% mean excess
return that is statistically insignificant. This inconsistency may be limited to the nature of horizontal asset
sales, which produce a competitive effect amongst rivals.
For the full sample of corporate customers of divesting firms, individual customer firms
experience a median abnormal return of -0.96% at the 10% level of significance at announcement, and the
individual and portfolio of customer firms experience significantly more negative than positive abnormal
returns at 10% level of significance, at least. However, the parametric t-tests for customers report no
significance for mean abnormal returns. For the entire sample of deals and subsamples of deals of
downstream firms, individual suppliers and supplier portfolios have no significant share price effects to
the divestiture announcement.
To summarize the stock price reactions for the entire sample of divestitures, I find that divesting
firms react positively; rivals and corporate customers respond negatively; while suppliers fail to generate
share price reactions distinguishable from zero. The adverse reaction by only the single- and multiplesegment industry rival portfolios sample indicate that horizontal sell-offs produce a competitive effect for
industry rivals. The results for the entire sample of divestitures are consistent with the diseconomies of
scale/efficiency hypothesis, which suggests that horizontal asset sales result in the divesting firm
improving its efficiency by eliminating firm scale diseconomies and utilizing the divestiture as an
opportunity to renegotiate contracts with their customers to become even more efficient. In addition, the
divestiture results in the divesting firm improving its competitive position relative to its rivals.
2.4.2.

Abnormal returns for divestiture subsamples
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In the spirit of Fee and Thomas (2004), I also present in Table 4 the abnormal returns for multiple
subsamples of deals in which the product-market influence is anticipated to be noticeable. To distinguish
Fee and Thomas (2004) capture large merger induced changes in industry concentration, resulting from
horizontal acquisitions, as an increase greater than 100 in industry Herfindahl and a Herfindahl of 2000,
respectively, for their sample. I employ a subsample of deals in which the pre-divestiture industry
Herfindahl Index is greater than 1800, (Ind. Herf > 1800), to evaluate the impact of divestitures in
concentrated industries. 8 I also use a subsample of deals in which the pre-divestiture industry Herfindahl
Index is less than or equal to 1800, (Ind. Herf <= 1800), to evaluate the impact of divestitures in less
concentrated industries. Consistent with prior studies, I compute the Herfindahl Index as the sum of the
squared market shares of the firms that operate in the industry (4-digit SIC code). To capture divestiture
induced deals that produce a substantial change in industry Herfindahl or concentration (increased
competition), I observe those deals that decrease the industry Herfindahl by more than 100 (∆ Ind. Herf.
< -100). I also capture the deals that do not produce a substantial change in industry Herfindahl or
concentration by observing those deals that do not decrease the industry Herfindahl by more than 100 (∆
Ind. Herf. >= -100).
2.4.2.1. Abnormal returns for concentrated vs non-concentrated industries
For the subsample of deals in concentrated industries, Panel A of Table 4 documents that
divesting firms experience a statistically significant average (median) abnormal return of 2.32% (1.04%)
at announcement, in contrast, Panels B presents statistically significant mean (median) abnormal returns
to single-segment rivals of -1.99% (-2.01%) at the 10% level of significance. In contrast for the
subsample of deals in non-concentrated industries, Panel C of Table 4 presents mean (median)
statistically significant single- and multiple-segment industry rivals of -1.51% (0.45%) at the 10% level of
significance at announcement, indicating differential competitive effects for single segment and
diversified rivals. Also for the subsample of deals in less concentrated industries, a sign test in Panel D of
8

An industry Herfindahl of 2000 is also used in untabulated results but reduces the number of observations in the
subsample, decreasing the statistical power of the sample. The results are qualitatively similar but inferences are
more difficult to substantiate.
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Table 4 indicates that corporate customers experience significantly more negative abnormal returns than
positive, at the 10% level of significance: suggesting that divestitures occurring in less concentrated
industries are considered worse news for corporate customers than those that occur in more concentrated
industries. For the subsample of deals in more concentrated industries, Panels F and G in Table 4 indicate
no significant share price effects for corporate suppliers at announcement. To summarize the subsample
of deals in concentrated industries, I find that divesting firms react positively at announcement, in
contrast, single-segment rivals in concentrated industries respond negatively at announcement. However,
diversified rivals react less negatively compared to diversified rivals in non-concentrated industries.
Customers react less negatively compared to deals in less concentrated industries. Suppliers generate no
significant reaction at announcement. For the subsample of deals in concentrated industries, the evidence
partially supports the product market competition and purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing power
hypotheses and, to a lesser extent, the monopolistic collusion hypothesis, which suggests that divesting
firms may potentially subject themselves to improvements in efficiency in concentrated industries, but
customers in less concentrated.
2.4.2.2. Abnormal returns for deals for deals with large declines in industry concentration vs. deals with
no large decline in industry concentration
To shed light on divestiture induced changes in industry concentration and, thus, its impact on the
competitive landscape that divesting firms, rivals, customers, and suppliers face in response to this event,
I compare deals that result in a large decrease in industry concentration (increasing degree of competition
in the divesting industry) to those deals that do not result in a large decrease in industry concentration. In
addition, by examining deals resulting in a large change in industry concentration, I can separate the
effects for the product market competition, purchasing efficiency, monopolistic collusion and
monopsonistic collusion hypotheses. For the subsample of divestiture deals that result in a large drop in
industry concentration, Panel A of Table 4 reports that divesting firms earn a marginally significant mean
(median) abnormal return of 2.50% (1.19%), which appears to be more positive than the subsample of
deals that do not experience a large change in concentration. Also for the subsample of deals in industries
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that do not experience a large decline in concentration, I find that divesting firms earn a slightly more
positive than negative abnormal returns in response the event, at the 10% level of significance. For the
subsample of deals that undergo a large reduction in industry Herfindahl, Panel B of Table 4 presents
marginally significant mean abnormal returns to single-segment rivals of -1.87% at the 10% level of
significance. In comparison for the subsample of deals in industries that do not experience a large decline
in concentration, Panels C of Table 4 presents slightly significant mean (median) abnormal returns to
single- and multiple segment rivals of -1.62% (-0.92%) at the 10% level of significance. These results
reinforce the evidence of differential competitive reactions from single segment and diversified industry
rivals at announcement of horizontal asset sales. For deals in industries that experience a large decline in
industry concentration, Panels D and E of Table 4 report that individual customers and customer
portfolios experience unfavorable median abnormal returns of -1.07% at announcement and significantly
more negative than positive abnormal returns at the 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.
However, Panels F and G of Table 4 report no significant share price reactions for individual suppliers
and supplier portfolios at announcement for this subsample of deals. The results for this subsample of
deals indicates that horizontal divestitures potentially increase competition in the divesting industry, thus,
reducing the likelihood that managers will be able to enjoy “the quiet life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2003). Accordingly, this increase in competition incentivizes managers to negotiate lower prices from
suppliers or lower wages from unions and improve productivity. However, these improvements may be
offset by a decline in buying power, suggesting that divesting firms experience waning bargaining power
with suppliers.
To summarize for the subsample of divestiture deals that result in a large decrease in industry
concentration, divesting firms respond positively; single-segment rivals respond significantly; corporate
customers react adversely, and suppliers do not react at all at announcement. These results provide mixed
evidence to support the product market competition and purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing power
hypotheses.
2.4.3.1. Abnormal operating performance for all divestitures
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In this subsection, I provide additional tests for the hypotheses linked to the entire sample such as
the industry demand hypothesis, financing hypothesis, diseconomies of scale hypothesis, and financial
distress hypothesis using operating performance of the divesting firms, customers, and suppliers. I report
median industry-adjusted operating performance changes for divesting firms, customers, and suppliers in
Table 5 using median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales. Panel A of Table 5 reports changes in median
industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales for divesting firms. Panels B and C of Table 5 report changes in
median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales for individual customer and customer portfolio, respectively.
Changes are presented from the year preceding the divestiture to each of the three years subsequent to the
divestiture, in addition to the median of the three year post-divestiture period. 9 I use the Wilcoxon signedrank test to determine significance for changes in operating performance. I document evidence of
significant operating performance deterioration for the entire sample of divesting firms.
For the entire sample of deals, Panel A of Table 5 reports sign tests that indicate that divesting
firms experience significantly more negative changes abnormal cash-flow margin during the postdivestiture period and for the first two years immediately following the divestiture 10% level of
significance, at least. Panels B and C of Table 5 indicate no significant changes in median industryadjusted cash flow margins for individual customers and customer portfolios, respectively. Panels D and
E of Table 5 report, for the entire sample of deals, that individual suppliers and supplier portfolios
experience a transitory increase in abnormal cash-flow margin in the immediately year subsequent to the
divestiture of 3.75% and 4.01%, respectively, at the 10% level of significance. With respect to the results
for the entire sample, one reason for the inconsistency between the positive abnormal returns and negative
cash-flow performance is that some of the divesting firms may be motivated to conduct horizontal
divestitures due to financial distress (but not all), but this effect may only be significant in the initial years
subsequent to the divestiture and not beyond that. Investors of the divesting may perceive these negative
cash flows to be short-term but place the firm in an overall better financial position. However, financial
distress would not necessarily explain why suppliers experience a temporary increase in operating
9

See Fee and Thomas (2004) for a more detailed description.
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performance. The increase in supplier operating performance may be attributed to a reduction in financing
constraints for divesting firms or to suppliers taking advantage of the reduced bargaining power of
divesting firms subsequent to the divestiture, which may also explain why divesting firms have negative
cash flow performance subsequent to the divestiture. Finally, another explanation for the divergence in
the results may be that the efficiency gains may offset adverse cash flow performance in the long term. In
Section 2.4.4.1. below, I attempt to trace the sources of the gains of the divesting by examining other
measures of operating performance to explain the positive abnormal returns for the entire sample.
In sum for the entire sample of deals, divesting firms’ operating performance declines; customers’
operating performance does not change; and suppliers’ operating performance improves. This evidence
provides mixed evidence in support of the financial distress hypothesis, diseconomies of scale hypothesis,
and industry demand and financing hypothesis for divesting firms, customers, and suppliers, respectively.
For the most part, these results are consistent with John and Ofek (1995) who note the underperformance
(using operating margin performance) of a sample of 46 firms (56.8% the size of my sample) that divest
non-focus increasing assets as a comparison sample to their sample of focus increasing firms. John and
Ofek (1995) primarily focus their analysis on focus increasing asset sales, whereas, non-focus increasing
asset sales is this study’s primary focus.
2.4.3.2. Abnormal operating performance for deals in concentrated vs. non-concentrated industries
For deals that occur in more concentrated industries, Panel A of Table 5 indicates that the median
divesting firm experiences a statistically significant decrease in cash-flow margins of 1.39% during the
post-divestiture period, significant at the 10% level, which is most prominent in the year immediately
following the divestiture. Moreover, sign tests indicate more negative than positive changes in abnormal
operating cash-flow margin during each of the years subsequent to the divestiture and general postdivestiture performance of at least the 10% level of significance. For deals in concentrated industries,
Panels B and C of Table 5 indicate no significant changes in operating performance for corporate
customers. So far the results indicate that the reduced operating performance for divesting firms cannot be
attributed to a decrease in monopoly rents, since customers fail to experience any favorable increases in
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operating performance due to increase quantities or reduced prices. Additionally, the results for the
operating performance of the divesting firm rules out the notion that divestitures in concentrated
industries enhance competition and thus managerial productivity. For deals in less concentrated
industries, Panels D and E of Table 5 indicate that individual suppliers and supplier portfolios improve
cash-flow margins in the year immediately following the divestiture and for the post-divestiture period, in
general, by at least 5.06%, at the 10% level of significance. For deals in more concentrated industries,
supplier post-divestiture performance is lower relative to that in less concentrated industries. Since
supplier operating performance appears to increase subsequent to deals in less concentrated industries
relative to deals in more concentrated industries, the evidence rules out the monopsonistic collusion
hypothesis, which suggests that suppliers benefit from higher prices subsequent to divestiture deals in
more concentrated industries. The evidence from this subsample appears to support the purchasing
inefficiencies / countervailing power hypothesis, which suggests that divesting firms are unable to switch
to more efficient suppliers. As a result, horizontal divestitures in concentrated industries erode the
bargaining power of divesting firms resulting lower operating performance because suppliers experience
an improvement in bargaining power. The improvement in cash flow performance for suppliers is more
pronounced for deals in less concentrated industries because suppliers can more readily exert their
increased market power over less powerful divesting firms.
Overall for deals in concentrated industries, operating performance declines for divesting firms;
there is no change in operating performance for customers; and supplier performance is more negative or
does not change. However, suppliers experience improvements in operating performance subsequent to
deals in less concentrated industries due to a deterioration in divesting firm buying power. Thus, the
evidence for the changes in operating performance in concentrated industries relative to non-concentrated
industries seems to be most consistent with the purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing power
hypothesis.
2.4.3.3. Abnormal operating performance for deals that result in large declines in industry concentration
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Similar to section 2.4.2.2. above, this section of the paper further investigates the impact of
divestiture induced changes in industry concentration and its effect on the competitive environment with
respect to the operating performance of divesting firms, customers, and suppliers. I compare the change in
operating performance of these stakeholders by examining divestiture deals that result in a large decrease
in industry concentration (increasing degree of competition in the divesting industry) to those deals that
do not result in a large decrease in industry concentration. For deals that occur in industries that do not
experience a large change industry Herfindahl or concentration, sign tests in Panel A of Table 5 suggest
that divesting firms display slightly more negative than positive changes in abnormal operating cash-flow
margin during the first two years subsequent to the divestiture, which disappears thereafter. For deals that
occur in industries that do experience a large change in industry Herfindahl or concentration, sign tests in
Panel A of Table 5 suggest that divesting firms display significantly more negative than positive changes
in abnormal operating cash-flow margin during the third year subsequent to the divestiture and during the
post-divestiture period in general that are significant at the 5% level of significance. For deals that occur
in industries that do experience a large change industry concentration, Panels B and C of Table 5 present
no significant changes in abnormal cash-flows margin for corporate customers.
For deals that occur in industries that experience a large change industry concentration, Panel D
of Table 5 indicate that individual suppliers experience significantly more negative than positive changes
in abnormal cash flow margin in the second year subsequent to the divestiture. The evidence indicates
that suppliers react more negatively, with respect operating performance, for deals that result in a large
decrease in industry concentration relative to those deals that do not result in a large change in
concentration, as shown in Panels D and E of Table 5. The results fail to support the monopolistic and
monopsonistic collusion hypotheses, which posit that divesting firms are no longer able to earn
monopsony or monopoly rents as a result of reduced market power since suppliers experience adverse
rather than favorable operating performance and customers fail to experience significant positive
performance subsequent to divestitures in industries that experience a large change in concentration.
However, the evidence is mixed in favor of the product market competition hypothesis. On the one hand,
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operating performance is negative for divesting firms in industries that experience a large change in the
competitive environment. On the other hand, suppliers experience adverse operating performance
subsequent to deals in industries that experience a large change in the competitive landscape, which
suggests that divesting firms appear to negotiate with these suppliers more aggressively due to enhanced
competitive pressures. Alternatively, these could also indicate that divesting firms in industries that
experience a large change in concentration suffer greater purchasing inefficiencies with respect to
suppliers, leading to negative performance due to a greater incapability to shift to more efficient suppliers.
In turn, suppliers may achieve higher prices from divesting firms at the expense of selling lower
quantities to divesting firm post-divestiture—leading adverse supplier performance.
To summarize deals that compose a large percentage of the industry, divesting firms display a
delayed negative reaction, in general; customer performance does not change; and supplier performance
deteriorates temporarily. Overall, the evidence, for these deals, is consistent with the purchasing
inefficiencies / countervailing power hypothesis and, to a much lesser extent, product market competition
hypothesis.
2.4.3.

Identifying sources of losses/gains
In the subsequent section, this study attempts to trace the sources of gains/losses or

improvement/deterioration in abnormal returns and cash-flow performance to the divesting firms by
investigating the variation in alternative measures of operating performance such as: cost of goods sold
(Compustat item 30) to sales (Compustat item 12); selling, general, and administrative expense (SG&A)
(Compustat item 189) to sales (Compustat item 12); employees (Compustat item 29) to sales (Compustat
item 12), and the wage-to-sales ratio. 10 Table 6 documents the sources of gains/losses in abnormal returns
and cash flow performance to the divesting firms and measures significance of performance using
Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests and sign tests.
2.4.4.1. Identifying sources of losses/gains for all divestiture deals

10

I take the product of the number of firm employees (Compustat item 29) and the national average wage obtained
from the Social Security Administration (Imrohoroglu and Tüzel, 2014).
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For the entire sample of divestitures, Panel A of Table 6 presents sign tests that indicate divesting
firms experience slightly more positive (43) than negative (27) changes in median industry-adjusted
operating cost of goods sold-to-sales during the post-divestiture period (year-1 to median postdivestiture), at the 10% level of significance. This suggests that more firms experience abnormal increases
in input costs than those that experience abnormal decreases in input costs. Also for these deals, Panel B
of Table 6 reports that the median divesting firm experiences a 1.15% transitory increase in medianindustry adjusted SG&A expense-to-sales, at the 10% level of significance in the third year subsequent to
the divestiture. This evidence indicates that there is slight and temporary increase in overhead costs. Panel
C of Table 6 indicates that, for the entire sample, the median divesting firm undergoes a marginal decline
(10% level of significance) of median industry-adjusted employee to sales of 0.03 but experiences no
significant changes in divesting firm median industry-adjusted wage-to-sales in the year immediately
following the asset sale. However, Panel D of Table 6 indicates no detectable changes in median industryadjusted average wage-to-sales. Also, changes in customer median industry-adjusted cost of goods soldto-sales subsequent to the upstream divestiture are not statistically significant (not reported in tables).
Panels E and F of Table 6 document the evidence from the changes in individual customer and
customer portfolio median industry-adjusted cost of goods sold-to-sales in order to investigate the
influence of upstream divestitures of customers’ input costs subsequent to the divestiture. For the entire
sample of divestitures, there are no statistically distinguishable changes in median industry-adjusted cost
of goods sold-to-sales following the upstream divestiture.
Summarizing the analysis of the sources of gains/losses for the entire sample of deals, I document
that abnormal input and overhead costs negatively impact operating performance of the median
divestiture around the announcement of horizontal asset sales, which slightly offsets the reduction of
median industry-adjusted employees-to-sales. One interpretation for these results is that divesting firms
attempt to reduce financial distress via horizontal asset sales, but this interpretation does not explain the
temporary increases in supplier cash flow performance. Another explanation for these results is that
divesting firms attempt reduce scale diseconomies and financing constraints by reducing the firm’s labor
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intensity, but horizontal divestitures also subjects the firm to temporary side effects such as increases in
input and administrative costs in the near term. In conjunction with the results from divesting firm
abnormal returns, the results indicate that the positive abnormal returns can be attributed primarily to
gains from labor related efficiencies `and that the market perceives these gains to be greater than the
reduced abnormal cash flows (resulting from input and overhead costs) in the long-run.
2.4.4.2. Identifying sources of losses/gains for deals in concentrated vs. non-concentrated industries
In the following section, I trace the sources of changes in operating performance by likening the
subsample of deals that occur in concentrated industries to those that occur in less concentrated industries.
For subsample of deals in concentrated industries, Panel B of Table 6 documents that divesting firms
experience a statistically significant 0.39% decrease in SG&A expense margin during the post-divestiture
period at the 10% level of significance and more abnormal reductions in SG&A expense-to-sales than
abnormal increases during the second year following the divestiture and the general post-divestiture
period (year-1 to median post-divestiture). For the subsample of deals that occur in less concentrated
industries, the median divestiture results in an economically and statistically significant increase of 1.59%
in SG&A expense-to-sales post-divestiture at the 10% level of significance. Also for the subsample of
deals that occur in less concentrated industries, the median divesture experiences a statistically and
economically significant increase of, at least, 2.00% in SG&A costs during the second and third years
subsequent to the divestiture and significantly more increases in abnormal SG&A expense-to-sales than
decreases in abnormal SG&A expense-to-sales in the third year subsequent to the divestiture. For the
subsample of deals that occur in less concentrated industries, Panel C of Table 6 the median divesting
firm experiences an economically and statistically significant decrease of 0.06 in industry medianadjusted employees-to-sales during the post-divestiture period at the 10% level of significance, which is
most noticeable during the first year subsequent to the divestiture. The results indicate that divesting firms
in concentrated industries are able to improve their efficiency with respect to overhead costs and labor
intensity, suggesting that efficiency gains come primarily from labor related factors despite the overall
adverse cash flow performance. These efficiency gains in operating performance help to support the
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positive abnormal returns exhibited by the divesting firms in concentrated industries and, perhaps, offset
the decline in operating performance stemming from the increase in input costs attributed to a loss in
bargaining power with suppliers.
For the subsample of deals in concentrated industries, individual customers and customer
portfolios experience a significant increase in median abnormal input costs of 1.59% at the 5% level of
significance, whereas for the subsample of deals in non-concentrated industries, individual customers
experience significantly more negative than positive changes in costs of goods sold to sales in the third
year subsequent to the divestiture. Taken in conjunction with the increase supplier cash flow performance
subsequent to deals in less concentrated industries and the decrease in divesting firm cash flow
performance subsequent to deals in concentrated industries, this evidence suggests that divesting firms in
concentrated industries appear to share increased input costs with their customers in response to
increasing purchasing inefficiencies stemming from reduced bargaining power with suppliers. Overall the
evidence from this customer subsample fails to support the monopolistic and monopolistic collusion
hypotheses but also provides direct evidence for the purchasing inefficiency hypothesis and indirect
evidence in support the product market competition hypothesis.
Post-divestiture overhead costs appear to be declining in concentrated industries while increasing
in less concentrated industries, which may make it difficult to detect changes in abnormal overhead costs
for the entire sample. In other words, the evidence may support two competing effects. For instance,
horizontal divestitures may increase the firm’s susceptibility to competitive pressures with enhance
managerial incentives to increase firm value but also come at a cost in the form of reduced bargaining
power with suppliers. Furthermore, post-divestiture labor intensity (employee to sales) for deals in
concentrated industries appears to decline more than deals in non-concentrated industries. For deals in
concentrated industries, these changes in operating performance seem to enhance operating performance
and serve as a source of gains for divesting firms compared to less concentrated industries. For deals in
concentrated industries, post-divestiture customer input costs increase temporarily, while post-divestiture
customer input costs decrease temporarily for deals in less concentrated industries. To summarize the
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comparison of deals in concentrated industries and less concentrated industries, the evidence tends to
favor the product market competition and purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing power hypotheses.
2.4.4.3. Identifying sources of losses/gains for deals with large declines in industry concentration vs.
deals with no large decline in industry concentration
Next, I attempt to identify the sources of gains/losses by comparing various measures of
operating performance for divestiture deals that in large changes in industry Herfindahl to those that do
not result in a large change in industry concentration. A sign test in Panel A of Table 6 suggests that
divesting firms experience significantly more abnormal increases in input costs than abnormal decreases
in input costs, at the 5% level of significance, during the post-divestiture period. For the subsample of
deals in industries that do not experience a large change in industry Herfindahl, divesting firms undergo a
1.59% increase in median industry-adjusted SG&A expenses to sales in third year following the
divestiture and significantly more positive changes in median industry-adjusted SG&A expense-to-sales
in the second year subsequent to the divestiture.
For the subsample of deals that experience a large change in industry Herfindahl, divesting firms
realize a transitory 0.03 decrease in employee to sales at 5% level of significance, and a sign test indicates
that divesting firms experience significantly more negative changes in median industry-adjusted
employees-to-sales during the post-divestiture period (year-1 to median post-divestiture), at the 5% level
of significance. Therefore, these results suggest that divestiture deals that result in a large reduction in
industry concentration (potentially improving competition) reduce or maintain normal input costs,
overhead costs, labor intensity, and wage expenses, in contrast, divestiture deals that do not result in a
large reduction in industry concentration increase or maintain normal input costs, overhead costs, labor
intensity, and wage expenses. The evidence in this subsample suggest that the source of the positive
abnormal returns may be likely attributed to the reduction of financing constraints and labor-related
factors and/or scale diseconomies. The observable gains appear to be enhanced by substantial changes in
the competitive environment, which seem to enhance managerial efficiency and effort to bring down
labor-related and overhead costs. The market appears to perceive that the efficiency changes may
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outweigh the increases in abnormal input costs in the long-run, suggesting that fixed costs and labor
intensity may be more important factors when downsizing firms to alleviate financing constraints and
diseconomies of scale. Overall for this subsample of deals, the evidence appears to substantiate the
product market competition hypothesis and suggest that these deals may be motivated by financing
constraints and firm scale concerns.
2.4.4.

Corporate customer abnormal returns and changes in operating performance: customer

concentration and switching costs
The subsequent section investigates the influence of customer market structure and switching
costs on corporate customer financial and operating performance. By examining customer concentration, I
can further explore the monopolistic collusion hypothesis, which suggests that customers in more
concentrated industries are likely to respond more positively to horizontal divestitures compared to those
in less concentrated industries due to the decreased capacity of industry rivals and divesting firms to
coordinate a reduction in output and higher prices. In contrast, investigating customer switching costs
allows me to further test the diseconomies of scale/efficiency and purchasing inefficiency/countervailing
power hypotheses. The diseconomies of scale/efficiency hypothesis suggests that divesting firms will
utilize horizontal divestitures, also, as an opportunity to improve the efficiency of contracting
relationships by adjusting prices upward on customers with high switching costs. Alternatively, divesting
firms may prefer to satisfy and assure customers vital to their business (customers with high switching
costs) that quality and service subsequent to the divesture will not decline but choose to take advantage of
customers less vital to the divesting firm’s survival (customers with low switching costs). With respect to
the purchasing inefficiency hypothesis, divesting firms may pass along potentially higher input costs to
their customers. Customers with high switching costs may have a strong customer-supplier relationship,
and thus, divesting firms may pass these costs along to customers with lower switching costs. Then again,
divesting firms may act opportunistically and pass these costs along to those customers with higher
switching costs.
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Table 7 presents the performance differences for several subsamples of corporate customers: nonconcentrated customers versus concentrated customers; and reliant customers (high switching costs)
versus non-reliant (low switching costs) customers. Panels A and B of Table 7 compares the performance
differences of individual customers and customer portfolios between non-concentrated customer
industries and concentrated customer industries, respectively, in order to evaluate the impact of customer
market structure on customer gains/losses. Panels C and D of Table 7 compares the performance
differences of individual customers and customer portfolios between reliant and non-reliant customers.
2.4.5.1. Customer concentration
First, the role of customer concentration of customer financial and operating performance is
examined. Individual non-concentrated customers react adversely at announcement experiencing median
abnormal returns of -1.07%, at the 10% level of significance. Although non-concentrated individual
customers and customer portfolios experience more negative than positive abnormal returns than
concentrated customers, the difference in abnormal returns and operating performance around the
divestiture announcement is negligible. The performance differences between the concentrated and nonconcentrated customer subsamples are not significant and fail to support the monopolistic collusion
hypothesis, which indicates that customers in more concentrated industries are likely to react more
positively to horizontal divestitures from upstream firms compared to those in less concentrated industries
due to the decreased capacity of industry rivals and divesting firms to coordinate a reduction in output and
higher prices.
2.4.5.2. Customer switching costs
Panels C and D of Table 7 compare the performance differences of individual customers and
customer portfolios between non-reliant customers and reliant customers, respectively, in order to assess
the impact of customer switching costs on customer gains/losses. Non-reliant individual customers and
customer portfolios experience significantly (at the 10% level) more negative median abnormal returns
and more negative than positive (at the 5% level) abnormal returns than reliant customers. The difference
in abnormal returns for these subsamples at divestiture announcement is insignificant. None of the
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customer subsamples display significant changes in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales nor any
significant differences in operating performance between reliant and non-reliant customers. The evidence
from the reliant and non-reliant customer subsamples suggests that, perhaps, horizontal asset sales are less
beneficial for non-essential customers than those with strong customer-supplier relationships. With
respect to the diseconomies of scale / efficiency hypothesis, the results suggest that divesting firms choose
to satisfy and reassure customers vital to their business that quality and service subsequent to the
divesture will not decline but, instead, opt to take advantage of customers less important to the divesting
firm’s survival. Additionally, the evidence indicates some support for the purchasing inefficiency /
countervailing power hypothesis, which indicates that divesting firms choose to maintain strong
customer-supplier relationships with customers with higher switching costs (relationship specific
investments) and pass along potentially higher costs to customers that are not as invested in divesting
firm’s business. Overall, the evidence is slightly consistent with the diseconomies of scale/efficiency and
the purchasing inefficiency/countervailing power hypotheses.
2.4.6.

Supplier abnormal returns and changes in operating performance: supplier concentration,

supplier retention decisions, and supplier switching costs
The following section investigates the impact of supplier concentration, supplier retention, and
supplier switching costs on supplier performance. By examining supplier concentration, I can extend our
investigation of the monopsonistic collusion hypothesis, which posits that the benefits of reduced
monopsony rents will most likely be revealed in less concentrated supplier industries. Supplier switching
costs allow me to continue examining the diseconomies of scale/efficiency hypothesis, which indicates
that divesting firms will opportunistically seek to improve contracting efficiencies with suppliers with
high switching costs. I also investigate the decision to retain a supplier subsequent to the divestiture rather
than terminating the relationship subsequent to the event to help us further explore the product market
competition hypothesis, which suggests that managers subject to divestiture induced increased
competition will likely terminate ineffective suppliers, reducing supplier profitability and value.
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Table 8 presents the results of logit analysis of the supplier termination decision and the
performance differences for several subsamples of suppliers. The logit analysis in Panel A of Table 8 will
allow me to further investigate the diseconomies of scale / efficiency hypothesis to determine if the gains
from the divestiture are linked to supplier termination decision. In addition, the logit analysis of the
supplier termination decision allows me to explore whether substantial changes in industry concentration
or industry concentration influences the supplier termination decision by divesting firms to investigate the
product market competition hypothesis. Lastly, the logit analysis can provide additional insight on
whether cash deals mitigate financing frictions and, thus, the decision to terminate suppliers. Panels B and
C of Table 8 compares the performance differences of individual suppliers and supplier portfolios
between non-concentrated supplier industries and concentrated supplier industries, respectively, to assess
the impact of supplier market structure on supplier performance. Panels D and E of Table 8 compare the
performance differences of individual suppliers and supplier portfolios between terminated and retained
suppliers, respectively, to assess supplier retention decisions and efficiency motivations. Panels F and G
of Table 8 presents the performance differences between suppliers that report a single large customer and
those that report more than one large customer for individual suppliers and supplier portfolios,
respectively, in order to evaluate supplier switching costs.
2.4.6.1. Logit analysis of supplier of termination decision: multivariate evidence
First, in Panel A of Table 8, I present the results of the logit regression in which the dependent
variable is a binary variable that is equal to one if the supplier is terminated in the year following the
divestiture and zero otherwise. I include only firms that have non-missing individual abnormal returns for
divesting firms and suppliers. Explanatory variables of the logit regression include divesting firm
abnormal returns, divesting firm deal characteristics, product market relationship characteristics, and
environmental factors. Deal characteristics include relative size of the transaction and method of payment.
Product market relationship characteristics examined are supplier switching costs and the length of the
relationship between the customer and supplier. I also incorporate environmental factors that describe the
competitive landscape such as: supplier industry concentration; divesting firm industry concentration; and
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deals that result in large changes in industry concentration. Divesting firm abnormal returns are the threeday mean cumulative abnormal returns centered on the divestiture announcement using the market-model.
Suppliers with single large customer is defined as suppliers that disclose only one large public customer
in the Compustat Customer Segment Database. Supplier industry concentration is a binary variable which
is equal to one if the supplier industry Herfindahl is greater than 1800 and zero otherwise. Relative deal
size is the ratio of deal transaction value to the market value of common equity in the year prior to the
divestiture. Cash is a binary variable that is equal to one if the method of payment was cash and is equal
to zero otherwise. Relationship duration is the number of years in which there has been a consistent
reported customer-supplier relationship in the Compustat Customer Segment Database. Industry Herf >
1800 are those deals that occurred in industries (four-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture
Herfindahl Index was greater than 1800. ∆ Industry Herf. < -100 are those deals that resulted in a change
in the industry Herfindahl Index that were below -100.
The primary variable of interest, ∆ Industry Herf <-100, is significant and positive, suggesting
that divestitures that result in a more competitive environment are more likely to lead to the termination
of a supplier relationship post-divestiture. However, Industry Herf >1800 is not significant, which
suggest that the degree of change in the competitive environment and not the level of concentration is
important to the supplier termination decision. This finding authenticates the product market competition
hypothesis, indicating that divesting firms eliminate less efficient suppliers post-divestiture due to
increased product market pressures. I also show that variable Divesting firm abnormal returns is positive
and significant at the 5% level, which suggests that divesting firms’ gains at announcement are positively
associated with the supplier termination decision. This finding supports the notion that the value
perceived by investors at divestiture announcement may be driven by not only asset sales assets but also
by eliminating inefficient or less essential suppliers.
Relationship duration is positive and significant, at the 5% level of significance, which suggests
that the greater the length of the supplier customer relationship the more likely the divesting firm is to
sever ties with the supplier. In addition, Suppliers with single large customer is positive and significant at
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the 10% level of significance suggesting that divesting firms are more likely to terminate suppliers with
high switching costs or those that depend solely on the divesting firm. Collectively, the results with
respect to Relationship duration and Suppliers with single large customer in the logit regression and
univariate results for the industry-adjusted employee-to-sales ratio indicate that the divesting firm is
increasing efficiency and value by breaking implicit contracts with various stakeholders, suppliers of
labor and inputs. These results also help to substantiate the diseconomies of scale / efficiency hypothesis.
Cash is negative and significant, which suggests that cash deals lessen the probability of
terminating a supplier relationship. This result may suggest that the divesting firm has improved its
liquidity and loosened its financial constraints, such that it is more likely to retain suppliers than terminate
them. Supplier industry concentration and Relative deal size are insignificant and suggest that neither
supplier market power nor the size of the divestiture deal influence the likelihood of the divesting firm
terminating the supplier subsequent to the divestiture deal.
Overall, I make several findings from the logit multivariate analysis. I find that deals that result in
large increases in the competitive environment in the divesting industry increase the probability of the
supplier being terminated subsequent to the deal. In addition, higher divesting firm abnormal returns are
positively associated with the supplier termination decision, suggesting divesting firms create value by
eliminating less essential suppliers. Divesting firms also appear to be more likely to terminate long-term
supplier relationships and those suppliers with greater switching costs, which suggests that divesting firm
attempt to increase efficiency and value by breaking implicit contracts with suppliers of labor (refer to
section 2.4.4.1. or Panel C of Table 6) and inputs. Jointly, these results support the product market
competition hypothesis and, indirectly, the diseconomies of scale / efficiency hypothesis.
2.4.6.2. Supplier concentration: univariate results
Next, the role of supplier concentration on supplier stock price and operating performance is
assessed. Sign tests in Panel B of Table 8 indicate that non-concentrated individual suppliers experience
slightly (at the 10% level) more negative than positive abnormal returns than concentrated individual
suppliers, but the difference in abnormal returns at divestiture announcement is insignificant. Sign tests in
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Panel B of Table 8 indicate that, not only do, concentrated supplier portfolios experience slightly (at the
10% level) more positive than negative abnormal returns than non-concentrated supplier portfolios, but
the difference in median abnormal returns of 2.09% at divestiture announcement is marginally significant
as well. The evidence is inconsistent with the notion that non-concentrated suppliers are more likely to
receive the benefits of reduced monopsony rents and, thus, fail to support the monopsonistic collusion
hypothesis. However, the results indirectly support the idea that concentrated suppliers are more able to
exploit divesting firms and take advantage of reduced countervailing power by temporarily improving
supplier profitability relative to non-concentrated suppliers. Hence, I identify indirect evidence in support
of the purchasing inefficiency/reduced countervailing power hypothesis. Overall, evidence from Panels B
and C of Table 8 indicates that concentrated suppliers compared to non-concentrated suppliers benefit
from downstream divestitures, while non-concentrated suppliers appear to be disadvantaged by
downstream horizontal asset sales.
2.4.6.3. Supplier retention versus termination: univariate results
Subsequently, the financial effects of retention and termination decisions on suppliers are
evaluated, similar to Fee and Thomas (2004). Panels D and E of Table 8 reports that though terminated
individual suppliers experience substantial deterioration in post-divestiture median industry-adjusted
cash-flow margins of -12.08%, the retained individual suppliers experience significant improvement in
post-divestiture median industry-adjusted cash-flow margins of 5.46%. The difference in post-divestiture
median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales of 17.54% between terminated and retained individual
suppliers is highly significant. Panel E of Table 8 indicates that terminated supplier portfolios experience
significant adverse mean (median) abnormal returns of -3.36% (-1.83%) at divestiture announcement,
whereas retained supplier portfolios insignificant abnormal returns at divestiture announcement. Although
terminated supplier portfolios experience trivial changes in median abnormal operating performance,
retained supplier portfolios experience a significant boost in cash-flows of 5.91%. Similar to the evidence
in Panel D, Panel E of Table 8 indicates that the difference in cash-flows between terminated and retained
supplier portfolios is 12.94% and is decidedly significant. In conjunction with the results from the logit
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regression in Panel A of Table 8 in which ∆ Industry Herf <-100 is significant and positively associated
with the supplier termination decision, the evidence suggests divestitures that result in a large reduction in
industry concentration are more likely to terminate a supplier relationship post-divestiture. This finding
validates the product market competition hypothesis, indicating that divesting firms eliminate less
efficient suppliers post-divestiture due to increased product market pressures. The results from the
supplier retention and termination subsamples are similar to those of horizontal mergers (Fee and
Thomas, 2004) but seem to be somewhat larger in magnitude (perhaps due to the difference in sample
sizes). The results in Panels D and E of Table 8 substantiate support for the product market competition
hypothesis.
2.4.6.4. Supplier switching costs: univariate results
Next, the role of switching costs on supplier performance is assessed. Panels F and G of Table 8
indicate that individual suppliers and supplier portfolios with a single large reported customer experience
adverse median abnormal returns of -1.77% and -2.27%, respectively, at the 10% level of significance,
while suppliers with multiple large customers do not experience a significant reaction at announcement.
Also, the difference in mean abnormal returns between suppliers with a single large customer and
suppliers that report more than one large customer for individual suppliers and supplier portfolio is at
least 2.21% at the 5% level of significance. In addition, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that the
difference in median abnormal returns between suppliers with a single large customer and suppliers that
report more than one large customer for individual suppliers is 1.96%. Panel G of Table 8 documents that
supplier portfolios with multiple large customers experience more improvements in median industryadjusted cash flows than supplier portfolios with a single large customer, however, the difference in cash
flows around the divestiture announcement is negligible. The evidence from the proxies for supplier high
and low switching cost subsamples suggest that downstream horizontal asset sales are detrimental to
suppliers with high switching costs but are beneficial to the cash flows of supplier portfolios with lower
switching costs. In sum, these results tend to support the diseconomies of scale/efficiency hypothesis,
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which designates that divesting firms resourcefully seek to improve contracting efficiencies with suppliers
by taking exploiting those with high switching costs.
2.4.7.

Divesting firms: multivariate results
For completeness, Table 9 reports the multivariate regressions that explain divesting parent firms

abnormal returns and changes in median industry adjusted changes in operating performance. The
dependent variable for Columns (1) – (12) in Table 9 is the abnormal returns for divesting parent firms at
announcement. In Column (1), the independent variable is the pre-divestiture TOBINS_Q. The estimated
coefficient on TOBINS_Q is negative and significant, which is the anticipated sign under the industry
demand hypothesis. It suggests that low productivity firms/performing firms have higher abnormal
returns at the announcement.
In Column (2), the independent variable is the pre-divestiture NEED_FOR_FUNDS. The
estimated coefficient is positive and significant, which is the anticipated sign under the financing
hypothesis. It indicates that firms with high financial constraints have higher returns at announcement. In
Column (3), the independent variable is the pre-divestiture ALTMAN_Z_SCORE. The coefficient on
ALTMAN_Z_SCORE is negative and insignificant. Therefore, I fail to document evidence in support of
the financial distress hypothesis.
In Column (4), the independent variable is pre-divestiture COGSSALE. The coefficient is positive
and insignificant and fails to support the diseconomies of scale hypothesis. In Column (5), the
independent variable is pre-divestiture EMPSALE and the coefficient is marginally significant and
positive, suggesting evidence in favor of the diseconomies of scale hypothesis. In Column (6), the
independent variable is pre-divestiture WAGESALE. In Column (7), the independent variable is predivestiture SGASALE. The coefficient on SGASALE is positive and marginally significant, which provides
additional support for the diseconomies of scale/efficiency hypothesis.
In Column (8), I include the indicator variable for significant concentration in addition to the
indicator for divestitures that result in substantial decreases in industry concentration, Ind. Herf.>1800
and ∆ Ind. Herf <-100, respectively. The coefficients on Ind. Herf.>1800 and ∆ Ind. Herf <-100 are
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positive insignificant. In Column (9), I include variables pertaining to deal characteristics REL_SIZE,
CASH, and, SAME_INDUSTRY. REL_SIZE is the net transaction value of the asset sale scaled by the
prior year’s market value of equity. The coefficient on REL_SIZE is positive and significant, suggesting
that larger transactions signal more positive news to shareholders. CASH is an indicator variable that is
equal to one if the deal was all cash deal, and equal to zero otherwise. CASH is positive and significant
suggesting that cash transactions are positive signals by sellers, which is consistent with Slovin, Sushka,
and Poloncheck (2005). This may also indicate that cash deals help to reduce firm financing constraints.
SAME_INDUSTRY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the division/segment/business unit was
sold to an acquirer with same four-digit SIC code and equal to zero, otherwise. I anticipate the coefficient
on SAME_INDUSTRY to be negative due to the fact that this type of deal would just redistribute market
power amongst firms in the same industry and offset the gains via the divestiture. The coefficient on
SAME_INDUSTRY is negative and insignificant.
In Column (10), I omit the variables NEED_FOR_FUNDS and COGSSALE due to
multicollinearity with SGASALE and EMPSALE, respectively. I omit WAGESALE because it is
mechanically related to EMPSALE. The coefficients on EMPSALE and SGASALE are significant and
positive, while t-statistics suggest that firms with higher labor intensity are more important to value
creation for divesting firms than overhead costs. However, both coefficients support the diseconomies of
scale/efficiency hypothesis and to a lesser extent the financing hypothesis due to the influence of
SGASALE on financial constraints.
In Column (11), I add the variables NEED_FOR_FUNDS and COGSSALE and omit the variable
SGASALE. NEED_FOR_FUNDS is significant and positive, which provides strong support the financing
hypothesis. COGSSALE is significant and negative, which suggest that divesting firms with high input
costs leads to lower abnormal returns. This evidence suggests that horizontal divestitures may subject
divesting firms to higher rents from suppliers.
In Column (12), I replace the variable EMPSALE with WAGESALE. WAGESALE and
NEED_FOR_FUNDS are both positive and significant, while COGSSALE is negative and significant.
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However, SGASALE is no longer significant, which likely due to the multicollinearity. These results are
consistent with those from Columns (10) and Column (11). Therefore the multivariate results in Table 8
allow us to evaluate the relative importance between the hypotheses and identify the sources of value
creation and destruction.
Multivariate analysis of divesting firm abnormal returns present strong support for the financing
hypothesis and diseconomies of scale/efficiency conjectures. These results also indicate that firms with
higher pre-divestiture input costs will likely result negative abnormal returns. This result suggests further
corroboration of purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing power hypothesis as well. These results also
indicate that cash deal consideration adds value for divesting firms by potentially mitigating divesting
firm financing constraints.
2.5. Conclusion
This study investigates the upstream and downstream product market impact of a sample of
horizontal asset sales from 1988 through 2005. I construct a data set that identifies corporate customers,
suppliers, and rival firms from a sample of firms proposing horizontal asset sales. I employ this data set to
explore the announcement related stock price reactions and post-divestitures changes in abnormal
operating performance. Multivariate analysis of divesting firm abnormal returns at announcement suggest
that the gains from horizontal asset sales arise from the elimination of divesting firm bureaucracy and
relaxation of financing constraints. In addition, I document that environmental factors matter when
considering horizontal divestitures. I present evidence that substantial divestiture activity promotes
positive changes in the competitive environment, which enhances managerial incentives to increase firm
productivity and reduced factor costs. However, I urge mangers, who ponder undertaking horizontal asset
sales, to consider the risks associated with this event such as potential erosion of purchasing efficiencies
that may arise from reduced bargaining power relative to powerful suppliers. The evidence indicates that
horizontal asset sales tend to be wealth generating events for divesting firms, but the analysis of
stakeholder wealth effects suggest that these events are perceived as bad news for less competitive rivals,
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customers less essential to the divesting firm’s production process, and suppliers with high switching
costs.
Multivariate analyses of divesting firm abnormal returns present strong support for the financing
and diseconomies of scale/efficiency hypotheses. The evidence indicates that firms with high predivestiture labor intensity and financing constraints are associated higher abnormal returns at
announcement. However, firms with higher pre-divestiture input costs are inversely related to abnormal
returns at announcement. This evidence suggests that horizontal divestitures may reduce firm
countervailing power, leading to bargaining disadvantages with suppliers and, thus, increased input costs.
This study complements prior studies on countervailing power (Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005;
Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011), indicating that substantial horizontal deconsolidation activity may
weaken divesting firm countervailing power relative to powerful suppliers.
Next, this study provides evidence that the competitive landscape matters when considering
horizontal asset sales. Divestiture deals that compose a large percent of the industry enhance competition,
are associated with reduced abnormal labor intensity and employee related expenses, but are exposed to
increased abnormal input costs relative to deals that do not compose a large percent of the industry. In
contrast, divestiture deals in more concentrated industries result in positive abnormal returns from
increased efficiency gains despite rising overhead costs and decreased cash flows for divesting firms.
However, divestiture deals in less concentrated industries result in suppliers experiencing improved
abnormal cash flows around the event, while less divesting firms suffer decreased abnormal cash flows.
These results supplement prior studies that suggest enhanced industry competition diminishes the
prospect of managers being able to live the “quiet-life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Giroud and
Mueller, 2001).
For the entire sample of horizontal asset sales, this study documents a positive stock price
reaction by divesting firms at announcement, a competitive effect (negative abnormal returns) for industry
rivals at announcement, a negative stock price reaction corporate customers respond negatively, and a
statistically insignificant stock price reaction by suppliers at announcement of the divestiture deal. Thus,
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the investigation of the wealth effects of horizontal sell-offs indicates that parent firms experience
positive wealth effects, but these gains do not extend to corporate customers and suppliers as they do with
vertical divestitures (Jain, Kini, and Shenoy, 2011).
Next, I report the significant role that customer switching costs have on corporate customer
wealth effects (performance) at announcement (around the announcement) of upstream divestitures. I find
that customers less reliant on divesting firms experience significantly more negative median abnormal
returns and more negative than positive abnormal returns than reliant customers. This evidence suggests
horizontal asset sales are less beneficial for non-essential customers than those with strong customersupplier relationships.
Finally, this study also underscores the importance of how supplier retention and termination
decisions and supplier switching costs affect supplier wealth effects (performance) at announcement
(around the announcement) of downstream divestitures. Multivariate logit analysis of the supplier
termination decision indicates that divesting firm abnormal returns, large changes in divesting firm
industry competition, high supplier switching costs, and length of the supplier divesting firm relationship
are positively associated with the supplier termination decision. Divesting firm wealth effects are
positively linked to the decision to end a supplier relationship, which support the efficiency view of
divestitures. Decreases in divesting firm industry concentration appear to motivate managers to sever ties
with suppliers, suggesting that these deals provoke managers cut ties with inefficient suppliers and, also,
reduces the chance of managers being able to live the “quiet-life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003;
Giroud and Mueller, 2001). Particularly, divesting firms are more likely to sever long-standing supplier
relationships and relationships with suppliers that are uniquely dependent on the divesting firm
subsequent to the horizontal divestiture deal. However, cash deals appear to mitigate divesting firm
financing constraints and are negatively associated with supplier termination decision. Divesting firms
appear to create value by breaching long-term implicit contracts within the firm (employees) and outside
of the firm (with suppliers). My evidence from the supplier retention and termination subsamples
complement those of horizontal mergers (Fee and Thomas, 2004) but the magnitude of the performance
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differences seem to be somewhat larger (perhaps due to the difference in sample sizes). Terminated
suppliers experience substantial deterioration in post-divestiture median industry-adjusted cash-flow
margins, while retained suppliers experience significant improvement in post-divestiture median industryadjusted cash-flow margins. This study also presents evidence that downstream horizontal asset sales are
detrimental to suppliers with high switching costs but are beneficial to the cash flows of supplier
portfolios with lower switching costs. These suppliers appear ex-ante more reliant on divesting upstream
firms and are expected to face larger switcher costs than suppliers that report more than one important
customer in their financial statements.
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CHAPTER 3: IS YOUR LOSS MY GAIN? HORIZONTAL DIVESTITURES AND PRODUCT
MARKET RELATIONSHIPS.
3.1. Introduction
An increasing body of literature in financial economics explores the sources of value creation of
certain corporate events by exploring product market relationships along the supply chain, rather than
exploring these events in isolation. For instance, one stream of literature examines the sources of value
creation resulting from horizontal takeovers and mergers (Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005;
Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011). Another stream explores the sources of value creation resulting from
vertical takeovers (Shenoy, 2012). More recently, Greene, Kini, and Shenoy (2013) examine sources of
value creation resulting from conglomerate acquisitions. This research often debates whether or not the
value derived from the aforementioned corporate events is from efficiency considerations or from
market/buying power considerations. Generally, this line of research indicates that increased buying
power resulting from acquisitions may serve as one particular source of value creation in the product
market. In a related paper, Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) document that market power motivations (i.e.
collusion, foreclosure) are not primary driving forces behind vertical divestitures and that
customer/suppliers/rivals experience positive information transfer effects.
The extant literature focuses mostly on corporate events that increase relative firm size that alters
the dynamics between customers and suppliers (Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005; Bhattacharyya
and Nain, 2011; Greene, Kini, and Shenoy, 2013), with exception of Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011). These
papers

largely

study

events

that

potentially improve

buyer/bargaining

power

relative

to

customers/suppliers. In effect, the prior research only explores events in which the firm grows in size at
the same stage of production (i.e. horizontal mergers/takeovers, tender offers), successive stages of stages
of production (i.e. vertical mergers or takeovers), or unrelated stages of production with overlapping
sources of supply (i.e. conglomerate mergers). In contrast, Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) examine
customer supplier relationships using vertical divestitures—an event in which the firm reduces its size via
successive stages of the production process. Therefore, I attempt to fill a void in the literature by
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examining product market relationships through an event that reduces firm size at the same stage of
production process, horizontal divestitures. 11 This study examines the impact of upstream and
downstream horizontal divestiture activity on product market relationships.
To date, little to no research, theoretical or empirical, discusses the consequences of a decrease in
relative firm size at a specific stage of the production process. What happens to buying power as firm size
decreases at the same stage of the production process? Therefore, this study explores four hypotheses
related to horizontal divestitures: the customer expropriation hypothesis, the pivotal buyer repositioning
hypothesis, the waterbed effect hypothesis, and the supplier expropriation hypothesis. The customer
expropriation hypothesis posits that suppliers, in the presence of incomplete contracts (Williamson,
1985), behave opportunistically following large downstream divestiture activity and increase input prices
as a result of reduced customer bargaining power, given relaxed countervailing power considerations
(Galbraith, 1952). Expanding the extant literature on buyer power and the literature on pivotal buyer
theory (Chipty and Snyder, 1999; Raskovich, 2003; and Adilov and Alexander, 2006), I investigate the
pivotal buyer repositioning hypothesis. The pivotal buyer repositioning hypothesis conjectures that
pivotal buyers have an incentive to reverse their pivotal position, by reducing their size and thus
eliminating potential cross-subsidization of suppliers and non-pivotal buyers (Raskovich, 2003)
subsequent to downstream divestiture activity. Next, I extend the literature on waterbed effects
(Majumdar, 2005; Inderst and Valletti, 2011) by exploring the waterbed effect hypothesis, which
postulates that downstream divestiture activity promotes asymmetric buyer power among customers and
engender lower prices for more powerful customers while increasing input prices to competing customers
in the years following downstream divestiture activity. Lastly, I complement the work of Bhattacharyya
and Nain (2011) by investigating the supplier expropriation hypothesis, which postulates whether

11

There are several respects in which a horizontal divestiture differs from that of a vertical one; some of these
differences include: stage of production, competitive effects, contracting environment, scale of production, and
motivations. The first and foremost distinction that I emphasize is that a horizontal divestiture, typically, represents a
separation of a subsidiary, division, or business unit at the same stage of production as that of the parent firm. In
contrast, a vertical divestiture represents a separation of a subsidiary, division, or business unit at a successive or
preceding stage of production relative to the parent firm.
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customers take advantage of economically dependent suppliers following significant upstream horizontal
divestiture activity.
I employ an empirical strategy, which strongly resembles that of Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011).
I conduct a cross-industry analysis of the product market impact of 46 (35) downstream (upstream)
industry-level horizontal divestiture events on supplier (customer) industries, resulting in 274 (35)
industry-supplier (industry-customer) pairs on profits, value, and producers’ prices (profits, value, and
input costs) over a sample period from 1979-2010. In contrast to Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), I
concentrate on cases in which firms reduce their size vis-à-vis suppliers, whereas, their focus is on cases
in which firm size increases via horizontal acquisition activity. In contrast, Bhattacharyya and Nain
(2011) investigate the product market effects of a 141 downstream horizontal merger events on supplier
industries that result in 1,155 merger industry-supplier industry pairs.
I document considerable evidence in support of the supplier expropriation hypothesis, suggesting
that upstream horizontal divestiture activity has an adverse effect on supplier industry selling power
(positive impact on customer industry buying power). I report evidence that opportunistic customers of
dependent supplier industries experience favorable changes in abnormal cash flow margins (4.9%),
abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets (2.3%), and declines in abnormal costs-of-goods sold
margin (2.3%) relative to customers of non-dependent suppliers. Supplier dependence captures the
highest quintile in which a supplier industry’s output sold to a customer industry as a percentage of its
total output sold. I also present some evidence that certain supplier industry barriers to entry (capital
expenditures) contribute to increase customer industry profitability, value and decreased input costs. I
also find moderate evidence in support of the pivotal buyer repositioning hypothesis, indicating that
pivotal buyers reduce their size via downstream divestiture activity and, therefore, exploit suppliers that
are dependent on their pivotal position and eliminate cross-subsidization of suppliers and non-pivotal
buyers. I find that suppliers with a pivotal buyer suffer a decrease in abnormal cash flow margin (10.1%)
and abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets (3.1%) relative to suppliers with a non-pivotal buyer. I
also present minor evidence that suppliers with pivotal buyers endure an unfavorable price decrease

60
(0.2% per month) in the years subsequent to a downstream divestiture. These results suggest that pivotal
buyers exhibit opportunistic behavior and take advantage of suppliers subsequent to substantial
downstream divestitures. However, I find little to moderate evidence in support of the waterbed effect,
while I present little to no evidence to corroborate the customer expropriation hypothesis with respect to
downstream divestiture activity.
This study makes several contributions to the recent stream of financial economics literature that
explores the impact of corporate events on buying power. This is the first study to explore, to my
knowledge, the implications of reducing firm size on customer-supplier relations at a specific stage of the
production process by examining producers’ prices, profitability, and value. In particular, I employ the
methodology by Bhattacharya and Nain (2011), who take the “direct approach” in examining the effect of
horizontal mergers on product prices. I contribute to the industrial organization literature that examines
the motives and consequences of buying power and waterbed effects. This study is similar to another
closely related study by Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011), who examine the product market effects of
vertical divestitures. The primary distinction between this study and that of Jain, Kini, and Shenoy is that
I focus on same (within) industry divestitures that occur at the same stage of production conducting
industry level analysis, whereas, Jain, Kini, and Shenoy focus on divestitures that occur in successive
stages of the production process conducting firm-level analysis. In addition, this study examines the
industry level impact of horizontal divestiture activity, which allow for cleaner tests of the industry level
impact on upstream/downstream firms compared to a similar approach studying vertical divestitures at the
industry level. For instance, the analysis vertical and horizontal divestitures allow one to examine
different hypotheses. Horizontal divestitures allow one to investigate the impact of potential changes in
buying power or market concentration on the ability to collude amongst rivals, using specific collusion
hypotheses (i.e., monopolistic or monopsonistic). In contrast, vertical divestitures facilitate the ability to
examine the ability to collude by exploring the impact on the coordination mechanism (Jain, Kini,
Shenoy, 2011).
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Next, I add to the line of research that explores the linkages along the supply chain and corporate
finance. In particular, I look to extend the literature that investigates the influence of major corporate
restructuring events and product market interactions. Finally, I contribute to the industrial-organization
literature that examines the relationship between buying power, buyer size, and industry structure by
distinguishing the relative impact of horizontal divestitures on countervailing power and pivotal buyer
positions within the customer and supplier industry context. This is the first study that explores the effect
of horizontal divestitures on countervailing power. In addition, this is the first to study how a type of
divestiture (horizontal in my case) may influence the pivotal buyer relationship, if any exists. In the
industrial organization literature, few studies consider the impact of a reduction in buyer size on the
customer-supplier relationship. Hence, this study takes one of the first steps towards shedding light on
that relationship. I introduce and examine the buyer repositioning hypothesis, which to my knowledge is
the first paper to do so. This is also the first paper to empirically examine waterbed effects in the
corporate finance literature and in the context of horizontal divestitures. In comparison, the prior literature
on waterbed effects focuses predominantly on merger events.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I illustrate the relevant
existing empirical literature. In Section 3.3, I motivate and develop my testable hypotheses. In Section
3.4, I discuss my sample construction, empirical strategy and results. In Section 3.5, I conclude my
discussion.
3.2. Existing Literature
In this section, I discuss related empirical literature that examines the impact of certain corporate
restructuring events along the supply chain with an emphasis on buyer power or market power theories.
The empirical literature appears to be largely biased in examining the influence of corporate restructuring
events on non-financial stakeholder relationships such as customers, suppliers, and rivals within the
corporate finance and industrial organization literature. Most studies related to corporate restructuring and
product markets are biased towards examining the effects of horizontal mergers and acquisitions on
market power or economic efficiencies along the supply chain (Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005;
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Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011). Other related papers examine buyer/market power (i.e. collusion, market
foreclosure, etc.) and efficiency motives along the supply chain along the supply chain in vertical mergers
and takeovers (Kedia, Ravid, and Pons, 2011; Shenoy, 2012), conglomerate acquisitions (Greene, Kini,
and Shenoy, 2013), and vertical divestitures (Jain, Kini, and Shenoy, 2011).
Bhattacharya and Nain (2011) execute cross-industry analyses of the product market impact of
horizontal acquisitions on supplier industries via effects on profits and prices and document evidence in
line with the generation of buying power via consolidation downstream. 12 They document strong
evidence that horizontal acquisitions generate buying power and impact the performance of economically
dependent supplier industries, resulting in large drops in both supplier profits and supplier prices (real
producers’ prices in the three years subsequent to downstream consolidation activity. Bhattacharya and
Nain’s (2011) findings suggest that horizontal mergers countervail upstream market power, indicating
that these mergers create bargaining power for merging firms to counteract bargaining power held by
suppliers. They propose consolidation in one industry prompts countervailing consolidations in industries
that share product market linkages as a potential transmission mechanism for mergers waves. In a recent
study, Ahern (2012) finds that industry economic dependence is an important consideration for the
division of gains between the target and acquiring firm in mergers. Fee and Thomas (2004) find evidence
consistent with the notion that buying power of customer firms relative to suppliers serves as key source
of gains in horizontal mergers. Shahrur (2005) shows that horizontal mergers and tender offers tend to
generate significant positive abnormal returns for rivals, suppliers and corporate customers suggesting
evidence in support of the efficiency hypothesis, however, they find that buyer power is a source of gains
in imperfectly competitive industries.
Kedia, Ravid, and Pons (2011) compare market reactions of horizontal, vertical, and
conglomerate mergers to investigate motives for vertical integration. Kedia, Ravid, and Pons (2011)
document evidence that vertical mergers create value in noncompetitive market environments and
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Downstream industries refers to customer industries along the supply chain, while, upstream industries refer to
supplier industries along the supply chain.
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evidence in support of market foreclosure theories, suggesting that vertical mergers of dominant firms
shut out rival firms. In contrast, Shenoy (2012) explores efficiency (i.e. underinvestment in relationshipspecific investments and hold-up concerns) and market power theories (i.e. collusion or market
foreclosure) as sources of value and creation behind vertical takeovers by examining the impact
announcements of vertical takeovers along the supply chain. Shenoy documents strong evidence in
support of the efficiency hypothesis and weaker evidence in support of the collusion hypothesis,
suggesting that firms undertake vertical mergers in order mitigate hold-up problems and underinvestment
in relationship-specific assets and to a lesser extent collude with rivals. Greene, Kini, and Shenoy (2013)
document evidence that conglomerate acquisitions create value from acquirers with segments that have
overlapping suppliers with those of target, leading to reduced suppliers prices and positive wealth effects.
Overall, the evidence is mixed evidence in support of both efficiency and market power theories (i.e.
market foreclosure, collusion, etc.) as sources of value creation behind vertical mergers and takeovers.
Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) investigate how product market considerations and financing
considerations influence the vertical divestiture decision and choice of divestiture (equity carve-outs or
spin-offs). Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) find evidence that parent firms experience positive wealth
effects on announcement. These wealth effects are linked to efficiency motives derived from corporate
focus and holdup consideration, while, anti-competitive motives such as collusion or foreclosure do not
appear to be a factor in the decision of the method to vertically disintegrate. In addition, Jain, Kini, and
Shenoy (2011) find that the wealth effects are also passed along to rival firms, supplier firms, and
customer firms, largely support efficiency explanations in vertical divestitures. Overall, they infer that
vertical divestitures appear to be good news for non-financial stakeholders along the supply chain.
Another stream of literature considers the impact of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) on product
markets. Chevalier (1995) examines the influence of leveraged buyouts on product market competition in
the local supermarket industry, encouraging entry and expansion by supermarket chains. She finds that
LBOs in the local supermarket industry increase the industry rivals’ returns and thus stimulates softer
product market competition in that industry.
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The emerging stream of literature that explores the effect of certain types (i.e. vertical, horizontal,
conglomerate) restructuring activities such as mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers generally associate
buyer/market power themes with horizontal and vertical mergers or takeovers along the supply chain,
while some of the evidence appears mixed between efficiency and market power explanations. Prior
literature fails to address horizontal divestitures in the corporate finance literature, to my knowledge. In
addition, extant research overlooks the influence of horizontal divestitures on product markets
relationships. Hence, the effects of horizontal deconsolidation remain largely unexplored, and I attempt to
fill this gap in the literature by investigating the impact of customer industry horizontal divestitures on its
supplier industry operating performance and producers’ prices. 13
3.3. Hypothesis development
In this section, I develop and discuss the implications of the supplier opportunism/expropriation,
pivotal buyer repositioning, and rival opportunism/waterbed effect hypotheses on supplier industry cash
flow margins

and

producers’

prices.

Lastly,

I investigate

the

implications

of

customer

opportunism/expropriation on customer industry cash flow margins. There are other potential
explanations of supplier profitability and pricing and customer profitability such as collusion, agency, and
market foreclosure theories, among others. In this study, I test implications that are specific to customer
(supplier) industry horizontal divestitures and have direct repercussions for firms in supplier (customer)
industries. I summarize hypotheses and empirical predictions in Table 10. Panel A of Table 10 contains
the hypotheses and predictions for my sample of downstream divestitures. Panel B of Table 10 contains
the hypotheses and predictions for my sample of upstream divestitures.
3.3.1.

Supplier opportunism/expropriation hypothesis
There are several means in which divesting firms may diminish their buying power. A divesting

firm may lose its ability to pool its purchases across divisions or business units, thus impeding its ability
13

I use “horizontal divestiture event,” “horizontal deconsolidation,” “industry divestiture event,” and “industry
deconsolidation interchangeably throughout the remainder of this study to describe my event of interest. Similarly,
downstream deconsolidation is used interchangeably with customer deconsolidation, downstream divestitures, or
customer divestiture event. In contrast, upstream deconsolidation is used interchangeably with supplier
deconsolidation, supplier divestiture event, or upstream divestitures.
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to demand price concessions or quantity discounts from its suppliers. Whereas in the case of horizontal
acquisitions, Fee and Thomas (2004) and Bhattacharya and Nain (2011) find evidence of efficiency
increasing buying power. Alternatively, a divesting firm may demonstrate a moderated capacity to use
buying power to limit purchases to monopsony levels, leading to elevated input prices that may rise to or
above marginal cost. Williamson (1985) argues that an incomplete contracting environment can promote
opportunistic behavior. As a result of a divesting firm’s reduced ability to negotiate lower input prices
from suppliers, suppliers in industries that have a relative bargaining advantage vis-à-vis customer
industries are poised to exploit their customers’ diminished ability to negotiate lower input prices and
potentially raised input prices.
If horizontal divestitures do diminish buying power, I anticipate this outcome to be revealed in
the operating performance of supplier industries. If a customer industry is heavily dependent on a
particular supplier industry for a key input in its production process, a significant horizontal divestiture
will likely lessen the divesting customer industry’s bargaining power relative to its supplier due to the
customer’s reduced size and ability to negotiate price concessions for volume purchases. Therefore, I
postulate that suppliers of dependent customer industries will enjoy a greater increase in operating
performance after downstream deconsolidation (horizontal divestiture event in a customer industry)
relative to suppliers of non-dependent customer industries. Therefore, my first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1. Suppliers of dependent customer industries experience greater favorable changes in
abnormal cash flow margins in the two years following an announcement of downstream deconsolidation.
Improvement in operating performance, while in line with selling power enhancement, is not a
conclusive substantiation of reduced buying power. On the one hand, alternative isolated aspects such as
decreases in production costs or wages may constitute an increase in profitability of supplier industries. If,
on the other hand, the increase in operating performance is linked to diminished buying power, I assume
that this effect will be highlighted in the form of improved selling prices in the supplier industry.
Therefore, my second hypothesis is:
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Hypothesis 2. Suppliers of dependent customer industries experience larger increases in selling prices
(real producers’ prices) subsequent to downstream deconsolidation.
Efficiency-improving divestitures bias the results against supporting my hypothesis for a
reduction in buying power. However, production efficiencies can decrease marginal costs of production,
resulting in lower selling prices and increased production. Similar to the case of horizontal mergers
(Bhattacharya and Nain (2011), efficiency-improving horizontal divestitures can raise the productive
efficiency downstream and can bring about a decrease in marginal costs of production, thus lowering
selling prices and increasing output levels. Alternatively, if deconsolidation permits divesting firms to
produce the same output with fewer inputs then the demand for inputs, and thus, prices should decline.
Efficiency-enhancing divestitures can end in perceived decreases in selling prices. The reduction in
supplier selling prices would not be explainable by diminished selling power, thus any increase in
producers’ prices would support the supplier opportunism hypothesis.
Next, I consider countervailing power in the context of horizontal divestitures. The theory of
countervailing power posits that economic power results in economic power (Galbraith, 1952). In
particular, the group that is subject to the economic power of a dominant group counteracts that position
by enhancing its own economic power relative to the power of the dominant group, thus exhibiting
countervailing power. In this context, a large customer employs its bargaining power relative to its
suppliers’ bargaining power; as a result, suppliers decrease their selling prices to its buyers. If
countervailing power serves as a mechanism to constrain buying power and selling power, then what is
the consequence of relaxing this constraint, in this case buyer size, on buying power? Inherent in the
theory of countervailing power is the notion that horizontal divestitures of downstream firms or buyers
relax the mechanism that constrains or keeps in check upstream firms’ or suppliers’ selling power. More
specifically, horizontal divestitures may reduce bargaining power, to the extent in which it eases the
restrictions on suppliers’ selling power, resulting in diminished buying power for a given customer
industry relative to supplier industries.
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In a model of dynamic countervailing power, Snyder (1996) shows that large buyers (customers)
achieve lower prices from colluding sellers, and that the profitability of all buyers improves at the
expense of the supplier after a merger of another firm due to merger induced competition amongst
suppliers (Snyder, 1998). Hence, in the absence of buying power or erosion thereof, countervailing power
theory suggests adverse consequences for not only a horizontally divesting customer firm, but for all other
customer firms in their industry, as well. If downstream deconsolidation diminishes countervailing power
as these theories designate, then customer industries that enjoy some degree of noncompetitive pricing
(resulting from industry concentration and firm size) prior to deconsolidation should experience greater
increases in price from opportunistic supplier industries, ex post. Therefore, the observable effect of
reduced countervailing power should be more pronounced (or easy to detect) in customer industries with
higher levels of concentration prior to downstream deconsolidation, since this type of customer industry
will be less likely to counteract supplier market power. Hence, my third hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3. If downstream deconsolidation diminishes buying power then customer industries with
higher levels of concentration prior to downstream deconsolidation will undergo larger price increases in
selling prices following downstream deconsolidation.
Next, I consider how barriers to entry may play a role on the impact of horizontal divestitures.
Industry demand characteristics that may influence barriers to entry are often highlighted as impediments
to competitive practices in the theory of industrial organization. Oligopoly theory conjectures that barriers
to entry serve as a mechanism to preserve a collusive environment reducing the risk of entry. There exists
empirical evidence that the concentration of buyers negatively influence supplier profitability, in support
of the theory of countervailing power (Galbraith, 1952; Lustgarten, 1975; Schumacher, 1991; Patatoukas,
2011). 14 Traditional textbooks in economic theory suggest that barriers to entry afford the ability to

14

Lustgarten (1975) finds evidence between the relationship of supplier concentration and buyer concentration,
confirming that structural factors such as the number of firms and barriers to entry are a factor in determining
oligopolistic relationships. Schumacher (1991) finds evidence that buyer power concentration reduces the
profitability of concentrated suppliers. Patatoukas (2011) finds evidence to suggest that research on the underlying
factors of customer-base concentration should be examined simultaneously with the features and dynamics of
upstream and downstream ﬁrms and industries.
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influence market prices (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005). In order to distinguish between industry demand
considerations and the conjectured deterioration of buying power, I must demonstrate that downstream
divestitures that improve demand effects upstream simply owing to enhanced efficiencies ought to have
no impact on prices of supplier industries with lower impediments to entry. Similarly, downstream
divestitures that diminish buying reduce demand effects upstream owing to enhanced efficiencies ought to
have little, if any, impact on prices of supplier industries with lower impediments to entry. Since these
more competitive environments are subject to price-taking behavior. This leads us to my fourth
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. If downstream deconsolidation diminishes buying power, concentrated supplier industries
with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation will enjoy larger increases in selling prices
following downstream deconsolidation of concentrated customer industries.
3.3.2.

Pivotal buyer repositioning hypothesis
Chipty and Snyder (1999) contend that larger buyers negotiate lower prices in the model of one

seller and multiple buyers. More recently, Adilov and Alexander (2006) extend Chipty and Snyder ’s
(1999) model and define a buyer as crucial, if the supplier is unable to cover its costs in the absence of
trading with the customer. Adilov and Alexander argue that firm size can still increase bargaining power
in the event of a horizontal merger, suggesting that there is a substitution effect between the bargaining
power effect and pivotal buyer effect, under the assumption of a concentrated supplier. In contrast,
Raskovich (2003) postulates that, in cases in which a supplier industry is characterized by high fixed
costs, low marginal costs and high concentration, a buyer may grow to the extent in which it assumes a
crucial role to a supplier’s choice to produce due to the supplier need to meet it high fixed costs.
Consequently, the buyer can no longer, convincingly, relinquish accountability for financing the supplier's
costs due to the extent the supplier is dependent on its customer. Therefore, a pivotal buyer is less able to
credibly negotiate with its supplier. Consequently, Raskovich (2003) contends that this circumstance
leads the pivotal buyer to commit unfairly toward shared costs of production, resulting in cross-
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subsidization of smaller, non-pivotal buyers (given that these non-pivotal buyers can resign responsibility
for financing the supplier's costs since they are not as crucial to the supplier production choice).
Overall, these buyer power and pivotal buyer theories imply that a pivotal buyer or customer firm
will have an incentive to divest (in order to reduce its size and thus its pivotal buyer status) if it is “on the
hook” for its supplier’s costs and cross-subsidization of non-pivotal buyers, thus reversing the buyer’s
pivotal position, increasing the firm’s ability to negotiate forcefully with their supplier. The reversal of
the buyer’s pivotal position may allow the supplier to fairly reassume responsibility for its shared costs,
improving the customer bargaining position and relieving the customer of cross-subsidization of nonpivotal buyers, as well. Assuming that the divesting firm’s buying power is inconsequentially reduced,
this improvement in bargaining position would allow the buyer to negotiate more aggressively and
credibly post-divestiture, and thus reducing the selling price for its inputs. The notion of a pivotal buyer
strongly suggests a role for supplier economic dependence. As a result, a dependent supplier may become
less profitable or experience a drop cash flow margin since the supplier reassumes full responsibility of its
own financing costs given that the once pivotal buyer is no longer considered as crucial to the supplier’s
production decision. Thus, my fifth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 5. More dependent and concentrated supplier industries experience greater adverse changes
in abnormal cash flow margins in the two years following an announcement of downstream
deconsolidation.
However, if the decline in supplier operating performance is linked to increased customer
bargaining power, I can anticipate that this effect will be highlighted in the form of reduced selling prices
by dependent supplier industries relative to non-dependent supplier industries. This leads us to my sixth
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6. Dependent supplier industries experience larger declines in selling prices (real producers’
prices) subsequent to downstream deconsolidation.
Efficiency-improving divestitures may reduce the ability to distinguish between the pivotal buyer
repositioning hypothesis and one of efficiency, since production efficiencies arising from the
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deconsolidated firm can decrease marginal costs of production, resulting in lower selling prices and
increased production. Increased production levels can stimulate demand for inputs and thus prices by
suppliers (in contrast to my proposition of pivotal buyer repositioning). Alternatively, if deconsolidation
permits divesting firms to produce the same output with fewer inputs then the demand for inputs, and
thus, prices should decline. Efficiency-enhancing divestitures can end in perceived decreases in selling
prices. The reduction in supplier selling prices would not be explainable by diminished selling power of
the deconsolidating industry but could be explaining by pivotal buyer repositioning, at least to some
degree.
Underlying this argument is the assumption that if the pivotal buyer can relinquish its pivotal
position, and therefore size, the buyer substitutes more bargaining power at the expense of it pivotal
position (Adilov and Alexander, 2006). Hence, once the pivotal buyer has reversed its pivotal position, it
will be more likely to obtain lower selling prices from its suppliers due to its increase bargaining power.
This reduction of firm size of a pivotal buyer should be more pronounced with respect to a concentrated
supplier industry. Thus a horizontal divestiture may serve as a mechanism to reverse a customer’s pivotal
position; as a consequence, I could interpret decreased input prices for the customer as evidence of
reversing the customer’s pivotal position: restoring the customer’s ability to bargain more aggressively.
Hence, more concentrated supplier industries prior to deconsolidation should experience a larger decrease
in selling prices after deconsolidation reflecting the reversal of the pivotal buyer’s position. Consequently,
my seventh hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 7. If downstream deconsolidation reverses a pivotal buyer’s pivotal position then supplier
industries with higher concentration prior to downstream deconsolidation will undergo a greater
reduction in selling prices following downstream deconsolidation.
Given that supplier industries could reduce selling prices as a result of increased efficiencies or
decreasing industry demand, I must distinguish potential increases in customer industry bargaining
position from those arising from efficiencies or demand. If downstream deconsolidation allows pivotal
buyers to reposition themselves, supplier industries with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation
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will suffer larger declines in selling prices following downstream deconsolidation of customer industries.
Hence, I present my eighth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 8. If downstream deconsolidation allows pivotal buyers to reposition themselves, supplier
industries with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation will suffer larger declines in selling
prices following downstream deconsolidation of customer industries.
3.3.3.

Waterbed effect hypothesis
Majumdar (2005) demonstrates how downstream mergers can lead to reduced input prices for the

newly merged firm, while at the same increasing input prices of the newly merged firm’s rivals, “the
waterbed bed effect.” In addition, Majumdar finds that pre-existing buying power plays a role in
enhancing the merging firm’s buying power in addition to making rivals worse off, citing reduced
demand from independent competitors and increased access to markets that the acquiring firm did not
initially have. In a related paper, Inderst and Valletti (2011) consider how a given buyer’s power (arising
from size) vis-à-vis suppliers compares with competing buyers and find that differential/asymmetric
buyer power among customers may lead to lower prices for more powerful customer while increasing
wholesale prices to competing customers. The asymmetry in buyer power provides the dominant firm
with advantageous terms of trade, and an increased competitive position in the retail market. Inderst and
Valletti (2011) show that if a supplier has the ability to price discriminate in which competing sources of
supply are uncontested and disparity in downstream firm size differential (buyer market power), the
potential waterbed effect should be more pronounced.
A horizontal divestiture potentially induces asymmetry or differential buying power of firms in
the divesting customer industry by redistributing buying power among the competing firms in that
industry. For instance, the resultant divesting firm is substantially smaller in size than prior to the
divestiture event, suggesting a reduced ability to exert the same degree of bargaining power or buying
power relative to its suppliers. Consequently, this event induces a potential redistribution of bargaining or
buying power of rivals or competing firms in the same industry vis-à-vis suppliers of crucial inputs. This
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suggests that more dominant competing rival firms may have improved bargaining position postdivestiture and possibly negotiate lower input prices with suppliers.
The waterbed effect suggests that horizontal divestitures may induce redistribution of buying
power and asymmetric gains in buying power among now dominant industry rivals post-divestiture.
These now dominant industry rivals potentially seek price concessions from suppliers, who have the
ability to price discriminate, at the expense of less dominant industry firms that may endure ensuing price
increase. As a result of these offsetting price increases and decreases, the net change in the supplier
operating performance is anticipated to be zero. Therefore, my ninth hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 9. Supplier or customer industry dependence has no effect on abnormal cash flow margins in
the two years following an announcement of downstream deconsolidation.
Given that supplier dependence and customer dependence should play no role in inducing
waterbed effects or rival opportunism, supplier dependence and customer dependence should have any
impact average supplier industry selling price. Accordingly, my tenth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 10. Supplier or customer industry dependence has no impact on supplier selling prices (real
producers’ prices) subsequent to downstream deconsolidation.
A large horizontal divestiture event can lead to a redistribution of buying power in a customer
industry. This redistribution may trigger a differential in buying power among the competing industry
rivals and divesting firm, resulting in a shift of dominant buyers within an industry. In supplier industries
in which there exists the ability to price discriminate, suppliers would be able to offer newly dominant
firms price discounts, while raising prices on newly non-dominant firms in the customer industry subject
to differential buying power. Therefore, I present my eleventh hypothesis:
Hypothesis 11. If downstream deconsolidation induces asymmetric customer buying power, supplier
industries with higher levels of concentration prior to downstream deconsolidation will lead to offsetting
selling price increases of less powerful customer and decreases in selling prices for more powerful
customers following downstream deconsolidation.
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To distinguish from Hypotheses 4 and 8, I must demonstrate that barriers to entry in the
supplier’s industry exacerbate waterbed effects due to these barriers allowing the supplier to continue
price discriminating behavior to customer industries. If downstream deconsolidation leads to asymmetric
customer industry buying power, supplier industries with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation
will be able to better discriminate selling prices following downstream deconsolidation of concentrated
customer industries, enhancing the waterbed effect of offsetting changes in input price. Next, I present my
twelfth and final hypothesis with respect to downstream deconsolidation.
Hypothesis 12. If downstream deconsolidation leads to asymmetric buying power, concentrated supplier
industries with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation will be able to better discriminate
selling prices following downstream deconsolidation of concentrated customer industries.
3.3.4.

Customer opportunism/expropriation hypothesis
For completeness, this section of the paper explores the implications of an upstream divestiture

event (upstream deconsolidation or supplier deconsolidation) on downstream firms. Stigler (1964)
contends that monopolistic collusion permits merging firms to collude with industry rivals and restrict
production to customers earning monopoly rents. Eckbo and Wier (1985) postulate that events that reduce
the chance of horizontal mergers would potentially result in lost monopoly rents to merging firms and
industry rivals. Eckbo (1983) asserts that under collusion brought about by merging firms, monopoly
rents are harmful to customers. By implication, a large horizontal divestiture may reduce supplier industry
concentration and diminish potential to collude amongst industry rivals. Assuming decreased industry
concentration from large horizontal divesture activity, the divesting supplier industry may lose potential
bargaining power relative to customer industries. Alternatively, divesting suppliers may no longer be able
to restrict output to monopoly levels, leading to lower input prices that may decline to marginal cost.
Thus, horizontal divestitures may harm ability of suppliers to bargain for higher input prices vis-à-vis
customers. Customers industries that have a bargaining advantage relative to supplier industries are in a
prime position to take advantage of their suppliers reduced ability to demand higher input prices, and
consequently reduce their (customers’) input prices.

74
If horizontal divestitures mitigate supplier selling power, I expect that this outcome will be
discovered in the operating performance of customer industries. If a supplier industry is very reliant on a
given customer industry for it sales, a substantial divestiture will likely reduce the supplier industry’s
negotiation power relative to its downstream customer industry. Thus, I posit that customer industries of
divesting upstream dependent supplier industries will enjoy a greater increase in operating performance
subsequent to upstream deconsolidation (horizontal divesture event in a customer industry) relative to
customers of less dependent supplier industries. Hence, my next hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 13. Customers of dependent supplier industries experience greater favorable changes in
abnormal cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years subsequent
to an upstream deconsolidation relative to customers of non-dependent supplier industries.
Consequently, if an upstream divestiture event weakens the bargaining position of upstream
firms, dependent supplier industries will be more vulnerable to granting price concessions as a result of
increased post-divestiture competition relative to less dependent supplier industries. Hence, I postulate
that customers of divesting upstream dependent supplier industries will experience reduced input costs
subsequent to the upstream divestiture event relative to less dependent supplier industries. Therefore, I
test the following conjecture:
Hypothesis 14. Customers of dependent supplier industries experience greater declines in abnormal
costs-of-goods sold margins in the two years subsequent to an upstream deconsolidation relative to
customers of less dependent supplier industries
Countervailing power theories posit that economic power brings about economic power
(Galbraith, 1952). For instance, the group that is constrained by the economic power of a dominant group
counters that position by boosting its own economic power in relation to the power of the dominant
group, thus engendering countervailing power. In this model, a large customer employs its bargaining
power relative to its suppliers’ bargaining power; consequently, suppliers cut their selling prices to its
buyers. If countervailing power serves as a medium to keep in check both buying power and selling
power, then I anticipate that relaxing this restriction will have adverse consequences for upstream
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suppliers’ selling power. Inherent in this model is the concept that horizontal divestitures of upstream
firms relax the channel that limits or keeps in check downstream firms’ or customers’ buying power.
More specifically, upstream horizontal divestitures may reduce bargaining power of supplier industries.
Potentially, upstream horizontal divestitures may strengthen the rivalry between colluding suppliers and
encourage these suppliers to offer lower prices to large buyers in a manner similar in which horizontal
mergers between buyers increase supplier competition (resulting in lower prices) in Snyder’s (1996,
1998) theory of dynamic countervailing power.
If upstream deconsolidation weakens countervailing power for supplier industries, then
concentrated suppliers, whose market power would be constrained by customer market power prior to
upstream deconsolidation, should no longer be able to effectively offset customer market power.
Therefore these customer industries should experience greater input price declines and hence higher cash
flow margins subsequent to the upstream divestiture. Employing supplier industry concentration as a
measure of market power, I state my next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 15. If upstream deconsolidation reduces selling power, customers whose suppliers have
higher concentration prior to upstream deconsolidation will experience greater favorable changes in
cash flow margins (abnormal operating income to market value of assets) in the two years subsequent to
an announcement of upstream deconsolidation.
As noted earlier, oligopoly theory posits that barriers to entry act as a channel to maintain a
collusive environment, in order to mitigate the risk of entry by new competitors, and is substantiated by
empirical evidence (Galbraith, 1952; Lustgarten, 1975; Schuacher, 1991; Patatoukas, 2011;
Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011). Upstream divestitures may lead to the increased probability of entry by
new competitors, and, thus, the threat of competition. Therefore, supplier industries will likely have to
compete on price and quality post-divestiture to the benefit of their customers. This competition may also
affect weaken structural barriers to entry within the industry.
Additionally, Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) document evidence to support countervailing power
theory, finding that suppliers with pricing power (market and structural) would be “natural targets” of
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buying power generated by “downstream consolidation” via horizontal acquisitions. Inversely,
countervailing power theory infers that upstream deconsolidation via horizontal divestitures make
suppliers with structural sources pricing power, again, “natural targets” due to reduced selling power
(alternatively, indirectly enhanced buying power) brought about by “deconsolidation upstream.” This
leads to my final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 16. If upstream deconsolidation reduces selling power, customers whose suppliers have
higher barriers to entry prior to upstream deconsolidation will experience greater favorable changes in
cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years subsequent to an
announcement of upstream deconsolidation.
3.4. Data sources, sample selection, and relevant characteristics of the sample
In this section, I describe the data sources and sample construction requirements employed to
identify my final sample of horizontal divestitures. I also present the relevant aspects of my final sample
of horizontal divestitures.
3.4.1.

Sample Formation
I commence by assembling a sample of industries that experienced an identifiable rise in

deconsolidation activity in order to obtain pre- and post-divestiture periods. I follow Villalonga and
McGahan (2005) in my initial stage of identifying horizontal divestitures in the Securities Data Company
(SDC) Platinum database. I obtain my sample of divestitures from SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions
database that meet the following criteria: (i) all divestitures announced and completed between January 1,
1979 and December 31, 2010. My next requirement is that the “divestitures” classification incorporates:
(ii) deals categorized by SDC as divestitures, spin-offs, and carve-outs. 15 Following Bhattacharyya and
15

As defined by Villalonga and McGahan (2005), SDC tracks divestitures in the event of a loss of majority control,
the parent firm loses majority ownership in the target, or the target firm disposes of assets. A spin-off represents the
tax-free distribution of stock by a firm off a unit, subsidiary, division, or another firm’s stock, or any fraction
thereof, to its stockholders. SDC follow spin-offs of any proportion. In comparison, a carve-out consists of a new
firm’s stock being distributed or being put up for sale to the public by way of an initial public offering (IPO). SDC
follows carve-outs under the condition that the carve-out corresponds to 100 percent of the unit, subsidiary, or
division or other firm. Following Villalonga and McGahan (2005) I exclude modifications in a firm’s ownership
structure created by a firm’s Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), or more generally by the acquisition of
partial or remaining in one of the sample firms (or in a subsidiary) that does correspond to a divestiture.
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Nain (2011), I also require that the: (iii) parent firm and the target firm (divested unit) to be U.S.-based. I
identify the parent and target firms’ divesting industries using the following SDC variables “Target
Ultimate Parent Primary SIC Code” and “Target Primary SIC Code,” respectively. Next, I restrict my
sample to include cases in which: (iv) the parent and target share the same primary four-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code. In addition, I require that: (v) the transaction value associated with
each divestiture is available.
For each four-digit SIC code in the divestiture sample, I measure quarterly divestiture activity as
the total transaction value of all horizontal divestitures announced in a quarter as a proportion of industry
total market value of common equity. Consistent with Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), I categorize an
industry as having undergone a divestiture event in a given quarter when the following restrictions are
met: (i) quarterly divestiture activity in the current quarter exceeds 5% of industry total market
capitalization and (ii) quarterly divestiture activity in any of the previous 8 quarters did not exceed 1.5%
industry total market value of common equity. 16 My initial restriction, (i), guarantees that the selected
industries undergo considerable horizontal deconsolidation in a given quarter, while the second
restriction, (ii), guarantees that I have clean pre-event period in which there was modest horizontal
divestiture activity. This designation of the divestiture event allows us to identify 137 four-digit SIC
codes that underwent at least one divestiture event between 1979 and 2010.
In order to establish customer or supplier relationships, I employ the make and use tables from the
1992 and 1997 Benchmark I-O accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The make table is
matrix displaying the industry production, or output, of each commodity in the economy at producer
prices, whereas, the use table is a matrix displaying the commodities consumed or used, by each industry
and final consumers at producer prices. Following Allayannis and Ihrig (2001) and Bhattacharyya and
Nain (2011), I generate an input-output matrix from the make and use tables. I use Bhattacharyya and
Nain’s (2011) matching procedure for the 1992 and 1997 input output matrix, since the BEA provides

16

I alter Bhattacharyya and Nain’s (2011) requirement of 12 quarters prior to and after divestiture event to 8
quarters prior to and after divestiture event in order to maximize the size of my sample.
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input-output tables every five years. In addition, 1992 is the final year in which the BEA uses the SIC
codes that can be matched to Compustat data, while 1997 input output matrix uses NAICS codes.
Therefore, staying consistent with Bhattacharyya and Nain, I must use the Census Bureau’s SIC-NAICS
correspondence tables for 1997 to match SIC and NAICS codes. I follow Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011)
and assume that this relationship exists for the latter half of my sample. Following Bhattacharyya and
Nain’s (2011) approach, I use the 1992 input-output matrix to link suppliers to industries deconsolidating
in or prior to 1994 (the first half of my sample) and the 1997 input-output matrix to match suppliers to
industries deconsolidating in or following 1995 (the second half of my sample).
I find 46 downstream industries that I am able to match suppliers to in my sample, whereas,
Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) are able to match suppliers to 141 industries. This disparity is likely due
to the frequency of divestiture activity that produces more contaminated matches that we are unable to
cleanly test. In addition, divestitures in general tend to be approximately one-third to one-half the size of
acquisitions, on average (Mulherin and Boone, 2000). Panel A of Table 11 identifies these divesting
industries accompanied by the number of divestitures that contribute to each divestiture event and the
proportion of the divestiture transaction value to industry total market value of common equity. I invert
the methodology outlined in Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) to identify upstream divestitures and match
up to ten customers industries to the sample of upstream divestiture events. I am able to link 35 upstream
divesting industries to customer industries in my sample. In contrast, Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) do
not examine upstream horizontal merger activity, since these actions are likely to be blocked by antitrust
authorities given the bias that selling power would likely increase. Panel A of Table 11 identifies
downstream divesting industries accompanied by the number of divestitures that contribute to each
divestiture event and the proportion of the divestiture transaction value to industry total market value of
common equity, while Panel B of Table 11 provides similar information for upstream divesting
industries.
I extend Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) in my approach to investigating the role of industry
dependence, by examining not only supplier dependence for the upstream divestiture sample, but also to
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investigate the pivotal buyer repositioning hypothesis by investigating the interaction of supplier industry
dependence, supplier high fixed costs, and customer industry concentration. Additionally, I examine the
role of customer dependence with respect to the supplier opportunism hypothesis. I use the input-output
matrix in order to compute the fraction, fjm of the deconsolidating customer industry m’s input purchased
from supplier industry j. Higher values of fjm suggest that the deconsolidating customer industry m is more
dependent on supplier industry. For every deconsolidating industry, I recognize up to ten supplier
industries with the largest values of fjm. Working with up to ten suppliers per deconsolidating industry, I
am able to incorporate industries selling a very small proportion of their output to the divesting industry
and less likely to be influenced substantially by downstream divestiture activity. This approach increases
the power of my cross-sectional tests in identifying any linkage between customer dependence and profit
or price fluctuations undergone by the supplier industry. Since there are only 46 clean downstream and 35
upstream divestiture events, respectively, I can acquire at most 460 divesting industry-supplier pairs and
350 divesting industry-customer pairs. Panel A in Table 12 shows the 274 divesting industry-supplier
industry pairs I obtain during my matching process, which is smaller than the number of merging
industry-supplier industry pairs (1,155) obtained by Bhattacharyya and Nain (20110 due to the lower
number events (47 compared to 141) we examine.
For the downstream divestiture sample, I characterize suppliers on which customers are
dependent, customer dependent, as suppliers with value of fjm in the top quintile of the distribution. I
classify lingering suppliers as non-customer dependent. Also for the downstream divestiture sample, I
characterize dependent suppliers as those suppliers with fmj in the top tercile (1/3rd) of the distribution. I
employ terciles rather than quintiles due to the fact that I using an interaction to capture pivotal buyers,
which reduces the number of observations that meet the criteria without losing substantial variation in the
sample. I use this delineation of supplier dependence to formulate my pivotal buyer classification. As
indicated earlier, Raskovich (2003) describes the conditions in which a supplier has a pivotal buyer
relationship. These conditions include a supplier having high fixed and marginal costs, high supplier
concentration, and the buyer is crucial to supplier’s production process. Using this depiction of a pivotal
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buyer relationship, I operationalize the variable, pivotal buyer, concept by meeting the following
conditions: suppliers with fmj in the top tercile (high supplier dependence), suppliers with pre-divestiture
abnormal high fixed costs top half of distribution (high fixed costs), and suppliers with average predivestiture industry concentration above 1800 (high concentration). All remaining suppliers that do not
meet these conditions are classified as having a non-pivotal buyer relationship.
However in my upstream divestiture sample, I define supplier dependence in a manner similar to
Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011). I characterize as the variable supplier dependent based on values fmj in
the top quintile. I also classify lingering suppliers as non-supplier dependent for those that are not
characterized as supplier dependent.
Panel A of Table 12 reports the distribution of fjm for dependent and non-dependent customers for
the downstream divestiture sample. fjm is calculated as the ratio of customer industry inputs purchased
from a given supplier industry to that customer industry’s total purchases in order to capture customer
(industry) dependence. Dependent customers in the divesting industry procure, on average, 4.56% of their
inputs from their suppliers, while non-dependent customers purchase 0.28%. Panel B of Table 12
represents the distribution of fmj for pivotal and non-pivotal suppliers for the downstream divestiture
sample. In contrast, fmj is calculated as the ratio of supplier industry output sold to a given customer
industry to that supplier industry’s total output produced in order to capture supplier (industry)
dependence. Dependent suppliers deliver, on average, 10.7% of their production to the divesting industry,
while non-dependent suppliers provide 0.4%. Panel C of Table 12 shows the distribution of fmj for
dependent and non-dependent suppliers for the upstream divestiture sample. Dependent suppliers supply,
on average, 10.7% of their production to the divesting industry, while non-dependent suppliers provide
0.4%.
3.4.2.

Supplier industry operating performance
I follow Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) with respect to my analysis of pre-divestiture and post-

divestiture industry operating performance and choice of explanatory variables, but I include a variables
for customer dependence, pivotal buyers, and both customer and supplier barriers to entry, whereas, they
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include only on supplier dependence and supplier barriers to entry. I begin my multivariate analysis using
the subsequent two regression models estimated using a pooled times series panel with clustered standard
errors by supplier two-digit SIC codes in equations (1) and (2).
PreDivSuppOperPerfj = α1 + α2 CDj + α3 PBj + α4Supp_HConc_HFCjt + α5SDj + α6cust_herfjt +
α7cust_ksjt + α8cust_capexjt + α9cust_advertjt + α10supp_herfjt + α11supp_ksjt + α12supp_capex jt +
α13Supp_advertjt + εjt
(1)
PostDivSuppOperPerfj = γ1 + γ2CDj + γ3PBj + γ4Supp_HConc_HFCjt + γ5SDj + γ6Cust_herfjt +
γ7Cust_ksjt + γ8cust_capexjt + γ9cust_advertjt + γ10supp_herfjt + γ11supp_ksjt + γ12Supp_capexjt +
γ13Supp_advertjt +
εjt
(2)
Using these two models, I investigate the effect of downstream deconsolidation on supplier
industry operating performance to empirically test my first, fifth, and ninth hypotheses.
PreDivSuppOperPerf and PostDivSuppOperPerfj are pre-divestiture and post-divestiture operating
performances of supplier j, respectively. I employ several measures of supplier operating performance as
described below. I use two accounting based measures of operating performance, the cash flow-to-sales
ratio and cash flow-to-total assets, and two value based measures of operating performance, the cashflow-to-market value of assets ratio and cash flow-to-enterprise value ratio. For my first proxy of
supplier operating performance, I define the cash flow-to-sales ratio of the median firm in the industry.
Staying consistent with Fee and Thomas (2004) and Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), I define the cash
flow-to-sales ratio as the ratio of operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) to sales
(Compustat item 12). I then measure the industry’s abnormal operating performance from that of the
median industry in the economy, which I define as ACFM. I measure ACFM two years prior to
divestiture, Pre_ACFM, and two years after divestiture, Post_ACFM.
I define ROA as the ratio operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) to total
assets (Compustat item 6) for the median firm in the industry. I define cash flow-to-total assets as the
ratio of operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) to total assets (Compustat item 6) for
the median firm in the industry. The cash flow-to-market value of assets is defined as the ratio of
operating income (Compustat item 13) to the sum of the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6),
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market value of equity (Compustat item 199) * (Compustat item 61), less the book value of common
equity (Compustat item 60) for the median firm in the industry. The cash flow-to-enterprise value ratio is
defined as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Compustat item 13)
to the sum of the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6), market value of equity (Compustat item
199) * (Compustat item 61), less the sum of book value of common equity (Compustat item 60) and cash
and short term investments (Compustat item 1) for the median firm in the industry. I define abnormal
operating performance for the cash flow-to-total assets, cash flow-to-market value assets, and cash flowto-enterprise value ratios (AROA, ACFMVA, and ACFEV, respectively) similar to ACFM for the other
variables. In addition, I define PreDivSuppOperPerf and PostDivSuppOperPerfj for the other variables
for supplier industries similar to Pre_ACFM and Post_ACFM.
I regress abnormal operating performance prior to downstream deconsolidation on customer the
dependence dummy and pivotal buyer dummy. The dummy variable, CD, represents suppliers on which
customer industries are dependent. The dummy variable, PB, represents suppliers that have a pivotal
buyer relationship with their customers. I regress, equation (2), abnormal operating performance after
downstream deconsolidation on customer dependence and pivotal buyer, as well. I proxy for customer
dependence using an indicator variable, CD, that equals one for suppliers in which the customer is
dependent and is zero, otherwise. Similarly, I proxy for pivotal buyer using an indicator variable, PB, that
equals one for suppliers that are dependent on customers, have high fixed costs, and have high industry
concentration dependent and is zero, otherwise. I also control for supplier dependence using an indicator
variable, SD, which equals one for suppliers that are dependent and is zero, otherwise, to capture the
influence of pivotal buyers. 17 I employ the same control variables as Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) and
Shumacher (1991) with respect to both customers and suppliers to be consistent with their methodology. 18
In addition, I control for industries that have high fixed costs and high supplier concentration but lack

17

Suppliers are dependent by definition of a pivotal buyer such that the buyer is essential to their business decisions.
Bhattacharyya and Nain obtain measures of the determinants of industry profitability such as competition, barriers
to entry, and product differentiation from the work of Shumacher (1991).
18
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supplier dependence to unofficially proxy for suppliers that do not have a pivotal buyer relationship but
have similar fixed costs and industry structure.
Supplier profitability is positively associated with more concentrated industry conditions,
increased barriers to entry, and increased product differentiation. Hence, I anticipate that the coefficients
on these barriers to positive. As stated earlier, I follow Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) with respect to my
choice of explanatory variables and dependent variable. I use the Herfindahl index, a traditional measure
of industry concentration. The Herfindahl index is sum of the squared market shares of the firms within
an industry; it is often used to capture industry competitiveness. High barriers to entry make it difficult for
firms to enter and compete with existing firms in a given industry. I measure barriers to entry using
capital intensity and capital expenditures to capture the effect of high capital requirements in a given
industry. I calculate capital intensity as industry total assets (Compustat item 6) divided by industry total
sales (Compustat item 12), for every four-digit SIC in a given year. I calculate capital expenditures as
industry total capital expenditures (Compustat item 128) divided by industry total assets (Compustat item
6). Capital intensity gives a scaled measure of the annual total capital stock relative at given point in time.
In comparison, capital expenditures give a scaled measure of essential annual capital investment in an
industry. Advertising intensity is used as a substitute measure for product differentiation in an industry. I
calculate advertising intensity as industry total advertising expense (Compustat item 45) divided by
industry total sales. Tables 13 and 14 provide us estimates of equations (1) and (2) using OLS with robust
standard errors clustered at the supplier two-digit SIC level. To mitigate the impact of outliers, all the
continuous variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile.
To examine these results, I utilize a similar interpretation as Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) in the
analysis of the pre-divestiture and post-divestiture operating performance, predominantly by comparing
the change in the coefficient/significance of the dependence (or pivotal buyer) variable. In Columns 1 and
3 Table 13, the dependent variables are the two-year average of supplier industry abnormal cash flow
margin and supplier abnormal return on assets prior to the downstream divestiture. The coefficient on the
customer dependence dummy, α1, is statistically insignificant in Columns 1 and 3, suggesting that the
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profitability of suppliers that have dependent customers is unnoticeably different than those which have
non-dependent customers prior to a horizontal divestiture event. The coefficient on the pivotal buyer
dummy, α2, is statistically significant, at the 1% level, and positive in Columns 1 and 3, suggesting that
the profitability of suppliers in a pivotal buyer relationship is significantly higher from non-pivotal buyers
prior to a horizontal divestiture event.
In Columns 2 and 4 of Table 13, the dependent variables are the two-year average of supplier
industry abnormal cash flow margin and supplier abnormal return on assets subsequent to the downstream
divestiture. The coefficient on the customer dependence dummy, γ1, is statistically insignificant in
Columns 2 and 4 of Panel A of Table 13, suggesting that the profitability of suppliers that have dependent
customers is still indistinguishable from those which have non-dependent customers subsequent to a
horizontal divestiture event. Thus, abnormal accounting performance for suppliers that have dependent
customers does not appear to change significantly following a downstream divestiture event, which does
not support the notion that suppliers act opportunistically and expropriate customers following horizontal
divestitures. The coefficient on the pivotal buyer dummy, γ2, is now insignificant in Columns 2 and 4,
suggesting that the profitability of suppliers in a pivotal buyer relationship is not significant and
indistinguishable from non-pivotal buyers subsequent to a horizontal divestiture event. Therefore the
difference in the coefficients for α2 and γ2 indicates that abnormal accounting performance for suppliers
that have a pivotal buyer relationship is at least 10% higher than those that do not have a pivotal buyer
relationship prior to the divestiture, which disappears subsequent to the horizontal divestiture event. Thus,
it appears that pivotal buyers seem to be able to use horizontal divestitures as an opportunity to reposition
themselves, reducing cross-subsidization by suppliers and non-pivotal buyers within their industry.
Supplier profitability does not appear to be significantly influenced by customer barriers to entry. I
document that supplier annual capital investment required in an industry appears to be associated with
higher cash flow margins. Hence, the results indicate that concentrated supplier industries with greater
barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation do not enjoy larger increases in supplier profitability following
downstream deconsolidation of concentrated customer industries, failing to support the supplier
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opportunism hypothesis. Also, the evidence fails to support the rival opportunism hypothesis, which
states that horizontal divestitures will generate an offsetting effect as rivals capture lost market power at
the expense of divesting firms.
In Columns 1 and 3 of Table 14, the dependent variables are the two-year average of supplier
industry abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets and supplier abnormal cash flow-to-enterprise
value prior to the downstream divestiture. Similar to the results from Table 13, the coefficient on the
customer dependence dummy, α1, is statistically insignificant in Columns 1 and 3, suggesting that the
value of suppliers that have dependent customers is unremarkably different than those which have nondependent customers prior to a horizontal divestiture event. The coefficient on the pivotal buyer dummy,
α2, is statistically significant, at the 5% level at least, and positive in Columns 1 and 3, suggesting that the
value of suppliers in a pivotal buyer relationship is significantly higher from non-pivotal buyers prior to a
horizontal divestiture event.
In Columns 2 and 4 of Table 14, the dependent variables are the two-year average of supplier
industry abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets and supplier abnormal cash flow-to-enterprise
value subsequent to the downstream divestiture. The coefficient on the customer dependence dummy, γ1,
is statistically insignificant in Columns 2 and 4, suggesting that the value of suppliers that have dependent
customers continues to be indistinguishable from those which have non-dependent customers subsequent
to a horizontal divestiture event. Thus, abnormal value based measures of operating performance for
suppliers that have dependent customers does not appear to change significantly following a downstream
divestiture event. The coefficient on the pivotal buyer dummy, γ2, is now insignificant in Columns 2 and
4, suggesting that the value of suppliers in a pivotal buyer relationship is not significant and
indistinguishable from non-pivotal buyers subsequent to a horizontal divestiture event. Therefore, the
difference in the coefficients for α2 and γ2 specifies that abnormal value based operating performance for
suppliers that have a pivotal buyer relationship is at least 3.5% higher than those that do not have a pivotal
buyer relationship prior to the divestiture but dissipates subsequent to the divestiture.
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Supplier profitability does not appear to be significantly influenced by customer barriers to entry
in general. I document that supplier annual capital investment required in an industry appears to be
associated with higher cash flow margins. I report that supplier value is higher in industries in which their
customer industries have higher capital stock. Since customer concentration tends to be associated with
customer barriers to entry, this suggest that customers with high capital stock prior to horizontal
divestitures may face a reduction in buying power for subsequent to horizontal divestitures and mildly
supports the notion of supplier opportunism. I also report that value is higher in supplier industries with
greater concentration and high annual capital investment requirements. The evidence supports most of the
findings from the previous paragraphs but also suggest that pivotal buyer repositioning of customers
subsequent to horizontal divestitures is value relevant for suppliers that cross-subsidize pivotal buyers
prior to horizontal divestitures. It appears that certain barriers to entry (annual capital investment and
supplier concentration) are important prior to and subsequent to horizontal divestitures but do not
decrease significantly subsequent to horizontal divestitures. Therefore, the results fail to support the idea
that concentrated supplier industries with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation will enjoy
larger increases in selling prices following downstream deconsolidation of concentrated customer
industries.
Qualitatively speaking, the results from Table 14 are suggestive of the pivotal buyer repositioning
notion that if downstream horizontal divesture events allow pivotal buyers to reposition themselves, then
supplier industries with greater barriers to entry prior to the event will suffer greater declines in
profitability following downstream deconsolidation of customer industries. Yet, these results, with respect
to supplier barriers to entry, are somewhat supportive of the waterbed effects hypothesis, which indicates
that if downstream divestiture events lead to asymmetric buying power, concentrated supplier industries
with greater barriers to entry be better positioned to price discriminate subsequent to downstream
divestiture events.
With respect to the supplier opportunism hypothesis that indicates that suppliers will
opportunistically take advantage of downstream divesting firms subsequent to horizontal divestitures, I
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expect that the coefficient, α1, will be positive in equation (1) but to be significantly smaller in magnitude
relative to γ1 in equation (2). With respect to the customer opportunism hypothesis that suggests that
pivotal buyers use horizontal divestitures to reposition themselves with respect to suppliers, I expect that
the coefficient, α2, will be significantly smaller in magnitude relative to γ2 in equation (2) to highlight the
reversal of the buyers’ pivotal position. The waterbed effect hypothesis posits that horizontal divestitures
generate offsetting changes in input prices in favor of industry rivals (at the expense of divesting firms),
which suggests that the coefficients, α1 and α2, in equation (1) will not be statistically distinguishable
from γ1 and γ2, in equation (2), respectively. I fail to reject the null for hypotheses 1 and 9 but reject the
null for hypothesis 5. Thus, the evidence from Table 14 appears to primarily provide evidence in support
of the pivotal repositioning hypothesis.
3.4.3. Supplier industry selling prices
For every supplier of a deconsolidating industry, I acquire the Producer Price Index (PPI) from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 19 The PPI series permit us to capture the fluctuations in prices
obtained by domestic producers for their goods and services. I account for inflation the PPI series by
using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. I delineate the deflated PPI series as the Real
Producer Price Index (RPPI).
3.4.4. Univariate analysis
I conduct independent sample t-tests on the RPPI series for the two years prior to divestiture and
the two years after divestiture. I test difference in means of the real producer price index series (RPPI)
prior to and subsequent to downstream deconsolidation; these tests will be conducted for all supplier
industries, between suppliers on which customers are dependent and not dependent. I test the difference in
19

The Producer Price Index series follows the prices of goods sold by wholesalers. The index represents typical
changes in prices obtained by domestic producers for their production. Methodical sampling techniques of
practically every mining through manufacturing industry in the economy are used to calculate producer price
indexes. In concept, the Producer Price Index is calculated according to the modified Laspeyres formula: 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 =
∑𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃0𝑡𝑡× 100, where It, is the price index in the current period; P0 is the price of a commodity; Pt is the current price
of the commodity; and Qa represents the quantity shipped during the weight-base period. Additional information can
be
found
in
Chapter
14,
Producers
Prices,
BLS
Handbook
of
Methods
http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/homch14.pdf.
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the means of the real producer price index between suppliers on which customers are dependent and
suppliers on which customers are not dependent, prior to and after downstream deconsolidation. I use the
univariate analysis to perform initial tests of my second set of hypotheses (hypotheses 2, 6, and 10)
regarding the impact downstream deconsolidation of supplier’s prices. Table 15 reports descriptive
statistics of the entire supplier industry RPPI over the two years preceding the downstream divestiture, the
two years subsequent to the downstream divestiture, and the difference between the two prices. The
difference is negative and insignificant. Then I split the split the sample into distinct groups: dependent
customers and non-dependent customers, and pivotal buyers and non-pivotal buyers. Panel A of Table 15
illustrates that suppliers with dependent customers pay significantly lower prices than those with nondependent customers before and after downstream deconsolidation of at least the 5% level of significance.
While both groups, dependent and non-dependent customers, experience negative and insignificantly
lower prices after the downstream divestiture, the difference-in-differences test in the last row of Panel A
of Table 15 indicates that this decline in prices is not significantly larger for non-dependent customers.
Panel B of Table 15 illustrates that suppliers with pivotal buyers do not pay significantly lower
prices than those with non-pivotal buyers before and after downstream deconsolidation at traditional level
of significance. Both suppliers with pivotal and non-pivotal buyers, fail to experience significantly
different RPPI after the downstream divestiture and the difference-in-differences test in the last row of
Panel A of Table 15 indicates that this difference in prices is not significantly larger for pivotal buyer
relative to non-pivotal buyers before and after the downstream divestiture event. My univariate tests fail
to reject both the supplier opportunism and pivotal buyer repositioning hypotheses, hence, my univariate
results support the waterbed effect relative to the supplier opportunism and pivotal buyer repositioning
hypotheses.
3.4.5. Multivariate analysis
Following Bhattacharyya and Nain’s (2011) multivariate approach with only slight modifications,
I estimate a pooled OLS model with Newey-West standard errors to continue examining the impact of
deconsolidation of real producers’ prices in Equation (3).
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Δrppi jt = α0 + α1CD j + α2PBj + α3Δrppi_inp1 jt + α4 Δrppi_inp2 jt + α5Δwage jt + α6Δtp t + εjt

(3)

I take the natural logarithm of the RPPI of supplier industry j. The dummy variable, CDj,
represents the customer industries that are dependent on suppliers. The dummy variable, PBj, represents
the supplier industries that are characterized by a pivotal buyer relationship. The other explanatory
variables in the regression control for industry demand conditions, and other factors of production that
may influence producers’ prices. The control variables rppi_inp1jt and rppi_inp2jt represent the natural
logarithm of RPPI of supplier industry j’s two primary input factors. I use the I-O tables in order to
determine supplier industry j’s two primary inputs by calculating weights, wji, that correspond to the share
that supplier industry i provides for supplier industry j. I rank these weights and take the top two-ranked
industries i that supply industry j. 20 I obtain price data for these inputs from BLS. I also take the natural
logarithm of the control variable wage, which represents the average hourly earnings of production
workers in the mining and manufacturing industries. However, these figures on hourly earnings are given
only at the three-digit SIC level. I apply the correspond three-digit SIC code that matches the four-digit
SIC code industries. I also control for industry demand conditions using the natural log of the industrial
production index, tp. Industrial production data are obtained from Federal Reserve Board. The industrial
production index measures the amount of productivity from the manufacturing, mining, electric and gas
industries. I incorporate a time trend dummy, industry dummies at the two-digit SIC level, and year
dummies to control for industry and time-specific factors.
I estimate equation (3) for all supplier industries over the 24 months prior to downstream
deconsolidation in column (1) and then independently over the 24 months subsequent to downstream
deconsolidation in column (2), disregarding the divestiture-event quarter. Using the input prices and
industrial production allow us to control for price fluctuations in supplier industries in order to better
assess the impact of my variables of interest. Table 16 shows results from the multivariate analysis of

20

As in Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), I too mitigate the potential issue of endogeneity amongst control variable
input prices and the dependent variable in my regression by confirming that the industries that contribute the
primary inputs of the supplier maintain no product market association with that of the downstream divesting
industry.
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suppliers selling prices. Column 1 in Table 16 shows that the coefficients of customer dependence
dummy, CD, and pivotal buyer dummy, PBI, are positive and statistically insignificant in the period
before the downstream divestiture event. Hence, after I take into account factor prices and demand
conditions, price changes in supplier industries with dependent customers is no longer significantly
different from those with non-dependent customers prior to the downstream divestiture event. The
insignificance of the pivotal buyer dummy reiterates the evidence from the univariate test, suggesting that
there is no significant difference in prices prior to the downstream divestiture event after controlling for
factor prices.
Yet, Column 2 in Table 16 shows that the coefficient of customer dependence dummy, CD, is
positive and significant at the 5% level, whereas the coefficient of pivotal buyer dummy, PB, is negative
and significant at the 10% level. Thus after the downstream divestiture event, dependent customers do
experience significantly adverse increases in input prices relative to non-dependent customers. This
evidence suggests that supplier industries charge dependent customer industries roughly 0.2% higher
prices per month relative to non-dependent customer industries subsequent to the downstream
deconsolidation. In contrast, after the downstream divestiture event, suppliers with pivotal buyers
experience significantly adverse decline in prices relative to those with non-pivotal buyers. The size of the
pivotal buyer coefficient suggests that the drop in prices for suppliers with pivotal buyers is about 0.2%
greater than suppliers with non-pivotal buyers.
Again, I follow Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) to control for industry demand related factors to
isolate the impact of our variables of interest on producers’ prices. Once I have controlled for industry
demand conditions and factor price fluctuations, I must still distinguish whether or not customer
dependence on a supplier industry and suppliers with pivotal buyers impact sellers’ prices prior to and
subsequent to divestiture. I estimate equation (4) to make this distinction.
Δrppijt = α0 + α1CDj + α2PBj + α3Δrppi_inp1
α8CDjPDjt + α9PBjPDjt + εjt
(4)

jt

+ α4Δrppi_inp2

jt

+ α5Δwage

jt

+ α6Δtp t + α7PDjt +
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I include in equation (4), three additional explanatory variables. I use the original indicator
variables, CD and PB, in this regression to measure customer dependence on a supplier industry and
suppliers with a pivotal buyer in equation (4). PD represents the indicator variable for post-divestiture,
which is equal to one for the period subsequent to the downstream divestiture event, and zero otherwise.
The coefficient for PD, α7 accounts for the variation in average price levels after downstream
deconsolidation for all suppliers. The coefficient for PD, α7 also accounts for any potential exogenous
shocks that may influence price levels in the post-deconsolidation period in supplier industries, in
addition to prompt divestitures in downstream industries. I also include an interaction term, my variables
of interest, CDjPDjt and PBjPDjt,, determines if there is a differential in average producer prices post
downstream divestiture for dependent customers and pivotal buyers, respectively. If the coefficient for
CDjPDjt (DjPDjt), α8 (α9), is positive (negative) and significant, then it would suggest further evidence in
line with the customer expropriation (supplier expropriation) hypothesis. I anticipate that the coefficients
on my control input prices and proxy for industry demand conditions will be positive and significant,
suggesting that these underlying factors influence suppliers’ prices. Column 3 of Table 16 displays the
results from the empirical test of equation (4) using the difference-in-differences approach. In Column 3,
the interaction coefficient, denoting the post-divestiture effect of customer dependence, CDjPDjt, has the
appropriate sign, positive, but is indistinguishable from zero. Similarly, in Column 3 the interaction
coefficient identifying the post-divestiture effect on pivotal buyers, PBjPDjt,, has the appropriate sign,
negative, but is also statistically insignificant. The evidence from Column 3 of Table 16 does not further
corroborate the findings from Columns 1 and 2.
As in Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), I attempt to use a differences-in-differences regression
model to illustrate that the potential difference in effect of downstream deconsolidation on suppliers’
prices does not rely upon the regression technique employed. The difference-in-differences approach
represents the interaction term between the variables of interest (i.e., CDj, PBj) and the post-divestiture
variable, PD, to isolate the effect of CDj or PBj subsequent to the divestiture event on producers’ prices. I
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execute the cross-sectional regression using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit
SIC industry level as shown in equation (5).
ΔlnRPPIj = α0 + α1CDj +α2PBj+α3ΔlnRPPI_INPj+α4ΔlnRPPI_INP2t+α5ΔlnWAGEt+α6ΔlnTP+εj

(5)

I drop the time subscript in equation (5).The dependent variable, ∆lnRPPIj, represents supplier j’s
average natural log of RPPI over the two years after the downstream divestiture less the average natural
log of RPPI over the two years prior to the downstream divestiture. My control variables take on similar
meaning. I take the changes in the average factor prices, wages, and total productivity. My variables of
interest are CDj and PBj, the indicator variables for customer dependence on the supplier industry and
suppliers with a pivotal buyer, respectively. Column 4 of Table 16 presents the empirical estimates of
equation (5). The number of observations in Column 4 is fewer than 30 and the results are interpreted
with caution. The coefficient on the customer dependence variable, CD, has the correct sign (positive) and
is statistically insignificant. Likewise, the coefficient on pivotal buyer variable, PB, also has the
appropriate sign (negative) but is statistically insignificant. The evidence from Columns 3 and 4 of Table
16 does not validate the evidence from Columns 1 and 2, with respect to the variable, CD, results fail to
demonstrate that suppliers of dependent customer industries undergo greater increases in selling prices
(real producers’ prices) subsequent to downstream deconsolidation and are, thus, weakly consistent with
the customer expropriation hypothesis. Similarly, the evidence from Columns 3 and 4 of Table 16 does
not substantiate the evidence from Columns 1 and 2, with respect to the variable, CD, and thus narrowly
supports the idea that dependent supplier industries experience larger declines in selling prices (real
producers’ prices) subsequent to downstream divestiture events, which is not supportive of the customer
opportunism hypothesis. In contrast, the waterbed effect hypothesis posits that neither supplier nor
customer industry dependence will have an impact on selling prices (real producers’ prices) subsequent to
downstream deconsolidation Overall, evidence from real producers’ prices provide mixed evidence at
best. I document weak evidence in support of the customer expropriation and supplier expropriation
hypotheses and moderate evidence in support of the waterbed effects hypothesis.
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3.4.6.

Distinguishing amongst diminishing buying power, efficiency, and pivotal buyer reposition

hypotheses
The multivariate analyses, so far, should establish whether a (an) decrease (increase) in selling
prices demonstrates pivotal buyer repositioning (diminishing buying power) amongst horizontally
divesting downstream industries. Yet, it is not quite clear whether these price effects are explained solely
by pivotal buyer repositioning or (diminishing buyer power). Highly concentrated industries are likely
environments for the demonstration of market power in the form collusion, market foreclosure effects, or
monopsonistic practices, hence, I must distinguish between the impact of efficiency produced by
deconsolidation and price decreases and any price increases associate with concentrated industries.
Customers with pricing power would be the likely subject of diminished buying power (enhanced
selling power from the perspective of the supplier) as submitted by countervailing power theory. The
pivotal buyer model conjectures that there are one or few suppliers; hence, I would expect that
concentrated suppliers would be a likely target for pivotal buyers looking to reposition themselves. Prior
research indicates that Compustat measures of industry concentration are deficient substitutes of actual
industry concentration, thus, we employ Becker and Thomas’s (2011) estimates of the Herfinadahl index
using the Compustat Segment Database, which I designate as sup_herf for supplier industries and
cust_herf for customer industries. Ali, Klasa. and Yeung (2008) indicate that the use of Compustat data to
measure industry concentration may capture some other effect, which may lead to improper inferences.
To examine my third set of hypotheses, I employ multiple measures of pricing power of both supplier and
customer industries. I employ estimates of the four-firm concentration ratio following Cremers, Nair, and
Peyer (2007), which I designate for supplier industries as sup_con and customer industries as cust_con,
for supplier industries and customer industries respectively. I calculate the four-firm concentration ratio
by taking the proportion of entire industry sales that is accounted for by the collective sales of the four
largest firms in the industry. I use only the year prior to the horizontal divestiture to preserve the size of
my sample to measure capital intensity, capital expenditures, and advertising expenses. I use following
regression model to measure these relationships in the following equation.
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ΔlnRPPIj = α0 + α1Concentration/Barrierj + α2ΔlnRPPI_INP1j + α3ΔlnRPPI_INP2t + α4ΔlnWAGEt +
α5ΔlnTP + εj
(6)
The measures of customer industry structure should allow us to empirically test the supplier
opportunism hypothesis that suggests if downstream deconsolidation moderates buying power, customer
industries with greater levels of concentration prior to the downstream divestiture event will experience
greater increases in selling prices following the downstream divestiture event. Table 17 presents
relationship between changes in supplier selling prices and customer market power prior to downstream
deconsolidation in a cross-sectional regression framework. I note that the number of observations for each
column in my cross-sectional framework in Table 17 is below 30, therefore the results must be interpreted
with caution and are considered qualitative in nature. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 17 present the regression
estimates of equation (6) with my measures of customer industry concentration. Both coefficients on
cust_con and cust_herf are positive and insignificant. Also, Panels A and B of Table 14 document that
customer industry concentration has no significant of supplier industry abnormal operating performance.
Collectively, these results indicate that customer concentration has no effect on supplier pricing and
supplier operating performance.
The proxies for customer barriers to entry allow me to test hypothesis 4 related to barriers to
entry. Similarly, I anticipate that the coefficients for the proxies for barriers to entry in the year prior to
horizontal deconsolidation should result in positive coefficients. Columns 3-5 of Table 17 reports that
only one of three customer barriers to entry, customer capital intensity, is statistically significant and
negative. These results provide weak evidence customer structural barriers play a significant role in
supplier pricing. Moreover, the results from Table 17 fail to substantiate the supplier opportunism
hypothesis and provide indirect support for the waterbed effects hypothesis, which suggests that
significant horizontal divestiture activity induces asymmetric input price changes in favor of industry
rivals.
The measures of supplier industry structure permit us to empirically assess the customer pivotal
buyer repositioning hypothesis that suggests if downstream deconsolidation reverses a pivotal buyer’s
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pivotal position, supplier industries with higher concentration prior to downstream deconsolidation will
undergo a greater reduction in selling prices following downstream deconsolidation. Table 18 reports the
relationship between changes in supplier selling prices and supplier pricing power prior to downstream
deconsolidation in a cross-sectional regression framework. Similar to Table 17, I note that the number of
observations for each column in my cross-sectional framework in Table 18 is below 30 and that the
results must be interpreted with caution and are considered qualitative in nature. Columns 1 and 2 of
Table 18 indicate that one of two supplier industry concentration measures are significant, sup_con, at the
1% level. Overall, the evidence is mixed and suggest that downstream horizontal divestitures contribute to
the reversal of a pivotal buyer’s pivotal position, indicating that supplier industries with higher
concentration prior to the downstream divestiture event will experience a greater drop in selling prices
subsequent to the divestiture.
By the same token, the coefficients for the proxies of barriers to entry allow us to test the pivotal
buyer hypothesis that postulates if downstream horizontal divestitures allow pivotal buyers to reposition
themselves, supplier industries with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation will undergo greater
declines in selling prices subsequent to downstream deconsolidation of customer industries. Similarly, I
anticipate that the proxies for the barriers to entry in the year prior to horizontal deconsolidation should
result in negative coefficients. In contrast, the rival opportunism/waterbed effect hypothesis predicts that
the measures for coefficients of supplier concentration and barriers to entry will only enhance the
waterbed effect, leading to offsetting price changes, and therefore coefficients indistinguishable from
zero. Columns 3-5 of Table 18 indicate that one of the three supplier industry barriers to entry are
significant, sup_ks, at the 10% level, and negative. This provides weak evidence in support of the pivotal
buyer hypothesis. Overall, Table 18 provides weak to moderate evidence in support of the pivotal buyer
repositioning hypothesis.
3.4.7.

Customer industry operating performance
Similar to prior analysis of operating performance, I follow Bhattacharyya and Nain with respect

to my analysis of pre-divestiture and post-divestiture operating performance of customer industry
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operating performance. I begin my multivariate analysis of upstream divestitures on customer industry
operating performance using the following two regression models estimated using a pooled times series
panel with clustered standard errors by customer two-digit SIC codes.
PreDivCustOperPerfm = α0 + α1SDj + α2supp_herfjt + α3supp_ksjt + α4supp_capexjt + α5supp_advertjt +
εjt
(7)
PostDivCustOperPerfm = α0 + α1SDj + α2supp_herfjt + α3 supp_ksjt + α4supp_capexmt + α5supp_advertjt
+ εjt
(8)
Using these two models, I investigate the effect of upstream deconsolidation on customer industry
operating performance to empirically test the supplier opportunism hypothesis, customer opportunism
hypothesis, and the waterbed effect hypothesis, with respect to operating performance, industry structure
concentration, and ruling out industry demand considerations, correspondingly. PreDivCustOperPerf and
PostDivCustOperPerf are the pre-divestiture and post-divestiture operating performances of customer m,
respectively. I employ measures of customer operating performance similar to those described above in
section 3.4.3.2. I use the accounting based measure of operating performance, the cash flow-to-sales ratio
and the value based measure of operating performance, the cash-flow-to-market value of assets ratio.
I focus on the supplier dependence dummy, SD, and the continuous variable fmj, to represent
supplier dependence. fmj, is the percentage of divesting supplier industry j’s output sold to the customer
industry m. Higher values of fmj indicate that the divesting supplier industry j is more dependent on the
downstream (customer) industry for buying its output. The supplier dependence dummy, SD, equals one
if fmj is in the top quintile, and is equal to zero otherwise. The control variables sup_herf, sup_ks,
sup_capex, and supp_advert take on similar meanings as defined earlier. Table 19 provides us estimates
of equations (8) and (9) using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the supplier two-digit SIC
level and year dummies.
Once again, I employ a consistent interpretation as Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) in the analysis
of the pre-divestiture and post-divestiture operating performance, primarily by comparing the change in
value/significance of the dependence variable. In Columns 1 and 3 of Table 19, the dependent variables is
the two-year average of customer industry abnormal cash-flow margin prior to the upstream divestiture.
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The coefficients for the proxies for supplier dependence, SD and fmj, are statistically insignificant in
Columns 1 and 3, suggesting that supplier dependence (or the extent of supplier dependence) on customer
industries has no effect on customer industry profitability prior to upstream divestitures. In Columns 2
and 4 of Table 19, the dependent variable is the two-year average of customer industry abnormal cash
flow margin subsequent to the upstream divestiture. However, the coefficients for the proxies for supplier
dependence, SD and fmj, are, now, both positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level), indicating
that there is a significant positive association between supplier dependence subsequent to the upstream
divestiture event. The size of the coefficient for SD in Column 2 suggests that the abnormal cash-flow
margins of customer industries on which supplier industries are dependent are roughly 4.9% higher than
those customer industries on which suppliers industries are not dependent. This evidence supports the
supplier expropriation hypothesis that suggests customers of dependent supplier industries experience
greater favorable changes in abnormal cash flow margins in the two years subsequent to an upstream
divestiture event relative to customers of non-dependent supplier industries.
In Columns 1 and 3 of Table 20, the dependent variables is the two-year average of customer
industry abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets prior to the upstream divestiture event. The
coefficients for the proxies for supplier dependence, SD and fmj, reiterate are statistically insignificant in
Columns 1 and 3, and reiterate the evidence found in Table 19, suggesting that supplier dependence has
no effect on customer value prior to the upstream divestiture event. In Columns 2 and 4 of 20, the
dependent variable is the two-year average of customer industry abnormal cash flow-to-market value of
assets following the upstream divestiture event. The proxies for supplier dependence, SD and fmj, are,
again, both positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level), indicating that there is a significant
positive association between supplier dependence subsequent to the upstream divestiture event. The
magnitude of the coefficient for SD in Column 2 suggests that the abnormal cash flow-to-market value of
assets in customer industries on which supplier industries are dependent are roughly 2.3% higher than
those customer industries on which suppliers industries are not dependent. Therefore, the results from
Table 20 corroborate those from Table 19, which indicates that customers of dependent supplier
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industries experience improved changes in accounting performance and value in the two years subsequent
to an upstream deconsolidation relative to customers of non-dependent supplier industries. Again, this
evidence suggests that customer industries exploit upstream divesting firms in the years subsequent to the
divestiture via an improved bargaining position.
Next, I evaluate whether upstream deconsolidation reduces selling power by testing if customers
whose suppliers have higher barriers to entry prior to upstream deconsolidation will experience greater
favorable changes in cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years
subsequent to an announcement of upstream deconsolidation. I test this conjecture using the variable
supp_herf in Table 19. In Columns 1 and 3 of Table 19, the coefficient is negative (negative t-stat) and
significant, with respect to its effect on pre-divestiture customer industry profitability. However in
Columns 2 and 4, the variable supp_herf becomes statistically insignificant, suggesting its effect becomes
more positive subsequent to the upstream divestiture event. In contrast to the results from Table 19,
supp_herf is statistically insignificant in Columns 1-4 in Table 20. The results suggests that supplier
industry concentration has no impact on customer industry value prior to the divestiture event nor
subsequent to the divesture event. Hence, the results from Table 20 provide mixed evidence in support of
the supplier expropriation hypothesis, suggesting that higher supplier concentration prior to the divestiture
is associated with customer improvements in accounting performance but has no long-term implications
for customer value.
I, now, focus on determining whether the supplier expropriation effects can be attributed to
industry demand or whether supplier structural barriers are important to witnessing these effects. I test
whether significant upstream divestiture activity reduces selling power. If so, I can expect customers
whose suppliers have higher barriers to entry prior to upstream deconsolidation to experience greater
favorable changes in cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years
subsequent to an announcement of upstream deconsolidation.

I examine the following proxies for

supplier barriers to entry, supp_ks, supp_capex, and supp_advert in Table 20. I find evidence that one of
the three barriers to entry, supp_capex is, for the most part, positive and significant, Tables 19 and 20.
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The evidence is mixed with respect to supp_ks, therefore, I conclude that there is weak evidence to
suggest that certain supplier barriers to entry influence customer profitability subsequent to upstream
divestiture activity. Thus, overall supplier pricing power and barriers appears to play to some modest role
in customer industry profitability subsequent to an upstream divestiture event, which further substantiates
the supplier expropriation hypothesis. Next, I determine whether customer improvements in profitability
and value can be attributed to supplier bargaining power by examining the impact customer industry
abnormal input costs.
Now, I explore whether customers of dependent supplier industries experience greater declines in
abnormal costs-of-goods sold margins in the two years subsequent to an upstream deconsolidation
relative to customers of less dependent supplier industries in Table 21. Table 21 provides us estimates of
equations (8) and (9) using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the supplier two-digit SIC level
and year dummies to evaluate customer industry pre- and post-divestiture abnormal cost structure. The
dependent variable in both equations (8) and (9) is abnormal cost-of-goods sold margin, ACGSM. The
ACGSM of an industry is defined as that industry’s median cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio minus the
cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio of the median industry in the economy. The cost-of-goods sold-to-sales
ratio is defined as the ratio of cost of goods sold (Compustat item 30) to sales (Compustat item 12). I
consider the supplier expropriation hypothesis and, again, focus on my attention on the supplier
dependence dummy, SD. In Column 1 of Table 21, the dependent variable is the average ACGSM in
customer industries over the two years preceding the downstream divestiture event. In Column 1 of Table
21, the coefficient on SD is positive and significant, at the 10% level, prior to the upstream divestiture
event. In Column 2 of Table 21, the dependent variable is the average abnormal cost-of-goods sold
margin, ACGSM, in customer industries over the two years following the upstream divestiture event. In
comparison, in Column 2 of Table 21, the coefficient on SD is positive and statistically insignificant. The
magnitude of the coefficient suggests that the average abnormal input costs (cost-of-goods sold margin)
for customers industries with dependent suppliers decline by about 2.3% relative to customers with nondependent supplier industries following an upstream divestiture event. Therefore, the results from Table
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21 support the conjecture that customers of dependent supplier industries enjoy greater declines in
abnormal input costs in the two years subsequent to an upstream deconsolidation relative to customers of
less dependent supplier industries. Overall, the evidence from the upstream divestiture sample provides
moderate to strong evidence in support of the customer opportunism/supplier expropriation hypothesis.
3.5. Conclusion
This study executes the first broad, cross-industry investigation of the product market effects of
horizontal divestitures on supplier (customer) industries via their impact on profitability, value, and prices
(profitability, value, and input costs). I document moderately strong evidence that upstream divestitures
erode supplier selling power and impact customer profitability, value, and cost structures. Customers
exploit suppliers dependent on customers industries for sales in their production process in the years after
major upstream divestiture activity. Customers of dependent suppliers experience noteworthy increases in
profitability and value, and significant declines in average input costs in the years subsequent to the
divestiture event. I also report that certain supplier barriers to entry, supplier capital expenditures play a
role in customer profitability. Suppliers with high capital investment requirements contribute to greater
customer profitability and value, suggesting mild evidence that upstream divestitures reduce upstream
countervailing power.
This study also presents modest evidence that corroborates the notion that horizontal
deconsolidation activity affords pivotal buyers the opportunity to reposition themselves with respect to
dependent suppliers in concentrated industries with substantial fixed costs. Suppliers with pivotal buyers
endure considerable drops in profitability and value in the two years following large downstream
divestiture activity. I document, as well, weak evidence that suppliers with pivotal buyers suffer
noticeable declines in selling prices, in the two years subsequent to significant downstream divestiture
activity.
This study reports little to moderate evidence to support the indication that opportunistic rivals
take advantage of divesting firms diminished market power, which then generates offsetting withinindustry increases and decreases in input costs. Lastly, this study documents little to no support for the
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notion that opportunistic suppliers take advantage of the diminished buying power of dependent customer
industries in the years subsequent to significant downstream divestiture activity.
To demonstrate that these results are not a repercussion of efficiency enhancements or industry
demand, I investigate the role of both supplier and customer market structure and power on suppliers’
prices and customer profitability and value. I provide mixed qualitative evidence that suppliers with high
four-firm industry concentration ratios prior to downstream deconsolidation experience greater price
reductions in the years following the downstream divestiture event. These results indicate that
downstream divestiture activity potentially creates an opportunity for pivotal buyers to reverse their
pivotal position and exploit their suppliers’ weakened bargaining position.
To my understanding, this is the first study to document that dependent suppliers play an
important role in customer industry operating performance and cost structure following significant
upstream divestiture activity. This is also the first paper to develop and report evidence in support of the
pivotal buyer repositioning hypothesis, in the context of horizontal divestitures, supplementing the work
of Raskovich (2003) and Adilov and Alexander (2006). Finally, this study complements the findings of
Fee and Thomas (2004), Shahrur (2005), and Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) by reporting that, in
addition to horizontal consolidation, horizontal deconsolidation activity has implications for supplier
profitability, value, and pricing power and customer profitability, value, and cost structure.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation explores the impact of horizontal divestitures on economically linked firms
exploiting, both, firm and industry level data. The second chapter of this dissertation examines the
product market effect of a sample of horizontal asset sales from 1988 to 2005 on actual corporate
customers, suppliers, and industry rivals using a sample of firms that classifies corporate customers,
suppliers, and industry competitors of firms proposing horizontal asset sales. The second essay of this
dissertation performs an extensive empirical cross-industry investigation of the product market effects of
46 downstream (35 upstream) quarterly horizontal divestiture events from 1979-2010 on supplier
(customer) industries via their impact on profitability, value, and prices (profitability, value, and input
costs). Prior studies examine the product market effects of horizontal acquisitions, vertical acquisitions
and divestitures, but this stream of literature fails to account for the impact of horizontal divestitures on
product market relationships. This line of research is important because extant literatures tend to view
events such as mergers, acquisitions, and other important corporate events in isolation.
The second chapter of this dissertation investigates the firm level effects of horizontal asset sales
by investigating the wealth effects at announcement and post-divestiture changes in abnormal operating
performance around divestitures for divesting firms, customers, and suppliers. I document evidence that
divestiture related wealth effects for divesting parent firms are associated with efficiencies resulting from
the reduction of firm bureaucracy and financing constraints. I also provide evidence that managers need to
consider balancing post-divestiture productivity gains with potential declines in profitability due to
reduced bargaining power with suppliers. Horizontal asset sales are distinct from vertical divestitures,
since I find evidence that parent firm divestiture gains are not shared by their industry rivals, corporate
customers and suppliers. In contrast, vertical divestitures generate positive wealth effects for divesting
firms and are shared by industry rivals, corporate customers, and suppliers.
The second chapter of this dissertation also finds that horizontal asset sales have negative wealth
effects for industry rivals, corporate customers, and certain subsamples of suppliers. In addition, the
evidence suggests that factors such as customer (supplier) switching costs and industry structure tend to
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play an important role in the wealth effects of customers (suppliers) at announcement of upstream
(downstream) divestitures. I report that customers less reliant on divesting firms experience significantly
more negative median abnormal returns and more negative than positive abnormal returns than reliant
customers. However, I find that downstream horizontal asset sales are damaging to suppliers with high
switching costs but are valuable to supplier portfolios with lower switching costs.
The third chapter of this dissertation documents the opportunistic behavior of economically
linked firms, such as customers and suppliers, in the context of horizontal divestitures. I conduct a
complete empirical cross-industry analysis of the product market effects of horizontal divestitures on
upstream (downstream) industries by exploring profits, value, and prices (profits, value, and input costs).
I find that opportunistic customers take advantage of supplier dependence in the years following
significant upstream divestiture activity. Consequently, these customers enjoy significant increases in
profitability, value, and a considerable drop in input costs relative to customers of non-dependent
suppliers.
Additionally, the third chapter of this dissertation indicates that suppliers with pivotal buyers
suffer unfavorable changes in profitability and value in the years subsequent to downstream divestiture
activity relative to suppliers with non-pivotal buyers. The evidence suggests that pivotal buyers capitalize
on significant downstream divestiture activity to reverse their pivotal position and eliminate crosssubsidization by suppliers and non-pivotal buyers within their industry. The third chapter of this
dissertation fails to present sufficient evidence to substantiate supplier and rival opportunism subsequent
to downstream horizontal deconsolidation.
Collectively, the second and third chapters of this dissertation indicate that horizontal divestiture
activity prompts opportunistic behavior. I document, at the firm level, that opportunistic upstream firms
(supplier) take advantage of divesting downstream firms reduced size to gain a temporary bargaining
advantage due to reduced countervailing power. In contrast, my cross-industry sample suggests that
significant downstream activity prompts exploited pivotal buyers, to seize an opportunity to reverse their
pivotal position, reducing supplier profitability and value. Whereas, significant upstream divestiture
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activity encourages customer industries to take advantage of dependent suppliers to reduce customer input
costs and improve customer profitability and value. This evidence complements the findings of Fee and
Thomas (2004), Shahrur (2005), and Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), which suggests that horizontal
divestitures can undermine countervailing power that is increased via horizontal acquisition activity. Also,
the second chapter of this dissertation reveals that downstream firm level horizontal divestitures can
reduce buying power, while, the third chapter reveals that significant upstream (supplier) divestiture
activity can lead to reduced selling power. These findings reiterate the importance of considering
economic linkages when examining restructuring activities. These findings are of concern for corporate
executives, financial analysts, investors, and corporate stakeholders of economically linked firms
undergoing significant restructuring activity.
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Firm-level Horizontal Asset Sale Definitions
Horizontal Asset Sale Deal Characteristics
CASH – An indicator variable that is equal to one if the deal was all cash deal, and equal to zero
otherwise.
REL_SIZE – The net transaction value of the asset sale scaled by the prior year’s market value of equity.
SAME_INDUSTRY – An indicator variable that is equal to one if the division/segment/business unit was
sold to an acquirer with same 4-digit SIC code and equal to zero, otherwise.
Definitions of Firm-level Characteristics
ALTMAN_Z_SCORE – The sum of 3.3 * earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets, 0.99 *
net sales scaled by total assets, 0.6 * market capitalization at fiscal year-end scaled by total liabilities, 1.2
* current assets scaled by total assets, and 1.4* retained earnings scaled by total assets.
Cash flow-to-sales – The ratio of operating income (Compustat item 13) to sales (Compustat item 12)
Costs of goods sold-to-sales (COGSSALE) – The ratio of cost of goods sold (Compustat item 30) to sales
(Compustat item 12).
Employees – The number of firm employees (Compustat item 29)
Employee-to-sales (EMPSALE) – The ratio of the number of firm employees (Compustat item 29) to
sales. (Compustat item 12).
NEED_FOR_FUNDS – The difference between capital expenditures (Compustat item 128) and the sum
of operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) and change in net working capital
(Compustat item 4 less Compustat item 5).
Selling, General, & Administrative expense-to-sales (SGASALE) – The ratio of selling, general, and
administrative expense (Compustat item 189) to sales (Compustat item 12).
TOBINS_Q – The ratio of the firm’s market value of assets to the book value of firm assets: (price at
fiscal year-end close (item 199) * common shares outstanding (item 25) plus total assets (item 6) less
book value of common equity (item 60)) scaled by total assets (item 6).
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Wage-to-sales (WAGESALE) – The product of the number of firm employees (Compustat item 29) and
the national average wage in a given year obtained from the Social Security Administration (Imrohoroglu
and Tüzel, 2014) divided by sales (Compustat item 12).
Definitions of Firm-level Industry Characteristics
Ind. Herf – Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the given industry
calculated from Compustat business segments.
Ind. Herf > 1800 – Deals that occurred in industries (4-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture
Herfindahl Index was greater than 1800.
Ind. Herf <= 1800 – Deals that occurred in industries (4-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture
Herfindahl Index was less than or equal to 1800.
∆ Ind. Herf. < -100 are those deals that resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were
below -100.
∆ Ind. Herf. >= -100 are those deals that resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were
greater than or equal to -100.
Definition of Firm-level Customer Characteristics
Reliant – Customers that have a ratio of customer sales (to the divesting firm) divided by the market value
of the customer firm two days prior to the event that is greater than 2.5%.
Non-reliant – classifies customers that have a ratio of customer sales (to the divesting firm) divided by the
market value of the customer firm two days prior to the event that is less than or equal to 2.5%.
Non-concentrated customers – Corporate customers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl Index that is
less than or equal to1800.
Concentrated customers – Corporate customers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl Index that is
greater than 1800.
Definitions of Firm-level Supplier Characteristics
Non-concentrated suppliers – Suppliers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is less than or equal to
1800.

107
Concentrated suppliers – Suppliers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is greater than 1800.
Retained suppliers are those suppliers that were listed as suppliers before and after a deal. Terminated
suppliers are those suppliers that were listed as suppliers before a deal but not after.
Suppliers w/multiple large customers – Suppliers that disclose more than one large public customer in the
Compustat Customer Segment Database.
Suppliers w/single large customer – Suppliers that disclose only one large public customer in the
Compustat Customer Segment Database.
Industry-level Horizontal Divestiture Definitions
Industry-Level Characteristics
Abnormal Cash Flow to Enterprise Value (ACFEV) – The cash flow-to-enterprise value ratio is defined as
the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Compustat item 13) to the sum
of the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6), market value of equity (Compustat item 199) *
(Compustat item 61), less the sum of book value of common equity (Compustat item 60) and cash and
short term investments (Compustat item 1).
Abnormal cash flow margins (ACFM) – Industry’s median cash flow-to-sales ratio minus the cash flowto-sales ratio of the median industry in the economy. The cash flow-to-sales ratio of a firm is the ratio of
operating income (Compustat item 13) to sales (Compustat item 12).
Abnormal Cash Flow-to-Market Value of Assets (ACFMVA) – Industry’s median cash flow-to-market
value of assets ratio minus the cash flow-to-market value of assets ratio of the median industry in the
economy. The cash flow-to-market value of assets is defined as the ratio of operating income (Compustat
item 13) to the sum of the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6), market value of equity
(Compustat item 199) * (Compustat item 61), less the book value of common equity (Compustat item
60).
Abnormal Cost-of-Goods Sold Margins (ACGSM) – Industry’s median cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio
minus the cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio of the median industry in the economy. The cost-of-goods
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sold-to-sales ratio is defined as the ratio of cost of goods sold (Compustat item 30) to sales (Compustat
item 12).
Abnormal Fixed Costs (AFCS) – Industry’s median fixed costs-to-sales ratio minus the fixed costs-tosales ratio of the median industry in the economy. The fixed costs-to-sales ratio is the ratio of selling,
general, and administrative expense (Compustat item 189) to sales ratio (Compustat item 12).
Abnormal Return on Assets (AROA) – Industry’s median return on assets minus the return on assets of the
median industry in the economy. The return on assets is defined as the ratio of operating income
(Compustat item 13) to the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6).
Advertising Expense – Industry’s total advertising expense (Compustat item 45) divided by the industry’s
total sales.
Capital intensity – Industry’s total assets (Compustat item 6) divided by industry sales (Compustat item
12).
Capital expenditure – Industry’s total capital expenditure (Compustat item 128) divided by the industry’s
total assets (Compustat item 6).
Customer Dependence (CD) – Dummy variable that equals one if the supplier’s customer industry
belongs to the top quintile of fjm, the percentage of customer industry m’s inputs purchased from the
upstream industry, j, and zero otherwise.
fmj – The percentage of divesting supplier industry j’s output sold to the customer industry m. Higher
values of fmj indicate that the divesting supplier industry j is more dependent on the downstream
(customer) industry for buying its output.
fjm – The percentage of supplier industry m’s input purchased by the divesting customer industry for the
sample of downstream divestitures.
Four-firm concentration ratio – Sum of sales for the top four-firms divided by industry total sales.
Herfindahl Index – Sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the given industry calculated from
Compustat business segments.
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Real PPI (RPPI) – Producer Price Index (PPI) data for supplier industries are obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). The PPI for each supplier is deflated using the GDP price deflator.
Pivotal buyer (PB) – Dummy variable that equals one if supplier industry belongs to the top tercile (1/3rd)
of fmj, the fraction of industry j’s output sold to the downstream divesting industry, the supplier’s average
Herfindahl index in the two years prior to the divestiture is greater than 1800, and abnormal fixed coststo-sales ratio is in the top half of the distribution, and zero otherwise. The Supplier high concentration and
high fixed costs dummy equals one if the supplier’s average Herfindahl index in the two years prior to the
divestiture is greater than 1800 and abnormal fixed costs to sales ratio is in the top half of the distribution,
and zero otherwise.
rppi – Log differences of RPPI.
rppi_inp1 – real PPI of the supplier industry’s top input.
rppi_inp2 – real PPI of the supplier industry’s second top input.
Supplier Dependence (SD) – Dummy variable that equals one if the customer industry has a supplier with
fmj in the top quintile and zero otherwise.
TV/TMVE – Total SDC divestiture deal transaction value less value (TV) of all horizontal acquisitions
announced in that quarter exceeds five percent of industry total market value of equity (TMVE). TV is the
total value of consideration paid by the acquirer excluding fees and expenses (in millions). TMVE is the
total market capitalization (in millions) MVE is csho* prcc_f (Compustat item 199) * (Compustat item
61) in a given quarter of a year.
wage – Log differences of average hourly earnings of production workers compiled by the BLS.
Economy Characteristics Definitions
tp – Obtained from the Federal Reserve Board, measures log differences of the real output of the
manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities industries.

110
APPENDIX B: FILES AND DATABASES
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 1992 and 1997 Benchmark Input-Output Tables
Federal Reserve Board
U.S. Census Bureau’s SIC-NAICS Correspondence Tables
Compustat Name File
Compustat Fundamentals Table
Compustat (Business) Segment Database
Compustat (Customer) Segment Database
CRSP Stockname File
CRSP Daily Price File
CRSP Daily Stock Index File
Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database
SEC Edgar Database
Lexis/Nexis Academic
Wall Street Journal Newswire
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APPENDIX C: TABLES
Table 1
Summary of empirical predictions of a divestiture on divesting firms, rivals, customers, and suppliers
These effects apply to anticipated changes in operating performance that follow divestitures as well stock market
reactions to events that increase the probability of divestiture. Panel A presents the hypotheses for the entire
sample of divestiture deals. Panel B presents hypotheses for subsamples of divestiture deals with product market
considerations.
Divesting firms

Rivals

Customers

Suppliers

Positive industry demand shock:
Transfer ownership of less
productive assets to those who
can put the assets to better use

Positive

Positive or Negative
(information or
competitive
advantage)

Positive

Financing

Positive

Positive

Diseconomies of scale /
Efficiency

Positive

Positive or negative
(more pronounced
amongst financially
constrained firms)
Positive or Negative
(Positive
information or
competitive
advantage)
(More pronounced
among larger rivals
firms (assets or
employees)

Zero to Positive
(suppliers
unaffected or
more valuable
customer
generates greater
demand for
inputs)
Positive

Panel A: Primary Hypotheses

Financial distress

Negative to Zero

Positive or negative
(more pronounced
amongst distressed
firms)

Zero to
negative
(firm seeks
additional
efficiencies
gains from
customers or
improved
coordination
from
decreased
size results in
net effect of
zero)
Negative
(more
pronounced
among
customers of
distressed
firms)

Zero to negative
(suppliers
unaffected,
reduced size
engenders fewer
orders, or firm
seeks additional
efficiency gains
via reduced
contracting
costs)

Negative
(more
pronounced
among suppliers
of distressed
firms)
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Table 1 (continued)
Divesting firms
Rivals
Panel B: Product Market Considerations (Balance tradeoff with motive)

Customers

Suppliers

Zero, positive,
or negative
(Higher input
prices or
decreased size
engenders
fewer orders)
Positive
(higher prices)
More
pronounced
among
concentrated
supplier
industries and
concentrated
deals
Positive,
negative, or
zero
(higher prices
but conceivably
lower quantity
for retained
suppliers)
More
pronounced for
more
concentrated
suppliers or
suppliers with
lower
switching costs
Negative
More
pronounced for
suppliers with
higher
switching costs
or less supplier
concentration

Monopolistic collusion:
Decreased ability of
industry competitors to
coordinate a reduction in
output and higher prices

Negative (reduced
monopoly rents)
More/less pronounced
among concentrated /
Non concentrated firms

Negative
(Decreased
monopoly rents)

Positive (Lower
Prices and
quantity
increased)

Monopsonistic collusion:
Decreased ability of
industry competitors to
coordinate lower input
prices

Negative
(reduced monopsony
rents)
More/less pronounced
among concentrated /
Non concentrated firms

Negative
(Decreased
monopsony
rents)

Zero to positive
(customers
unaffected or
higher quantity
and decreased
prices)

Purchasing inefficiencies /
countervailing power
considerations:
Inability to switch to more
efficient suppliers

Negative (higher input
costs)
More/less pronounced
among concentrated /
Non concentrated firms

Positive or
negative (higher
input costs or
competitive
advantage)

Zero to negative
(customers
unaffected or cost
increase passed
along in higher
prices)
More pronounced
for customers
with higher
switching costs
or lower
relationshipspecific
investments

Product market
competition: increased
susceptibility to
competition for less
competitive industries

Positive
(decreased probability
of living quiet life)
More pronounced in
more concentrated
industries

Positive or
negative
(Rivals w/less
leverage vs.
Rivals w/more
leverage)

Positive, Zero, or
negative
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Table 2
Sample description of divesting firms
The sample includes all proposed divestitures initiated between 1988 and 2005 that are covered in the Securities
Data Corporation (SDC) database and that also meet the following criteria: Parent was seeking to divest a majority
interest through the transaction; announcement date of the deal can be determined via a search of Lexis Nexis and
Wall Street Journal newswire. The sample includes all proposed divestitures initiated between 1988 and 2005 that
are covered in the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database and that also do not meet the following criteria: (1)
parent firms are private firms, limited partnerships, financial and regulated firms [Compustat historical Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code 6000-6999, 4000-4099, 4500-4599, or 4800-4999], Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs), foreign firms, or joint ventures, (2) information on the parent firm is not accessible on Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) directly following the divestiture, (3) concurrent announcements are made such
as quarterly earnings; issues of equity, preferred stock or warrants; mergers and acquisitions; termination of
technical agreements; share repurchases; private placements, dividends; and executive turnover (4) parent firms
simultaneously announce an intent to spin off or carve out a unit in addition to divesting assets, (5) the
announcement date of the proposed divestiture cannot be determined via a search of newswires and newspapers
archived in Lexis-Nexis and WSJ, (6) parent does not have data available in Compustat on both a consolidated and
industry –segment basis (7) parent and proposed divestiture target (subsidiary or unit) are not U.S. based, (8) the
parent and divestiture target do not have matching SIC codes in SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. NTV is
the Net Transaction Value of the deal (exclude deal fees). Parent TA is total value of assets in prior calendar year
obtained from Compustat and is reported in 2003 dollars. MVE is market value of equity in the prior calendar year
obtained from Compustat (calculated as the share price of common stock at fiscal year-end * number common
shares outstanding) and is reported in 2003 dollars. Industries in Panel B are defined as in Fama and French (1997).
Year
Deals Percentage
Average
Average
Average
Relative
Employees
Parent MVE
Parent TA
NTV
NTV /
(thousands)
($ millions)
($ millions)
($ millions)
Parent TA
Panel A: frequency of deals by Year
1988
1
1.23
331.57
50.07
54.45
0.03
9.40
1989
1
1.23
36.95
38.57
2.49
0.07
0.40
1991
5
6.17
6,041.11
5,922.24
238.93
0.04
11.06
1992
5
6.17
571.06
1,673.47
53.17
0.06
7.81
1993
2
2.47
3,126.04
6,780.67
154.05
0.02
36.88
1994
1
1.23
939.92
2,530.83
67.02
0.03
2.57
1996
2
2.47
465.63
865.64
46.78
0.15
1.30
1997
4
4.94
10,489.62
7,248.09
99.78
0.15
37.31
1998
1
1.23
329.09
857.67
31.52
0.04
0.23
1999
9
11.11
5,254.68
7,190.47
69.11
0.07
36.66
2000
3
3.70
460.60
467.17
30.19
0.21
1.81
2001
5
6.17
9,345.28
6,380.51
255.62
0.05
66.56
2002
6
7.41
8,639.27
4,447.30
134.66
0.02
53.57
2003
10
12.35
25,234.59
11,581.49
262.34
0.94
73.11
2004
6
7.41
3,225.37
5,512.67
89.57
0.03
31.72
2005
14
17.28
13,794.63
9,370.32
185.96
0.06
36.33
All deals
81
100.00
10,801.58
7,399.85
172.87
0.17
37.54
Panel B: frequency of deals by industry
Petroleum and
24
29.63
Natural Gas
Healthcare
10
12.35
Electronic
10
12.35
Equipment
Pharmaceutical
8
9.88
Products
Restaurants,
7
8.64
Hotels, Motels
Business Services
6
7.41

4,668.98

6,619.70

236.25

0.08

4.79

2,742.99
24,803.23

5,821.20
13,934.61

87.27
170.86

0.07
0.92

58.06
48.58

42,087.53

13,247.41

112.29

0.03

26.55

9,570.20

8,651.47

126.40

0.01

141.57

586.49

443.28

57.70

0.10

1.78
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Table 2 (continued)
Retail
Other

5
11

10,621.74
2,462.80

8,229.74
2,964.47

474.07
113.76

0.10
0.08

90.40
17.58

Panel C: frequency of deals by deal characteristics
Method of payment
Cash
31
38.27
7,776.74
Stock
3
3.70
618.38
Mixed
3
3.70
1,937.59
Unknown
44
54.32
14,231.39

7,016.98
387.55
1,661.90
8,538.94

226.17
8.15
238.04
142.10

0.34
0.08
0.26
0.06

35.72
0.42
6.74
43.45

Intra vs inter industry transaction
Intra-industry
43
transaction
Inter-industry
38
transaction

6.14
13.58

53.09

13,736.25

8,051.02

190.65

0.07

27.63

46.91

7,480.76

6,663.01

152.74

0.29

48.75
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Table 3
Sample description of corporate customers and suppliers of divesting firms by industry
Customer and supplier market value of equity are calculated two trading days prior to the announcement date. MVE
is the market value of equity obtained from CRSP and is reported in 2003 dollars. Industries are defined as in Fama
and French (1997).
Number
with
customer
or
supplier
as match

Percentage

Number
with
customer
as match

Average
Customer
MVE
($ millions)

Number
with
supplier as
match

Average
Supplier
MVE
($ millions)

22

15.71%

3

23,295.29

19

315.45

21

15.00%

10

56,244.00

11

872.31

11

7.86%

6

9,122.41

5

513.06

10

7.14%

4

41,921.97

6

122.59

10

7.14%

-

-

10

223.73

10

7.14%

2

58,959.02

8

10,604.83

6

4.29%

-

-

6

123.79

Pharmaceutical Products
Measuring and Control
Equipment
Retail

6

4.29%

-

-

6

1,853.50

5

3.57%

1

13,548.67

4

428.72

5

3.57%

5

100,609.06

-

-

Automobiles and Trucks
Trading

4

2.86%

4

35,458.67

-

-

4

2.86%

-

-

4

3,158.05

Utilities

4

2.86%

4

14,711.55

-

-

Other

22

15.71%

3

2,288.49

19

549.09

Total

140

100.00%

42

41,148.41

98

1,472.00

Industry

Electronic Equipment
Petroleum and Natural Gas
Wholesale
Computers
Machinery
Communication
Business Services
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Table 4
Mean (median) abnormal returns for divesting firms, industry rivals, corporate customers and suppliers
Abnormal return is the abnormal return for a three-day window centered on the divestiture announcement date and
calculated from a market model estimated over the period from 240 to 41 days before the divestiture announcement.
I require at least 100 trading days over the estimation window to calculate abnormal returns. Industry Herf > 1800
are those deals that occurred in industries (four-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture Herfindahl Index was
greater than 1800. Industry Herf <= 1800 are those deals that occurred in industries (four-digit SIC code) in which
the pre-divestiture Herfindahl Index was less than or equal to 1800. ∆ Industry Herf. < -100 are those deals that
resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were below -100. ∆ Industry Herf. >= -100 are those deals
that resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were greater than or equal to -100. t-statistics for
abnormal returns are based on tests that the standardized prediction errors are equal to zero. Significance of the
number of positive versus number of negative is calculated using a sign test. Significance of the median abnormal
return is assessed using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.

All

Panel A: abnormal returns to divesting parent firms
Mean abnormal return
1.58%
t-statistic
2.50**
Median abnormal return
0.79%**
Positive, negative
50, 31**

Industry
Her. >1800

2.32%
2.51**
1.04%**
19, 11

Subsample of deals
Industry
∆ Industry
Herf.
Herf. <
<=1800
-100
2.50%
2.04*
1.19%*
18, 12

1.04%
1.41
0.75%
32, 19*

Panel B: Abnormal returns on announcement for rival portfolios: single-segment only
Mean abnormal return
-1.09%
-1.99%
-0.58%
-1.87%
t-statistic
-1.85*
-1.80*
-0.86
-1.93*
*
Median abnormal return
-0.59%
-2.01%
-0.17%
-0.89%
Positive, negative
36, 44
11, 18
25, 26
13, 17

-0.63%
-0.84
-0.32%
23, 27

Panel C: Abnormal returns on announcement for rival portfolios: single- and multiple-segment
Mean abnormal return
-1.49%
-1.45%
-1.51%
-1.28%
t-statistic
-1.87**
-1.27
-1.90*
1.28
Median abnormal return
-0.52%**
-1.67%
-0.45%*
-0.52%
Positive, negative
33, 47
12, 17
21, 30
14, 16

-1.62%
-1.76*
-0.89%*
19, 31

Panel D: abnormal returns to individual customers
Mean abnormal return
-0.58%
t-statistic
-1.00
Median abnormal return
-0.96%*
Positive, negative
14, 28**

-0.92%
-1.49
-1.07%**
5, 14*

-0.29%
-0.32
-0.75%
9, 14

-0.92%
-1.49
-1.07**
5, 14*

-0.23%
-0.19
-0.77%
7, 10

0.09%
0.09
-1.00%
4, 7

1.15%
1.31
0.71%
31, 20

∆ Industry
Herf. >=
-100

-0.81%
-1.13
-0.79%
10, 21*

Panel E: abnormal returns to customer portfolios
Abnormal return
-0.59%
0.09%
-0.89%
t-statistic
-0.94
0.09
-1.08
Median abnormal return
-1.03%
-1.00%
-1.06%
Positive, negative
12, 24*
4, 7
8, 17
*** **
*
, , and denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
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Table 4 (continued)

Industry
Her. >1800

Industry
Herf.
<=1800

∆ Industry
Herf. <
-100

∆ Industry
Herf. >=
-100

Panel F: abnormal returns to individual suppliers
Mean abnormal return
0.34%
t-statistic
0.41
Median abnormal return
-0.04%
Positive, negative
47, 51

1.95%
1.24
-0.04%
16, 19

-0.56%
-0.59
-0.04%
31, 32

1.66%
1.31
0.22%
21, 19

-0.58%
-0.53
-0.60%
26, 32

Panel G: abnormal returns to supplier portfolios
Mean abnormal return
0.68%
t-statistic
0.64
Median abnormal return
-0.32%
Positive, negative
20, 25

2.44%
1.21
0.28%
10, 9

-0.60%
-0.56
-0.72%
10, 16

1.46%
0.72
0.41%
8, 7

0.29%
0.23
-0.60%
12, 18

All
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Table 5
Changes in abnormal operating performance of divesting firms, corporate customers and suppliers
Changes in median industry-adjusted operating performance are calculated as post-divestiture industry-adjusted
operating performance minus year –1 industry-adjusted operating performance. Cash-flow to sales is defined as the
ratio of operating income (Compustat item 13) to sales (Compustat item 12). Industry Herf > 1800 are those deals
that occurred in industries (four-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture Herfindahl Index was greater than 1800.
Industry Herf <= 1800 are those deals that occurred in industries (four-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture
Herfindahl Index was less than or equal to 1800. ∆ Industry Herf. < -100 are those deals that resulted in a change in
the industry Herfindahl Index that were below -100. ∆ Industry Herf. >= -100 are those deals that resulted in a
change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were greater than or equal to -100. Significance of the number of
positive versus number of negative is calculated using a sign test. Significance of changes in median industryadjusted operating performance is assessed using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Subsample of deals
All
Industry
Industry
∆ Industry
Her. >1800
Herf.
Herf. <
<=1800
-100
Panel A: changes in divesting firm median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales
-2.51%
-2.53%*
-2.47%
-1.39%
Year –1 to year +1
**
Positive, negative
24, 45
8, 21**
16, 24
8, 17

∆ Industry
Herf. >=
-100
-2.75%
16, 28*

Year –1 to year +2
Positive, negative

-2.08%
20, 41**

-1.58%
7, 19**

-2.92%
13, 22

-0.56%
7, 15

-3.45%
13, 26*

Year –1 to year +3
Positive, negative

-0.94%
22, 30

-2.80%
6, 16*

0.25%
16, 14

-6.62%
4, 14**

0.25%
18, 16

Year –1 to median post-divestiture
Positive, negative

-1.07%
27, 42*

-1.39%**
7, 22***

-0.43%
20, 20

-0.96%
7, 18**

-1.42%
20, 24

Panel B: changes in individual customer median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales
Year –1 to year +1
-0.65%
2.11%
-0.93%
Positive, negative
12, 16
4, 3
8, 13

0.48%
8, 7

-2.00%
4, 9

Year –1 to year +2
Positive, negative

0.78%
17, 10

0.74%
4, 2

0.78%
13, 8

0.74%
8, 6

0.78%
9, 4

Year –1 to year +3
Positive, negative

0.41%
15, 11

-0.42%
3, 3

1.31%
12, 8

0.43%
7, 6

0.40%
8, 5

Year –1 to median post-divestiture
0.88%
1.06%
0.78%
Positive, negative
17, 11
4, 3
13, 8
*** **
, , and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.

1.06%
8, 7

0.78%
9, 4
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Table 5 (continued)
Industry
∆ Industry
Herf.
Herf. <
<=1800
-100
Panel C: changes in customer portfolio median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales
Year –1 to year +1
-0.19%
2.11%
-0.37%
0.48%
Positive, negative
11, 13
4, 3
7, 10
8, 7
All

Industry
Her. >1800

∆ Industry
Herf. >=
-100
-2.00%
3, 6

Year –1 to year +2
Positive, negative

0.78%
14, 9

0.74%
4, 2

0.78%
10, 7

0.74%
8, 6

0.78%
6, 3

Year –1 to year +3
Positive, negative

0.41%
12, 10

-0.42%
3, 3

1.31%
9, 7

0.43%
7, 6

0.39%
5, 4

Year –1 to median post-divestiture
Positive, negative

0.88%
14, 10

1.06%
4, 3

0.78%
10, 7

1.06%
8, 7

0.78%
6, 3

Panel D: changes in individual supplier median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales
Year –1 to year +1
3.75%*
-2.66%
5.91%**
Positive, negative
35, 23
10, 11
25, 12**

-2.66%
12, 15

11.19%***
23, 8**

Year –1 to year +2
Positive, negative

-4.32%
15, 25

-3.33%
4, 10

-5.71%
11, 15

-11.03%
4, 14**

-0.64%
11, 11

Year –1 to year +3
Positive, negative

-1.62%
18, 20

-2.64%
6, 7

-0.59%
12, 13

-7.60%
6, 10

2.14%
12, 10

Year –1 to median post-divestiture
Positive, negative

1.55%
31, 27

-2.83%
9, 12

9.07%*
22, 15

-4.12%
11, 16

5.91%
20, 11

Panel E: changes in supplier portfolio median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales
Year –1 to year +1
4.01%*
0.11%
5.48%**
**
Positive, negative
21, 8
5, 4
16, 4**

1.61%
5, 4

8.55%**
16, 4**

Year –1 to year +2
Positive, negative

-4.53%
9, 14

-4.53%
2, 5

-4.35%
7, 9

-6.84%
2, 6

-4.10%
7, 8

Year –1 to year +3
Positive, negative

-1.02%
9, 13

-1.02%
2, 5

-1.73%
8, 8

-6.67%
2, 6

0.87%
8, 7

Year –1 to median post-divestiture
Positive, negative

4.01%
19, 10

-2.64%
3, 6

5.06%*
16, 4**

4.01%
6, 3

4.47%
13, 7

***, **,

and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
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Table 6
Sources of losses/gains in abnormal returns and changes in abnormal operating performance
Changes in median industry-adjusted operating performance are calculated as post-divestiture industry-adjusted
operating performance minus year –1 industry-adjusted operating performance. Cost of goods sold-to-sales is
defined as the ratio of cost of goods sold (Compustat item 30) to sales (Compustat item 12). SG&A to sales is
defined as the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expense (Compustat item 189) to sales (Compustat item
12). Employee to sales is defined as the ratio of the number of firm employees (Compustat item 29) to sales
(Compustat item 12). Wage-to-sales is defined as the product of the number of firm employees (Compustat item 29)
and the national average wage in a given year obtained from the Social Security Administration (Imrohoroglu and
Tüzel, 2014) divided by sales (Compustat item 12). Industry Herf > 1800 are those deals that occurred in industries
(four-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture Herfindahl Index was greater than 1800. ∆ Industry Herf. < -100
are those deals that resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were below -100. ∆ Industry Herf. >= 100 are those deals that resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were greater than or equal to -100.
Significance of the number of positive versus number of negative is calculated using a sign test. Significance of
changes in median industry-adjusted operating performance is assessed using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Subsample of deals
Industry
∆ Industry
Herf.
Herf. <
<=1800
-100
Panel A: changes in divesting firm median industry-adjusted cost of goods sold-to-sales
1.22%
1.33%
1.10%
2.98%*
Year –1 to year +1
Positive, negative
43, 27*
18, 11
25, 16
18, 7**
All

Industry
Her. >1800

∆ Industry
Herf. >=
-100
1.00%
25, 20

Year –1 to year +2
Positive, negative

1.54%
36, 25

1.84%
16, 9

1.23%
20, 16

2.45%
15, 7

0.76%
21, 18

Year –1 to year +3
Positive, negative

2.40%
30, 21

2.02%
14, 10

2.92%
16, 11

4.85%*
15, 6*

0.38%
15, 15

Year –1 to median post-divestiture
Positive, negative

1.60%
43, 27*

1.33%
18, 11

1.67%
25, 16

3.71%*
19, 6**

1.10%
24, 21

Panel B: changes in divesting firm median industry-adjusted SG&A expenses to sales for divesting firms
0.30%
-0.24%
0.69%
-0.17%
0.56%
Year –1 to year +1
Positive, negative
30, 28
10, 15
20, 13
11, 13
19, 15
Year –1 to year +2
Positive, negative

-0.15%
23, 26

-2.17%
5, 17**

2.00%**
18, 9

-2.14%
7, 14

1.88%
16, 12*

Year –1 to year +3
Positive, negative

1.15%*
24. 19

-0.69%
7, 13

6.97%***
17, 6**

-0.39%
8, 10

1.59%**
16, 19

-0.39%
10, 14

0.45%
17, 17

-0.25%
-0.39%*
1.59%*
Year –1 to median post-divestiture
Positive, negative
27, 31
7, 18**
20, 13
*** **
*
, , and denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
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Table 6 (continued)
All

Industry
Her. >1800

Industry
Herf.
<=1800

∆ Industry
Herf. <
-100

∆
Industry
Herf.
>=
-100
Panel C: changes in divesting firm median industry-adjusted employees to sales (thousands per million ($)) * 100
-0.03*
-0.04*
-0.01
-0.02*
-0.04
Year –1 to year +1
Positive, negative
29, 41
10, 19
19, 22
9, 16
20, 25
Year –1 to year +2
Positive, negative

-0.02
27, 33

-0.08
10, 17

-0.00
17, 26

-0.07
8, 15

0.01
19, 18

Year –1 to year +3
Positive, negative

-0.01
24, 28

-0.02
9, 15

0.00
15, 13

-0.04
6, 12

0.00
17, 16

Year –1 to median post-divestiture
Positive, negative

-0.01
30, 40

-0.06*
10, 19

0.00
20, 21

-0.04**
6, 19**

0.01
24, 21

-0.03%
21, 20

-0.37%
10, 15

-0.38%
20, 25

Panel D: changes in divesting firm median industry-adjusted wage to sales
-0.38%
-1.19%**
Year –1 to year +1
Positive, negative
30, 40
9, 20*
Year –1 to year +2
Positive, negative

-0.79%
27, 35

-1.98%
9, 18

0.06%
18, 17

-1.58%
8, 15

-0.60%
19, 20

Year –1 to year +3
Positive, negative

-0.53%
23, 31

-0.72%
8, 16

-0.01%
15, 15

-0.82%
6, 13

-0.24%
17, 18

Year –1 to median post-divestiture
Positive, negative

-0.28%
30, 40

-1.35%*
9, 20*

-0.29%
21, 20

-0.39%*
5, 19**

0.30%
23, 22

Panel E: changes in individual customer cost of goods sold to sales
-0.22%
-1.39%
Year –1 to year +1
13,
15
3, 4
Positive, negative

-0.14%
10, 11

-0.93%
6, 9

0.99%
7, 6

Year –1 to year +2
Positive, negative

-1.05%
12, 16

1.03%
4, 3

-1.05%
8, 13

-0.65%
7, 8

-1.05%
5, 8

Year –1 to year +3
Positive, negative

-0.30%
11, 14

1.59%**
6, 1

-1.17%
5, 13*

0.74%
8, 6

-1.14%
3, 8

Year –1 to median post-divestiture
Positive, negative

-0.57%
13, 15

1.03%
4, 3

-1.00%
9, 12

-1.00%
6, 9

0.99%
7, 6
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Table 6 (continued)
All

Industry
Her. >1800

Panel F: changes in customer portfolio cost of goods sold-to-sales
-0.22%
-1.39%
Year –1 to year +1
11, 13
3, 4
Positive, negative

Industry
Herf.
<=1800

∆ Industry
Herf. <
-100

∆ Industry
Herf. >=
-100

-0.14%
8, 9

-0.93%
6, 9

0.99%
5, 4

Year –1 to year +2
Positive, negative

-0.85%
11, 13

1.03%
4, 3

-1.05%
7, 10

-0.65%
7, 8

-1.05%
4, 5

Year –1 to year +3
Positive, negative

-0.29%
10, 12

1.59%**
6, 1

-1.14%
4, 11

0.74%
8, 6

-1.04%
2, 6

-0.57%
1.03%
-1.00%
Year –1 to median post-divestiture
11,
13
4,
3
7, 10
Positive, negative
*** **
*
, , and denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.

-1.00%
6, 9

0.99%
5, 4
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Table 7
Performance differences for customer subsamples
Non-concentrated customers classifies corporate customers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is less than or equal
to1800. Concentrated customers classifies corporate customers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is greater than 1800.
Reliant classifies customers that have a ratio of customer sales (to the divesting firm) divided by the market value of the customer
firm two days prior to the event that is greater than 2.5%. Non-reliant classifies customers that have a ratio of customer sales (to
the divesting firm) divided by the market value of the customer firm two days prior to the event that is less than or equal to 2.5%.
Abnormal return is the abnormal return for supplier firms over a three day window centered on the merger announcement date.
Changes in median supplier industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales are calculated as median post-divestiture industry-adjusted cashflow to sales minus year –1 industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales. Significance of differences in abnormal returns is assessed using
a t-test. Significance of differences in median abnormal returns and changes in median industry-adjusted operating performance
is assessed using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.

Panel A: performance differences between non-concentrated and concentrated individual customers
Non-concentrated
Concentrated
Difference
customers
customers
Mean abnormal returns
-0.45%
-0.85%
-0.40%
t-statistic
-0.68
-0.74
0.32
Median abnormal returns
-1.07%*
0.40%
1.47%
Positive, negative
7, 22***
7, 6
Change in median industry-adjusted cashflow to sales
Positive, negative

1.06%

0.18%

13, 8

4, 3

-0.88%

Panel B: performance differences between non-concentrated and concentrated for customer portfolios
Mean abnormal returns
-0.32%
-1.18%
-0.87%
t-statistic
-0.43
-0.99
0.64
Median abnormal returns
-1.07%
0.12%
1.19%
Positive, negative
7, 19**
6, 6
Change in median industry-adjusted cashflow to sales
Positive, negative

1.06%

-0.10%

12, 7

3, 3

Panel C: performance differences between reliant and non-reliant individual customers
Reliant
Non-reliant
Mean abnormal returns
-0.47%
-0.64%
t-statistic
-0.59
-0.80
Median abnormal returns
-0.47%
-1.08%*
Positive, negative
7, 9
7, 19**
Change in median industry-adjusted cashflow to sales
Positive, negative

1.41%

0.48%

5, 3

12, 8

Panel D: performance differences between reliant and non-reliant customer portfolios
Mean abnormal returns
-0.76%
-0.60%
t-statistic
-0.97
-0.69
Median abnormal returns
-0.79%
-1.07%*
Positive, negative
6, 9
6, 17**
Change in median industry-adjusted cash1.41%
0.88%
flow to sales
Positive, negative
4, 3
11, 7
*** **
, , and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.

-1.16%

Difference
-0.17%
0.14
-0.61%

-0.93%

0.16%
0.13
-0.28%

-0.53%
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Table 8
Supplier termination decision and performance differences for supplier subsamples
Panel A presents the results of a logit regression where the dependent variable is equal to one if a supplier is
terminated in year after divestiture and zero otherwise. The sample for this analysis consists of suppliers with nonmissing 3-day cumulative abnormal returns around completed divestitures. Divesting firm abnormal returns are the
3-day mean cumulative abnormal returns centered on the divestiture announcement for divesting firm using marketmodel. Suppliers with single large customer is defined as suppliers that disclose only one large public customer in
the Compustat Customer Segment Database. Supplier industry concentration is a binary variable which is equal to
one if the supplier industry Herfindahl is greater than 1800 and zero otherwise. Relative deal size is the ratio of deal
transaction value to the market value of common equity in the year prior to the divestiture. Relationship Duration is
the number of years in which there has been a consistent reported customer-supplier relationship in the Compustat
Customer Segment Database. Industry Herf > 1800 are those deals that occurred in industries (four-digit SIC code)
in which the pre-divestiture Herfindahl Index was greater than 1800. ∆ Industry Herf. < -100 are those deals that
resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were below -100. Cash is a binary variable that is equal to
one if the method of payment was cash and is equal to zero otherwise. Non-concentrated suppliers classifies
suppliers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is less than or equal to 1800. Concentrated suppliers classifies
suppliers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is greater than 1800. Retained suppliers are those suppliers that
were listed as suppliers before and after a deal. Terminated suppliers are those suppliers that were listed as suppliers
before a deal but not after. Suppliers w/multiple large customers is defined as suppliers that disclose more than one
large public customer in the Compustat Customer Segment Database. Suppliers w/single large customer is defined
as suppliers that disclose only one large public customer in the Compustat Customer Segment Database. Abnormal
return is the abnormal return for supplier firms over a three day window centered on the merger announcement date.
Changes in median supplier industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales are calculated as median post-divestiture industryadjusted cash-flow to sales minus year –1 industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales. Chi-squared statistics are reported in
parentheses to determine significance of logit regression coefficients. Significance of differences in abnormal
returns is assessed using a t-test. Significance of differences in median abnormal returns and changes in median
industry-adjusted operating performance is assessed using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Panel A: logit regression analysis of supplier termination decision
Dependent variable:
Supplier Terminated
Intercept
Divesting firm abnormal returns
Supplier with single large customer
Relative deal size
Supplier industry concentration
Relationship Duration
Industry Herf > 1800
Δ Industry Herf < -100
Cash
Pseudo R2
Observations
*** **
, , and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.

-4.252***
(11.27)
0.260**
(4.38)
1.975*
(3.19)
-6.237
(0.17)
-0.477
(0.18)
1.027**
(5.84)
-1.228
(1.01)
2.450**
(4.87)
-3.667*
(5.37)
0.431

71
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Table 8 (continued)
Panel B: performance differences between non-concentrated and concentrated for individual suppliers
NonConcentrated
Difference
concentrated
suppliers
suppliers
Mean abnormal returns
-0.69%
1.55%
2.25%
t-statistic
-0.67
1.17
1.35
Median abnormal returns
-0.95%*
1.85%
2.80%
Positive, negative
21, 32
26, 19
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to
sales
Positive, negative

2.96%

1.54%

14, 12

16, 15

-1.42%

Panel C: performance differences between non-concentrated and concentrated for supplier portfolios
Mean abnormal returns
-1.15%
2.20%
3.35%
t-statistic
-0.98
1.27
1.66
Median abnormal returns
Positive, negative

-0.76%
12, 21

1.33%
16, 7*

2.09%*

Change in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to
sales
Positive, negative

4.47%

1.57%

-2.90%

12, 6

9, 7

Panel D: performance differences between terminated and retained individual suppliers
Terminated
Retained
Mean abnormal returns
-1.76%
1.13%
t-statistic
-1.29
1.12
Median abnormal returns
-1.39%
0.04%
Positive, negative
11, 16
36, 35
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to
sales
Positive, negative

-12.08%**

5.46%**

4, 11

26, 16

Panel E: performance differences between terminated and retained supplier portfolios
Terminated
Retained
Mean abnormal returns
-3.36%
1.44%
t-statistic
-2.10*
1.16
Median abnormal returns
-1.83%**
0.27%
Positive, negative
4, 13**
20, 17
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to
-7.03%
5.91%**
sales
Positive, negative
4, 7
15, 6*
*** **
*
, , and denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.

Difference
2.89%
1.57
1.43%
17.54%***

Difference
4.80%
2.26**
1.59%**
12.94%**
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Table 8 (continued)
Suppliers
Suppliers
Difference
w/single large
w/multiple
customer
customers
Panel F: performance differences between individual suppliers with a single large customer and multiple large
customers
Mean abnormal returns
-2.16%
1.29%
3.44%
t-statistic
-1.90*
1.23
2.23**
*
Median abnormal returns
-1.77%
0.19%
1.96%**
Positive, negative
10, 17
37, 34
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to
sales
Positive, negative

-0.59%

4.22%

8, 9

22, 18

4.81%

Panel G: performance differences between supplier portfolios with a single large customer and multiple large
customers
Mean abnormal returns
-1.90%
1.54%
3.44%
t-statistic
-1.93*
1.27
2.21**
Median abnormal returns
-2.27%*
0.20%
2.47%
Positive, negative
7, 10
20, 18
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to
-2.94%
5.91%*
sales
Positive, negative
5, 7
15, 8
*** **
, , and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.

8.85%
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Table 10
Summary of hypotheses and empirical predictions for quarterly horizontal divestiture events
Panel A: Summary of downstream divestiture hypotheses and empirical predictions

(1)
Supplier Opportunism /
Customer Expropriation
Hypothesis
H1 Suppliers of dependent
customer industries experience
greater favorable changes in
abnormal cash flow margins
(cash flow-to-market value) in
the two years following an
announcement of downstream
deconsolidation

Hypotheses
(2)
Customer Opportunism /
Pivotal Buyer Repositioning
Hypothesis
H5 More dependent and
concentrated supplier
industries experience greater
adverse changes in abnormal
cash flow margins (cash flowto-market value) in the two
years following an
announcement of downstream
deconsolidation

Producers’
Prices

H2 Suppliers of dependent
customer industries experience
larger increases in selling
prices (real producers’ prices)
subsequent to downstream
deconsolidation

H6 Dependent supplier
industries experience larger
declines in selling prices (real
producers’ prices) subsequent
to downstream
deconsolidation

H10 Neither supplier nor
customer industry dependence
have an impact on selling
prices (real producers’ prices)
subsequent to downstream
deconsolidation

Industry
Structure
Concentration

H3 If downstream
deconsolidation diminishes
buying power, customer
industries with higher levels of
concentration prior to
downstream deconsolidation
will undergo larger price
increases in selling prices
following downstream
deconsolidation

H7 If downstream
deconsolidation reverses a
pivotal buyer’s pivotal
position, supplier industries
with higher concentration
prior to downstream
deconsolidation will undergo
a greater reduction in selling
prices following downstream
deconsolidation

H11 If downstream
deconsolidation induces
asymmetric customer buying
power, supplier industries with
higher levels of concentration
prior to downstream
deconsolidation will lead to
offsetting selling price
increases of less powerful
customer and decreases in
selling prices for more powerful
customers following
downstream deconsolidation

Efficiency and
Industry
Demand
Considerations

H4 If downstream
deconsolidation diminishes
buying power, concentrated
supplier industries with greater
barriers to entry prior to
deconsolidation will enjoy
larger increases in selling
prices following downstream
deconsolidation of concentrated
customer industries

H8 If downstream
deconsolidation allows
pivotal buyers to reposition
themselves, supplier
industries with greater
barriers to entry prior to
deconsolidation will suffer
larger declines in selling
prices following downstream
deconsolidation of customer
industries

H12 If downstream
deconsolidation leads to
asymmetric buying power,
concentrated supplier
industries with greater barriers
to entry prior to
deconsolidation will be able to
better discriminate selling
prices following downstream
deconsolidation of concentrated
customer industries

Operating
Performance

(3)
Rival Opportunism /
Waterbed Effect Hypothesis
H9 Supplier or customer
dependence has no effect on
abnormal cash flow margins
(cash flow-to-market value) in
the two years following an
announcement of downstream
deconsolidation
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Table 10 (continued)
Panel B: Summary of Upstream Divestiture Hypotheses and Empirical Predictions

Operating
Performance

Hypotheses
(4)
Customer opportunism /
Supplier expropriation hypothesis
H13 Customers of dependent supplier industries experience greater favorable changes in
abnormal cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years
subsequent to an upstream deconsolidation relative to customers of non-dependent supplier
industries.

Producers’
Prices

H14 Customers of dependent supplier industries experience greater declines in abnormal
costs-of-goods sold margins in the two years subsequent to an upstream deconsolidation
relative to customers of less dependent supplier industries.

Industry
Structure
Concentration

H15 If upstream deconsolidation reduces selling power, customers whose suppliers have
higher concentration prior to upstream deconsolidation will experience greater favorable
changes in cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years
subsequent to an announcement of upstream deconsolidation.

Industry
Demand
Considerations

H16 If upstream deconsolidation reduces selling power, customers whose suppliers have
higher barriers to entry prior to upstream deconsolidation will experience greater favorable
changes in cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years
subsequent to an announcement of upstream deconsolidation.
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Table 11
Description of industries that experience a horizontal divestiture event
Panel A lists the industries that experience a downstream horizontal divestiture event between 1979 and 2010, the
Fama and French 48 industry classification, the year and quarter of the divestiture event, the size of the divestiture
event, and the number of deals contributing to the divestiture event. A horizontal divestiture is defined as a
divestiture between two firms within the same primary four-digit SIC code. An industry is classified as having
experienced a divestiture event in a given quarter if the total transaction value (TV) of all horizontal acquisitions
announced in that quarter exceeds five percent of industry total market value of equity (TMVE). TV is the total
value of consideration paid by the acquirer excluding fees and expenses (in millions). TMVE is the total market
capitalization (in millions).
SIC
2086
3559
3585
3949
3845
3537
3442
3613
3448
3585
3821
3532
3555
3564
3715
3845
3821
3533
3843
3845
3564
2086
3334
2511
7819
2013
3579
2732
3448
3751
2851
3715
3724
3532
2721
3334
3743
2741
2891
3743
2273
3715
7371
2211
3272
2842

Fama and French 48-Industry
Description
Soda
Mach
Mach
Toys
MedEq
Autos
BldMt
ElcEq
BldMt
Mach
LabEq
Mach
Mach
Mach
Autos
MedEq
LabEq
Mach
MedEq
MedEq
Mach
Soda
Steel
Hshld
Fun
Food
Comps
Books
BldMt
Hshld
Chems
Autos
Aero
Mach
Books
Steel
Ships
Books
Chems
Ships
Txtls
Autos
BusSv
Txtls
BldMt
Hshld

Year

Quarter

TV/TMVE

No. of deals

1981
1981
1982
1982
1983
1984
1984
1985
1986
1986
1986
1987
1988
1988
1989
1989
1990
1990
1991
1992
1992
1993
1993
1993
1994
1995
1995
1996
1996
1996
1996
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
2000
2000
2001
2003
2003
2004
2005
2010
2010

4
4
3
4
2
3
4
4
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
3
2
3
3
1
3
2
2
4
1
2
2
1
1
3
4
1
1
2
4
4
4
1
2
3
3
3
1
1
1
3

2.019
0.083
0.089
0.776
1.713
0.129
0.131
0.061
0.588
0.053
0.343
0.139
0.101
0.289
0.422
0.074
2.050
0.084
0.055
0.052
0.050
0.081
0.075
0.306
0.056
0.147
0.060
0.057
0.067
0.089
0.061
0.065
0.057
0.681
0.150
0.197
0.115
3.998
0.431
0.268
0.061
0.107
0.128
0.059
1.183
0.061

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Table 11 (continued)
Panel B lists the industries that experience an upstream horizontal divestiture event between 1979 and 2010, the
Fama and French 48 industry classification, the year and quarter of the divestiture event, the size of the divestiture
event, and the number of deals contributing to the divestiture event. A horizontal divestiture is defined as a
divestiture between two firms within the same primary four-digit SIC code. An industry is classified as having
experienced a divestiture event in a given quarter if the total transaction value (TV) of all horizontal acquisitions
announced in that quarter exceeds five percent of industry total market value of equity (TMVE). TV is the total
value of consideration paid by the acquirer excluding fees and expenses (in millions). TMVE is the total market
capitalization (in millions).
SIC

2086
3559
3585
3949
3537
3442
3613
3448
3585
3532
3555
3564
3715
3845
3821
3533
3843
3845
3564
2086
3334
2013
3579
2732
3448
2851
3715
3724
3532
3334
3743
2741
3743
2273

Fama and French
48-Industry
Description
Soda
Mach
Mach
Toys
Autos
BldMt
ElcEq
BldMt
Mach
Mach
Mach
Mach
Autos
MedEq
LabEq
Mach
MedEq
MedEq
Mach
Soda
Steel
Food
Comps
Books
BldMt
Chems
Autos
Aero
Mach
Steel
Ships
Books
Ships
Txtls

Year

Quarter

TV/TMVE

No. of Deals

1981
1981
1982
1982
1984
1984
1985
1986
1986
1987
1988
1988
1989
1989
1990
1990
1991
1992
1992
1993
1993
1995
1995
1996
1996
1996
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
2000
2001
2003

4
4
3
4
3
4
4
1
2
1
2
2
1
3
2
3
3
1
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
4
1
1
2
4
4
1
3
3

2.019
0.083
0.089
0.776
0.129
0.131
0.061
0.588
0.068
0.139
0.101
0.289
0.422
0.078
0.170
0.084
0.055
0.068
0.064
0.100
0.075
0.147
0.060
0.057
0.082
0.061
0.065
0.057
0.681
0.059
0.115
3.998
0.360
0.061

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Table 12
Distributions of dependent and non-dependent customers, pivotal and non-pivotal buyers, dependent and
non-dependent suppliers
Panel A of this table describes the fraction of customer input purchased by divesting industry for dependent and
non-dependent customers and provides the distribution of fjm, the percentage of supplier industry m’s input
purchased by the divesting customer industry for the sample of downstream divestitures. Panel B of this table
describes the fraction of supplier output sold to the divesting industry for pivotal buyers and non-pivotal buyers and
provides the distribution of fmj, the percentage of supplier industry j’s output sold to the divesting industry m. Panel
C provides the distribution of fmj, the percentage of divesting supplier industry j’s output sold to the customer
industry m for dependent suppliers and non-dependent suppliers of customer industries for upstream divestitures.
Higher values of fjm indicate that the divesting customer industry is more dependent on the supplier industry, m, for
purchasing its input. Dependent customers are defined as those with suppliers with fjm in the top quintile. Remaining
suppliers are classified as those with non-dependent customers. Higher values of fmj indicate that the supplier
industry j is more dependent on the divesting industry for buying its output. Pivotal buyers identify those suppliers
with high fixed costs, (above median abnormal selling, general, and administrative expense-to-sales), high predivestiture supplier concentration (pre-divestiture supplier Herfindahl index greater than or equal to 1800), and with
fmj in the top tercile (upper one-third). Remaining suppliers are classified as non-pivotal buyers. Remaining suppliers
are classified as non-pivotal buyers.
Panel A
fjm
Dependent customers
Non-dependent customers
All
Panel B
fmj
Pivotal buyers
Non-pivotal buyers
All
Panel C
fmj
Dependent suppliers
Non-dependent suppliers
All

N
51
223
274

Minimum (%)
0.87
0.00
0.00

Maximum (%)
23.71
2.18
23.71

Mean (%)
4.56
0.28
1.07

Median (%)
2.67
0.03
0.19

N
34
240
274

Minimum (%)
0.04
0.00
0.00

Maximum (%)
13.63
22.08
22.08

Mean (%)
1.57
0.52
0.65

Median (%)
0.39
0.00
0.03

N
7
28
35

Minimum (%)
6.3
0.1
0.1

Maximum (%)
22.1
5.2
22.1

Mean (%)
11.5
1.4
3.5

Median (%)
9.2
0.8
1.1
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Table 13
Supplier accounting based abnormal operating performance
This table presents a multivariate analysis of accounting based measures of supplier industry abnormal operating
performance: abnormal cash flow margins (ACFM) and abnormal return on of assets (AROA). ACFM of an
industry is defined as that industry’s median cash flow-to-sales ratio minus the cash flow-to-sales ratio of the median
industry in the economy. The cash flow-to-sales ratio of a firm is the ratio of operating income (Compustat item 13)
to sales (Compustat item 12). The return on assets is defined as the ratio of operating income (Compustat item 13) to
the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6). In Column 1, the dependent variable is the average ACFM in
supplier industries over the two years preceding the downstream divestiture event. In Column 2, the dependent
variable is the average ACFM in supplier industries over the two years following downstream divestiture. In
Column 3, the dependent variable is the average AROA in supplier industries over the two years preceding the
downstream divestiture event. In Column 4, the dependent variable is the average AROA in supplier industries over
the two years following downstream divestiture. The customer dependence dummy equals one if the supplier’s
customer industry belongs to the top quintile of fjm, the percentage of customer industry m’s inputs purchased from
the upstream industry, j, and zero otherwise. The Pivotal buyer dummy equals one if supplier industry belongs to the
top tercile (1/3rd) of fmj, the fraction of industry j’s output sold to the downstream divesting industry, the supplier’s
average Herfindahl index in the two years prior to the divestiture is greater than 1800, and abnormal fixed costs-tosales ratio is in the top half of the distribution, and zero otherwise. The Supplier high concentration / HFC (high
fixed costs) dummy, equals one if the supplier’s average Herfindahl index in the two years prior to the divestiture is
greater than 1800 and abnormal fixed costs to sales ratio is in the top half of the distribution, and zero otherwise.
Abnormal fixed costs of an industry is defined as that industry’s median fixed costs-to-sales ratio minus the fixed
costs-to-sales ratio of the median industry in the economy. The fixed costs-to-sales ratio is the ratio of selling,
general, and administrative expense (Compustat item 189) to sales ratio (Compustat item 12). The supplier
dependence dummy equals one if the supplier industry belongs to the top tercile of fmj, the fraction of industry j’s
output sold to the downstream divesting industry and zero otherwise. Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared
sales market shares of firms in the given industry calculated from Compustat business segments. Capital intensity is
industry total assets (Compustat item 6) divided by industry sales (Compustat item 12). Capital expenditure is the
industry’s total capital expenditure (Compustat item 128) divided by the industry’s total assets (Compustat item 6).
Advertising expense is the industry’s total advertising expense (Compustat item 45) divided by the industry’s total
sales. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit SIC level are in parentheses. Year
dummy variables used in regression (not shown). All the continuous
variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile The superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels respectively.

Intercept
Customer dependence dummy
Pivotal buyer dummy
Supplier high concentration/ HFC dummy
Supplier dependence dummy

1
Dependent
variable:
Supplier ACFM
before
downstream
divestiture
-0.035

2
Dependent
variable:
Supplier ACFM
after
downstream
divestiture
-0.052b

3
Dependent
variable:
Supplier AROA
before
downstream
divestiture
0.000

4
Dependent
variable:
Supplier AROA
after
downstream
divestiture
-0.036

(-1.28)

(-1.91)

(-0.01)

(-1.10)

0.010

-0.016

0.018

-0.003

(0.79)

(-1.21)

(1.31)

(-0.20)

0.100a

0.022

0.101a

0.019

(5.63)

(1.17)

(4.29)

(0.88)

-0.063a

-0.059a

-0.027b

(-9.04)

-0.031c
(-3.11)

(-11.37)

(-2.60)

-0.014

-0.012

-0.026c

--0.011

(-0.89)

(-0.94)

(-1.88)

(-0.51)
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Table 13 (continued)
Customer Herfindahl index
Customer capital intensity
Customer capital expenditure

-0.000

0.000c

0.000

0.000

(-0.19)

(1.82)

(0.10)

(1.08)

0.007

0.016

0.004

0.010

(0.65)

(1.28)

(0.47)

(0.77)

0.062

-0.068

0.062

-0.068

(0.45)

(-0.53)

(0.43)

(-0.64)

Customer advertising expense

0.128

0.251

-0.042

0.213

(0.18)

(0.47)

(-0.07)

(0.64)

Supplier Herfindahl index

-0.000

0.000

-0.000

0.000c

(-0.97)

(0.17)

(-0.98)

(1.90)

0.023

0.025b

-0.019

-0.007

(1.10)

(2.17)

(-1.17)

(-0.54)

0.472c

0.229

0.454b

0.351

(1.95)

(1.45)

(2.57)

(1.11)

-1.136b

-0.586

-0.289

-0.540

(-2.75)

(-1.50)

(-1.01)

(-1.16)

Supplier capital intensity
Supplier capital expenditure
Supplier advertising expense

R-squared

0.28

0.10

0.32

0.11

F-statistic

8.98a

2.30b

11.23a

2.70a

Observations

293

272

293

272
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Table 14
Supplier market value based abnormal operating performance
This table presents a multivariate analysis of value based measures of supplier industry abnormal operating
performance: abnormal cash flow to market value of assets (ACFMVA) and abnormal cash flow to enterprise value
(ACFEV). ACFMVA of an industry is defined as that industry’s median cash flow-to-market value of assets ratio
minus the cash flow-to-market value of assets ratio of the median industry in the economy. The cash flow-to-market
value of assets is defined as the ratio of operating income (Compustat item 13) to the sum of the book value of total
assets (Compustat item 6), market value of equity (Compustat item 199) * (Compustat item 61), less the book value
of common equity (Compustat item 60). The cash flow-to-enterprise value ratio is defined as the ratio of earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Compustat item 13) to the sum of the book value of total
assets (Compustat item 6), market value of equity (Compustat item 199) * (Compustat item 61), less the sum of
book value of common equity (Compustat item 60) and cash and short term investments (Compustat item 1). In
Column 1, the dependent variable is the average ACFMVA in supplier industries over the two years preceding the
downstream divestiture event. In Column 2, the dependent variable is the average ACFMVA in supplier industries
over the two years following downstream divestiture. In Column 3, the dependent variable is the average ACFEV in
supplier industries over the two years preceding the downstream divestiture event. In Column 4, the dependent
variable is the average ACFEV in supplier industries over the two years following downstream divestiture. The
customer dependence dummy equals one if the supplier’s customer industry belongs to the top quintile of fjm, the
percentage of customer industry m’s inputs purchased from the upstream industry, j, and zero otherwise. The Pivotal
buyer dummy equals one if supplier industry belongs to the top tercile (1/3rd) of fmj, the fraction of industry j’s
output sold to the downstream divesting industry, the supplier’s average Herfindahl index in the two years prior to
the divestiture is greater than 1800, and abnormal fixed costs-to-sales ratio is in the top half of the distribution, and
zero otherwise. The Supplier high concentration / HFC (high fixed costs) dummy equals one if the supplier’s
average Herfindahl index in the two years prior to the divestiture is greater than 1800 and abnormal fixed costs to
sales ratio is in the top half of the distribution, and zero otherwise. Abnormal fixed costs of an industry is defined as
that industry’s median fixed costs-to-sales ratio minus the fixed costs-to-sales ratio of the median industry in the
economy. The fixed costs-to-sales ratio is the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expense (Compustat item
189) to sales ratio (Compustat item 12). The supplier dependence dummy equals one if the supplier industry belongs
to the top tercile of fmj, the fraction of industry j’s output sold to the downstream divesting industry and zero
otherwise. Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the given industry calculated
from Compustat business segments. Capital intensity is industry total assets (Compustat item 6) divided by industry
sales (Compustat item 12). Capital expenditure is the industry’s total capital expenditure (Compustat item 128)
divided by the industry’s total assets (Compustat item 6). Advertising expense is the industry’s total advertising
expense (Compustat item 45) divided by the industry’s total sales. T-statistics based on robust standard errors
clustered at the two-digit SIC level are in parentheses. Year dummy variables used in regression (not shown). All the
continuous variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Intercept

1
Dependent
variable:
Supplier
ACFMVA before
downstream
divestiture
-0.007

2
Dependent
variable:
Supplier
ACFMVA after
downstream
divestiture
-0.016

3
Dependent
variable:
Supplier
ACFEV before
downstream
divestiture
-0.005

4
Dependent
variable:
Supplier ACFEV
after downstream
divestiture
-0.018

(-0.36)

(-0.75)

(-0.20)

(-0.77)

Customer dependence dummy

0.014

0.004

0.015

-0.003

(1.50)

(0.37)

(1.41)

(-0.22)

Pivotal buyer dummy

0.035c

-0.002

0.047b

-0.001

(1.97)

(-0.24)

(2.79)

(-0.08)

-0.036a

-0.019b

-0.043a

-0.019b

(-5.39)

(-3.08)

(-11.21)

(-2.70)

Supplier high concentration / HFC dummy
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Table 14 (continued)
Supplier dependence dummy
Customer Herfindahl index
Customer capital intensity
Customer capital expenditure
Customer advertising expense
Supplier Herfindahl index

-0.009

0.001

-0.013

0.006

(-0.91)

(0.01)

(-1.13)

(0.03)

-0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(-0.03)

(1.39)

(1.21)

(0.77)

c

0.003

0.015c

0.004

(1.87)

(0.56)

(1.97)

(0.77)

0.014

0.094

-0.031

0.051

-0.058

(1.16)

(-0.36)

(0.60)

(-0.69)

-0.170

0.090

-0.179

0.122

(-0.49)

(0.66)

(-0.47)

(0.87)

0.000c

0.000a

0.000a

0.000c

(2.05)
Supplier capital intensity
Supplier capital expenditure
Supplier advertising expense

(3.03)

(2.41)

(1.97)

b

-0.014

-0.027a

-0.018c

(-2.90)

(-2.02)

-0.022

(-1.67)

(-2.99)

c

0.126

0.270a

0.201

(2.03)

(0.66)

(2.52)

(0.96)

-0.367

-0.207

-0.449b

-0.320

(-1.72)

(-0.86)

(-2.47)

(-1.06)

0.192

R-squared

0.32

0.21

0.39

0.19

F-statistic

10.90a

5.89a

14.79a

4.91a

293

272

293

272

Observations
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Table 15
Supplier selling prices: Univariate analysis
Panel A of this table compares prices in supplier industries during the two years before and two years following
divestiture in a downstream industry for all supplier industries, dependent customers and non-dependent customer
groups. Panel B of this table compares prices in supplier industries during the two years before and two years
following divestiture in a downstream industry for suppliers with pivotal buyers and non-pivotal buyers. Producer
Price Index (PPI) data for supplier industries are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The PPI for
each supplier is deflated using the GDP price deflator to obtain the Real PPI (RPPI). The table includes all
divestiture industry-supplier industry pairs for which RPPI data are available. Dependent customers are supplier
industries with the top 1/5th of values for fjm, the fraction of industry j’s output sold to the downstream divesting
industry. Non-dependent customers of supplier industries include all remaining supplier industries. U.S. Census
Bureau’s 1992 and 1997 benchmark Input-Output tables are used to calculate customer dependence. T-statistics are
provided in parentheses. Pivotal buyers identify those suppliers with high fixed costs, (above median abnormal
selling, general, and administrative expense-to-sales), high pre-divestiture supplier concentration (pre-divestiture
supplier Herfindahl index greater than or equal to 1800), and as dependent (those suppliers with fmj in the top
tercile). Remaining suppliers are classified as non-pivotal buyers. Remaining suppliers are classified as non-pivotal
buyers. U.S. Census Bureau’s 1992 and 1997 benchmark Input-Output tables are used to calculate supplier
dependence. T-statistics are provided in parentheses. Bold font indicates significance at least at the 10% percent
level. The superscripts a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
Panel A
1
Before downstream divestiture
N
RPPI

2
After downstream divestiture
N
RPPI

3
Change
Δ RPPI

All supplier industries

172

176.2

159

173.2

Dependent customers

33

158.1

27

156.7

Non-dependent customers

139

180.5

132

176.6

-3.9
(-0.47)

-19.9b
(-2.45)

2.5
(0.22)

-22.4a
(-2.87)

Difference

-3.0
(-0.43)
-1.4
(-0.18)

Panel B

Pivotal buyers
Non-pivotal buyers
Difference

1
Before downstream divestiture
N
RPPI
19
171.2
153

176.8
-5.6
(-0.64)

2
After downstream divestiture
N
RPPI
18
173.6
141

173.2
0.4
(0.04)

3
Change
Δ RPPI
2.4
(0.24)
-3.6
(-0.47)
6.0
(0.49)
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Table 16
Supplier selling prices: Multivariate analysis
This table presents a multivariate analysis of selling prices in the supplier industry during the four years surrounding
the downstream divestiture event. For each supplier of a deconsolidating industry, I obtain the Producer Price Index
(PPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) starting from two years before the downstream divestiture event to
two years after the downstream divestiture event. The PPI series are adjusted for inflation using the GDP price
deflator to obtain RPPI. Columns 1-3 contain estimates of panel regressions. In Column 1 (Column 2) the data are
restricted to the 24 months preceding (following) the downstream divestiture event. Column 3 contains estimates of
the full panel of the 48-month period. The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 is the monthly RPPI in logdifferences. The dummy variable, CD, identifies divesting downstream industries that are highly dependent on
suppliers for inputs: CD equals 1 if the fraction of customer input, fjm, purchased by the downstream industry lies in
the top quintile and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable, PB, identifies supplier industries that are characterized as
having a pivotal buyer crucial to their production process: PB equals 1 if suppliers have above median abnormal
selling, general, and administrative expense-to-sales, an average pre-divestiture supplier Herfindahl index greater
than 1800, and suppliers with fmj in the top tercile; 0 otherwise. Abnormal fixed costs of an industry is defined as
that industry’s median fixed costs-to-sales ratio minus the fixed costs-to-sales ratio of the median industry in the
economy. The fixed costs-to-sales ratio is the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expense (Compustat item
189) to sales ratio (Compustat item 12). For a given supplier, the Post-Divestiture Dummy (PD) equals 1 in the
months following the downstream event and 0 for the months preceding. The control variables rppi_inp1 and
rppi_inp2 represent the real PPI of the supplier industry’s two primary inputs, again in log differences. The variable
wage represents log differences of average hourly earnings of production workers compiled by the BLS. tp, obtained
from the Federal Reserve Board, measures log differences of the real output of the manufacturing, mining, and
electric and gas utilities industries. The panel regression includes a time trend, industry dummies at the two-digit
SIC level and year dummies. T-statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors. Column 4 presents estimates of
a cross-sectional regression in which the dependent variable is a supplier industry’s average log RPPI over the two
years after the downstream divestiture minus the average log RPPI over the two years prior to the downstream
divestiture. For control variables, I calculate the change in average input prices, wages and total production in the
same manner. The explanatory variables of interest is the customer dependence dummy, CD, and pivotal buyer
dummy, PB. In Columns 4, t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit
SIC level. In all regressions, bold font indicates significance at least at the 10% percent level. The superscripts a, b,
and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Dependent variable: change in supplier
RPPI
Intercept
Customer dependence dummy (CD)
Pivotal buyer dummy (PB)
Input price 1 (rppi_inp1)
Input price 2 (rppi_inp2)
Wages (wage)
Total production (tp)

1
Panel: before
downstream
divestiture
-0.045
(-0.58)
0.000
(0.18)
0.002
(1.19)
0.559a
(5.49)
0.077b
(2.15)
0.023
(0.89)
0.139b
(2.02)

2
Panel: after
downstream
divestiture
-0.242a
(-2.79)
0.002b
(2.14)
-0.002c
(-1.76)
0.228a
(3.10)
0.062c
(1.74)
0.065b
(2.29)
0.370a
(7.07)

.21
1,871

0.35
2,524

Post-divestiture (PD)
CD x PD
PB x PD
R-squared
Observations

3
Full Panel
(difference-in
difference)
-0.151b
(-2.32)
0.001
(0.68)
0.000
(0.00)
0.310a
(4.28)
0.062b
(2.28)
0.060a
(2.67)
0.305
(6.49)
-0.001
(-0.96)
0.001
(0.39)
-0.001
(-0.82)
0.38
4,395

4
Cross-sectional

-0.010
(-0.78)
- 0.098
(-1.01)
-0.039
(-0.65)
-1.828
(-0.27)
-0.459
(-0.44)
12.047a
(17.19)
-0.144
(-0.34)

.54
29
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Table 17
Changes in supplier selling prices and customer market power prior to downstream deconsolidation
This table investigates the linkage between the change in supplier selling prices post-downstream deconsolidation
and several measures of customer pricing power. I identify the 10 most dependent suppliers of each of the 46
industries that underwent a divestiture event between 1979 and 2010. For each supplier to a deconsolidating
industry, I obtain the Producer Price Index (PPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) starting from two years
prior the downstream divestiture event to two years after the downstream divestiture event. The PPI series are
adjusted for inflation using the GDP price deflator to obtain RPPI. All six columns present estimates of the crosssectional regression in which the dependent variable is a supplier industry’s average log RPPI over the two years’
post-downstream deconsolidation minus the average log RPPI over the two years prior. The change in average input
prices (rppi_inp1 and rppi_inp2), wages (wage), and total production (tp) are calculated in a similar fashion.
cust_con is the four-firm concentration ratio of the customer industry prior to the downstream divestiture and
cust_herf its Herfindahl index. The following variables are obtained from Compustat as of the year prior to
downstream deconsolidation: cust_con is sum of sales for the top four-firms divided by industry total sales for the
customer industry, cust_herf is the sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the customer industry
calculated from Compustat business segments, cust_ks is customer industry total assets divided by customer industry
total sales, cust_capex is equal to customer industry capital expenditures divided by customer industry assets,
cust_advert is customer advertising expenses divided by customer industry total sales. t-Statistics (in parentheses)
are based on robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit SIC level. In all regressions, bold font indicates
significance at least at the 10% level. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.

Intercept
Customer 4-firm concentration ratio (cust_con)

1
-0.029
(-0.60)
0.001
(0.84)

Customer Herfindahl index (cust_herf)

2
-0.067
(-0.91)

3
0.382c
(1.85)

4
-0.056
(-0.74)

0.000
(1.12)
-0.379c
(-2.00)

Customer capital intensity (cust_ks)
Customer capital expenditures (cust_capex)

0.632
(1.00)

Customer advertising expenses (cust_advert)
Input price 1 (rppi_inp1)
Input price 2 (rppi_inp2)
Wages (wage)
Total production (tp)

Observations
R-squared

5
-0.031
(-0.49)

-6.616
(-1.22)
-0.442
(-0.41)
11.429c
(1.82)
0.675
(0.69)

-5.830
(-1.14)
-0.409
(-0.40)
11.277c
(1.82)
0.759
(0.89)

-3.394
(-0.83)
-1.794
(-1.28)
4.126
(0.60)
-1.707
(-1.20)

-6.494
(-1.14)
-0.480
(-0.42)
11.325c
(1.73)
0.321
(0.29)

1.468
(0.61)
-7.007
(-0.85)
-0.651
(-0.59)
11.161
(1.56)
1.142
(1.18)

25
0.25

25
0.26

23
0.39

23
0.25

23
0.23
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Table 18
Changes in supplier selling prices and supplier pricing power prior to downstream deconsolidation
This table investigates the linkage between the change in supplier selling prices post-downstream deconsolidation
and several measures of supplier pricing power. I identify the 10 most dependent suppliers of each of the 46
industries that underwent a divestiture event between 1979 and 2010. For each supplier to a deconsolidating
industry, I obtain the Producer Price Index (PPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) starting from two years
prior the downstream divestiture event to two years after the downstream divestiture event. The PPI series are
adjusted for inflation using the GDP price deflator to obtain RPPI. All six columns present estimates of the crosssectional regression in which the dependent variable is a supplier industry’s average log RPPI over the two years’
post-downstream deconsolidation minus the average log RPPI over the two years prior. The change in average input
prices (rppi_inp1 and rppi_inp2), wages (wage), and total production (tp) are calculated in a similar fashion. sup_con
is the four-firm concentration ratio of the supplier industry prior to the downstream divestiture and sup_herf is its
Herfindahl index. The following variables are obtained from Compustat as of the year prior to downstream
deconsolidation: sup_con is sum of sales for the top four-firms divided by industry total sales for the supplier
industry, sup_herf is the sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the supplier industry calculated from
Compustat business segments, sup_ks is supplier industry total assets divided by supplier industry total sales,
sup_capex is equal to supplier industry capital expenditures divided by supplier industry assets, sup_advert is
supplier advertising expenses divided by supplier industry total sales. t-Statistics (in parentheses) are based on
robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit SIC level. In all regressions, bold font indicates significance at least
at the 10% level. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Intercept
Supplier 4-firm concentration ratio (sup_con)

1
-0.017
(-0.45)
-0.008a
(-2.82)

Supplier Herfindahl index (sup_herf)

2
0.076
(0.66)

3
0.165
(1.49)

4
-0.048
(-.0.53)

-0.000
(-1.33)
-0.154c
(-1.73)

Supplier capital intensity (sup_ks)
Supplier capital expenditures (sup_capex)

0.717
(0.42)

Supplier advertising expenses (sup_advert)
Input price 1 (rppi_inp1)
Input price 2 (rppi_inp2)
Wages (wage)
Total production (tp)

Observations
R-squared

5
-0.076
(-1.38)

-10.612c
(-2.01)
0.279
(0.26)
36.836a
(3.08)
0.363
(0.36)

-7.253c
(-1.77)
-1.016
(-0.87)
15.138b
(2.34)
0.706
(0.70)

-7.867
(-1.63)
-0.466
(-0.42)
26.409b
(2.20)
0.460
(0.45)

-5.586
(-0.94)
-0.957
(-0.91)
10.649
(1.57)
1.046
(1.15)

8.521
(1.66)
-9.425c
(-1.77)
0.362
(0.34)
13.813b
(2.15)
0.283
(0.24)

25
0.53

25
0.32

23
0.36

23
0.23

23
0.37
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Table 19
Customer accounting based abnormal operating performance
This table presents a multivariate analysis of abnormal cash flow margins (ACFM) customer industries. ACFM of
an industry is defined as that industry’s median cash flow-to-sales ratio minus the cash flow-to-sales ratio of the
median industry in the economy. The cash flow-to-sales ratio of a firm is the ratio of operating income (Compustat
item 13) to sales (Compustat item 12). In Columns 1 and 3, the dependent variable is the average ACFM in supplier
industries over the two years preceding the upstream divestiture event. In Columns 2 and 4, the dependent variable
is the average ACFM in supplier industries over the two years following the upstream divestiture event. fmj, is the
percentage of divesting supplier industry j’s output sold to the customer industry m. Higher values of fmj indicate that
the divesting supplier industry j is more dependent on the downstream (customer) industry for buying its output. The
supplier dependence dummy equals one if the customer industry has a supplier with fmj in the top quintile and zero
otherwise. Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the supplier industry calculated
from Compustat business segments. Capital intensity is industry total assets (Compustat item 6) divided by industry
sales (Compustat item 12). Capital expenditure is the supplier industry’s total capital expenditure (Compustat item
128) divided by the industry’s total assets. Advertising expense is the supplier industry’s total advertising expense
(Compustat item 45) divided by the industry’s total sales. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the
two-digit SIC level are in parentheses. Year dummy variables used in regression (not shown). The superscripts a, b,
c and indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Intercept
Supplier dependence dummy

1
Dependent
variable:
Customer
ACFM before
downstream
divestiture
-0.034
(-1.63)
0.005
(0.12)

2
Dependent
variable:
Customer
ACFM after
downstream
divestiture
-0.150
(-1.82)
0.049c
(2.13)

fmj
Supplier Herfindahl index
Supplier capital intensity
Supplier capital expenditure
Supplier advertising expense

R-squared
F-statistic
Observations

3
Dependent
variable:
Customer
ACFM before
downstream
divestiture
-0.056a
(-4.12)

4
Dependent
variable:
Customer
ACFM after
downstream
divestiture
-0.175c
(-2.12)
0.005c
(1.97)
0.000
(1.20)
0.047c
(2.09)
0.542b
(2.81)
0.661
(0.25)
0.32
10.69a
38

-0.000b
(-2.49)
0.050a
(4.31)
0.249c
(1.87)
-3.036
(-0.93)

0.000
(1.12)
0.041
(1.59)
0.382
(1.39)
0.288
(0.12)

0.003
(1.53)
-0.000b
(-2.58)
0.054
(4.90)
0.313
(2.76)
-2.356
(-0.73)

0.33
9.03a
51

0.30
160.06a
38

0.36
9.46a
51
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Table 20
Customer market valued based abnormal operating performance
This table presents a multivariate analysis of abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets (ACFMVA) of customer
industries. ACFMVA of an industry is defined as that industry’s median cash flow-to-market value of assets ratio
minus the cash flow-to-market value of assets ratio of the median industry in the economy. The cash flow-to-market
value of assets is defined as the ratio of operating income (Compustat item 13) to the sum of the book value of total
assets (Compustat item 6), market value of equity (Compustat item 199) * (Compustat item 61), less the book value
of common equity (Compustat item 60). In Columns 1 and 3, the dependent variable is the average ACFMVA in
customer industries over the two years preceding the upstream divestiture event. In Columns 2 and 4, the dependent
variable is the average ACFMVA in customer industries over the two years following the upstream divestiture
event. fmj, is the percentage of divesting supplier industry j’s output sold to the customer industry m. Higher values
of fmj indicate that the divesting supplier industry j is more dependent on the downstream (customer) industry for
buying its output. The supplier dependence dummy equals one if the customer industry has a supplier with fmj in the
top quintile and zero otherwise. Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the
supplier industry calculated from Compustat business segments. Capital intensity is industry total assets (Compustat
item 6) divided by industry sales (Compustat item 12). Capital expenditure is the supplier industry’s total capital
expenditure (Compustat item 128) divided by the industry’s total assets. Advertising expense is the supplier
industry’s total advertising expense (Compustat item 45) divided by the industry’s total sales. t-statistics based on
robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit SIC level are in parentheses. Year dummy variables used in
regression (not shown). The superscripts a, b, c and indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively.

Intercept
Supplier dependence dummy

1
Dependent
variable:
Customer
ACFMVA
before
downstream
divestiture
-0.033
(-1.38)
0.002
(0.07)

2
Dependent
variable:
Customer
ACFMVA
after
downstream
divestiture
-0.106c
(-2.31)
0.023c
(1.95)

fmj
Supplier Herfindahl index
Supplier capital intensity
Supplier capital expenditure
Supplier advertising expense

R-squared
F-statistic
Observations

3
Dependent
variable:
Customer
ACFMVA before
downstream
divestiture
-0.046c
(-2.17)

4
Dependent
variable:
Customer
ACFMVA
after
downstream
divestiture
-0.122
(-2.64)
0.003c
(2.22)
0.000
(1.34)
0.005
(0.18)
1.346a
(8.28)
-0.447
(-0.29)
0.35
34.53a
38

-0.000
(-0.36)
0.006
(0.50)
0.547a
(5.43)
-2.033
(-0.93)

0.000
(1.19)
0.001
(0.04)
1.254a
(7.62)
-0.738
(-0.48)

0.002
(1.18)
0.000
(0.25)
0.008
(0.66)
0.588a
(5.83)
-1.602
(-0.78)

0.26
8.68a
51

0.33
17.17a
38

0.28
9.03a
51
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Table 21
Customer abnormal input cost structure
This table presents a multivariate analysis of abnormal cost-of-goods sold margins (ACGSM) of customer
industries. ACGSM of an industry is defined as that industry’s median cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio minus the
cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio of the median industry in the economy. The cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio is
defined as the ratio of cost of goods sold (Compustat item 30) to sales (Compustat item 12). In Column 1, the
dependent variable is the average ACGSM in customer industries over the two years preceding the upstream
divestiture event. In Column 2, the dependent variable is the average ACGSM in customer industries over the two
years following upstream divestiture event. fmj, is the percentage of divesting supplier industry j’s output sold to the
customer industry m. Higher values of fmj indicate that the divesting supplier industry j is more dependent on the
downstream (customer) industry for buying its output. The supplier dependence dummy equals one if the customer
industry has a supplier with fmj in the top quintile and zero otherwise. Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared
sales market shares of firms in the supplier industry calculated from Compustat business segments. Capital intensity
is industry total assets (Compustat item 6) divided by industry sales (Compustat item 12). Capital expenditure is the
supplier industry’s total capital expenditure (Compustat item 128) divided by the industry’s total assets. Advertising
expense is the supplier industry’s total advertising expense (Compustat item 45) divided by the industry’s total sales.
t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit SIC level are in parentheses. Year dummy
variables used in regression (not shown). The superscripts a, b, c and indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels respectively.

Intercept
Supplier dependence dummy
Supplier Herfindahl index
Supplier capital intensity
Supplier capital expenditure
Supplier advertising expense

R-squared
F-statistic
Observations

1
Dependent variable:
Customer ACGSM before
downstream divestiture
-0.106c
(-2.31)
0.023c
(1.95)
0.000
(1.19)
0.001
(0.04)
1.254a
(7.62)
-0.738
(-0.48)

2
Dependent variable:
Customer ACGSM after
downstream divestiture
-0.050
(-0.41)
0.091
(0.99)
0.000
(1.19)
-0.041
(-0.98)
1.015
(1.34)
-9.444c
(-1.94)

0.33
17.17a
51

0.35
5.19b
38
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This dissertation is the first to study the product effect of horizontal divestitures on upstream and
downstream firms. This first essay examines product market impact of a sample of horizontal asset sales
from 1988 to 2005 on corporate customers, suppliers, and industry rivals. I create a sample of firms that
classifies corporate customers, suppliers, and industry competitors of firms proposing horizontal asset
sales, and employ this data set to investigate the wealth effects at announcement. This study also
considers post-divestiture changes in abnormal operating performance for divesting firms, customers, and
suppliers.
I document evidence that divestiture related wealth effects for divesting parent firms are
associated with efficiencies resulting from the reduction of firm bureaucracy I provide evidence that
managers must balance post-divestiture productivity gains with potential declines in profitability due to
reduced bargaining power with suppliers. Unlike prior evidence from vertical divestitures (Jain, Kini, and
Shenoy, 2011), this study documents that parent firm divestiture gains are not shared by their industry
rivals, corporate customers and suppliers. I also find that these events have negative implications for the
valuation of industry rivals, corporate customers, and certain subsamples of suppliers. In addition, the
evidence suggests that factors such as customer (supplier) switching costs and industry structure tend to
play an important role in the wealth effects of customers (suppliers) at announcement of upstream
(downstream) divestitures.
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The second essay of my dissertation investigates this topic by exploring quarterly horizontal
divestiture activity at the industry level by aggregating firm level divestitures by industry using a sample
of horizontal divestitures from 1979-2010. This essay documents the opportunistic behavior of certain
product market participants, such as customers and suppliers, in the context of horizontal divestitures. I
perform an extensive empirical cross-industry investigation of the product market effects of horizontal
divestitures on supplier (customer) industries via their impact on profitability, value, and prices
(profitability, value, and input costs).
The second essay presents evidence that opportunistic customers exploit supplier dependence in
the years following significant upstream divestiture activity. As a result, these customers enjoy significant
increases in profitability, value, and a considerable decline in input costs relative to customers of nondependent suppliers. Additionally, I also find that suppliers with pivotal buyers suffer unfavorable
changes in profitability and value in the years subsequent to downstream divestiture activity relative to
suppliers with non-pivotal buyers. This evidence suggests that pivotal buyers capitalize on significant
downstream divestiture activity to reverse their pivotal position and eliminate cross-subsidization by
suppliers and non-pivotal buyers within their industry.
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